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INTRODUCTION
The task of writing a contemporary history is sur
rounded by more than the ordinary difficulties common to
any scholarly effort.

Scarcely a month passes without

the publication of letters, memoirs, biographies or other
evidence which may supplement or refute what has previously
been accepted as fact.

Also political shifts--a presi

dential election campaign, a war or domestic economic
unrest--often alter perspectives as to the wisdom of past
policies.
The twentieth century historian in writing on the
causes of recent wars has enjoyed one advantage.

In

earlier times, the archives or repositories of belliger
ent nations have been closed to non-official readers
for a period of forty to eighty years after cessation
of hostilities.^

This was not the case, however, after

World War I, yet the historian, during the first years,
had access to only a limited and edited amount of infor^
mation.

A radical change occurred after I92O when many

of the national archives of the erstwhile belligerent
powers were opened to scholars.

It was inevitable that

a drastic revision of judgments reached during the war
would follow the publication of so much new evidence.
^Harry E. Barnes, History and Social Intelligence
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, I926), p. 22?.
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Historians who had written without reserve during and
immediately after the war saw themselves confronted
with the need of revising their own Judgments or having
others do the Job for them.
A case in point was the American historian during
and after World War I.

Prior to the American entry in

1917, public opinion in the United States was divided.
The declaration of war, however, forced the consensus
of the American people along one line with one ultimate
goal, the complete defeat of the Central Powers.

To

assure an united home front, the government set out
through the use of propaganda and censorship to mold
dissident groups into a conforming public amenable to
the successful prosecution of the war.
Propagandizing by official and private agencies in
the United States, to say nothing of the innumerable
pressures exerted upon the public mind from without
the country, was probably a necessary evil accompanying
the war, but the vicious hatreds and prejudices engen
dered by that device made the task of contemporary his
torians, particularly those writing on the origins of
the war while hostilities were in progress, doubly
difficult.

In the frenzied atmosphere of war, scholars

were frequently caught up in the mass hysteria and made
concrete observations without the advantage of essential
perspectives.

The publication of the secret documentary

evidence bearing on the war's beginnings confronted them
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with the need for revision of the wartime verdict of
responsibility.

The label of "revisionism" has been

applied to the work of the historians who challenged
the wartime Interpretation of responsibility for World
War I, but. In a broader sense, all historians are re
visionists .
A study of the writings of American scholars on

the question of the origins of the war logically must
be divided Into two broad phases.

The first Includes

works written while the authors were subject to wartime
pressures, propaganda and a marked shortage of substantial
evidence and roughly spans the years 191I1-I92O.

The

second phase, the revisionist period beginning about 1920,
followed the unprecedented openings of national archives
after the war and witnessed an Increasing acceptance In
America and the world at large of the revisionist posi

tion on the origins of the war.

CHAPTER I

INTELLECTUAL CLIMATE, I91I1-I92O
Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, signed
June 28, 1919, reads as follows:
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm
and Germany accepts, the responsibility of her
self and her allies for causing all the loss and
damage to which Allied and Associated Governments
and their nationals have been subjected as a con
sequence of the war imposed upon them by the
aggression of Germany and her allies.
This is the famous or infamous "war guilt" clause
upon which were based the Allied demands for reparations
and which, by implication, sanctioned the entire treaty.
It was generally assumed in the United States and in
other Entente nations that Germany, by her acquiescence
in such an indictment, admitted her guilt and ended
for all time the debate over the responsibility for
precipitating World War I.
from the case.

Nothing could have been further

On the contrary, neither the German

nation nor a great body of historians, variously called
revisionists or debunkers, was ready to accept the
signing as final proof of Germany’s guilt.
In 1919, however, Germany had no choice except to
subscribe to a verdict in which she had no faith.

The

German people as a whole were certain that they had not
willed the war.

German diplomats and statesmen, while

recognizing certain omissions and blunders, likewise
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were not conscious of having charted a course which
aimed at war.

The German signature on the Treaty of

Versailles hence could only be involuntary— extorted
at the point of a bayonet.

It was inevitable that Ger

many from the first advocated a closer examination of
the evidence, convinced that the verdict was open to
modification.
American historians generally were ready to accept
and defend the judgment of the Allies.

Wartime emotions

and the lack of evidence to the contrary made them
susceptible to interpretations which in retrospect seem
crude and infantile.

It is necessary to examine the

climate and bounds within which the historian moved.
By 191^, historical scholarship generally had
attained a high degree of impartiality.

Patriotic senti

ments the world over had been subordinated to a desire
to tell the truth.

Then came the World War, and history

was set back, in psychological temper, to the generation
before Ranke.

Historians of repute in all nations were

guilty of succumbing to the popular ardor sweeping the
world.

It was in the United States, however, that the

largest number of eminent scholars "broke loose from
their intellectual moorings and outdid Bancroft in
enthusiasm.
^Harry E. Barnes, A History of Historical Writing
(Norman; University of Oklahoma Press, 193#), P. 279*
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That the student of history may become affected by
biases arising from religion, race, nationality, partisan
zeal or economic attachments is a generalization which
might be applied to the historiography of any period but
which is even more true during periods of international
tension.

After the decision of the United States govern

ment to enter the war in 1^17, the American historian
was more than ever apt to succumb to any or all of these
pitfalls in his search for the truth.

Furthermore, it

goes without saying that even the most scholarly histor
ian is likely to become group-conditioned, a fact which
was illustrated graphically by the behavior of American
historians and pseudo-historians during the war years.
Many of these, #10 had shown remarkable poise in handling
such controversial subjects as the American Revolution
or the Civil War, showed now that they had not the
courage to oppose public opinion and rode a crest of
popularity by reiterating what was being said on street
corners across the nation.

In the frenzied atmosphere

of American neutrality and particularly after the entry
of the United States into the war, authors were caught
up in the mass hysteria brought on by the dissemination
of propaganda and made their Interpretations without
the advantage of an objective perspective.
History when you are in the midst of it is
always nearly Intolerable to the sensitive. It
is only when a period is over and everything has
been burned away that we can stand it. That is
because we see the form and direction, and at the

same time, we do not know what it was like to
live in it.
At the outset, there can be little doubt that
United States public opinion generally favored the
Entente in the European war.

If the press can be con

sidered an accurate reflection of American consensus,
and in this case, it probably can, the American people
overwhelmingly favored the Allies,

A nation-wide survey

of editors in 191^ showed 367 pro-Ally and only 20
in favor of the Central Powers.^

In 191^» President

Wilson’s public utterances were models of neutrality,
although he was privately "heart and soul for the
Allies,"^

His pleas for neutrality in both thought and

deed were a difficult, if not an impossible, achieve
ment to attain given the circumstances.

While their

sympathies were with the Allies, the vast majority
of Americans nevertheless hoped that their country
might remain aloof from the European conflict.

As late

as 1916, President Wilson received a mandate from the
people to continue his policy which had "kept us out
of war,"

The ardent wish for neutrality expressed widely

in the United States stemmed probably from two sources,
^Harold Lavine and James Weschler, War Propaganda
and the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1940), p, ix.
^Harvey Wish, Contemporary America (New York:
Harpers & Bros,, 1955)> P • 190*
^H*C, Peterson, Propaganda for War (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1939), P» I90.
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the traditional position in regard to European disputes
and the official stand taken by the President.
One segment of American society, however, was vocal
in its partiality toward the Entente powers--the acade
micians, whose number was relatively small but whose
influence was great.

Into this group, the intelligentsia,

would fall the most influencial of American historians.
Probably representative of the historical profession in

1914 was Dr. Roscoe Thayer who replied to President
Wilson's plea for neutrality in an extremely unneutral
fashion:
Only a moral eunuch could be neutral in the
sense implied by the malefic dictum of the Presi
dent of the United States...I have noticed in
this crisis that the men who boasted of being
impartial were either pro-German, or they had no
hearts to beat faster although the fate of man
kind hung in the balance.^
That Thayer's sentiments represented those of the
majority of the American historical profession is in
dicated by his election, despite the protests of
Professors Ferdinand Schevill of Chicago and Henry A.
Sill of Cornell, as president of the American Histor
ical Association shortly before the declaration of war
on Germany.
Besides pressures from within the country, the war
time historian had to contend with propaganda emanating
from each of the opposing European camps.

Although Ger-

^C. Hartley Grattan, "The Historian Cut Loose,"
The American Mercury. XI, No. l+Ij. (August, I927), ^17»
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many invested millions of dollars In a propaganda
campaign to induce the United States to consider the
attributes of remaining neutral, the British propaganda
machine far overshadowed anything the Germans could
muster.

The English "war of words" was propaganda in the

broadest sense of the word.

News, money and political

pressure each played a part in the battle which was
fought not only in London, Washington and New York, but
also in classrooms and pulpits throughout the United
States.

The campaign was so designed that American pas

sions and emotions would become involved to an extent that
neutrality would become a virtual impossibility.^
Toward attaining this objective, the Allies had a
tremendous advantage over the Central Powers.

Count von

Bernstorff, German ambassador to the United States during
the years of neutrality, once said that the Anglo-Saxon
heritage and language barrier were two factors with which
the German propagandists were never able to cope.

In

addition to these two very powerful advantages, the English
were able to take advantage of the German example of
how not to conduct their campaign.

Realizing the immense

value of the written and spoken word, the German govern
ment established its official propaganda headquarters
in New York City.
blunder.

They committed nearly every possible

They were far too open with their operations--

too negligent of tact and finesse.
^Peterson, p. I|_.

In short, the Germans
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were never able to gauge public opinion; they were always
logical but never psychological,? and their efforts back
fired and ultimately seriously damaged their cause.

What

the Germans did not understand was that the effectiveness
of propaganda depends upon the expert munipulation of
genuine sympathies, not on bribery.

More than anything

else, their campaign was compromised from the outset since
there were few sympathies with which they could work save
those of the Irish and German-Americans.
Serving as an additional obstacle with which the
German propagandists had to grapple before they could
hope to attain any degree of success was the fact that
prior to the war, few American newspapers had had
correspondents in Europe.

As a result, Americans

were forced to rely almost exclusively upon British
journalists for their news of Europe, and that news
was unavoidably colored by the British attitude.

The

more Anglicized the news the historian read, the more
certain appeared the veracity of the incomplete docu
ments on hand.

The German activity in Belgium, as

reported by the Anglo-American press, seemed to bear
out the most insidious of the Entente charges.
As if the American people were not already getting
more than enough of the British point of view in their
daily news diet, the Royal Navy, on August 5» 191^, cut
?George Viereck, Spreading
Germs
of Hate (New
______ g ueri
York: H. Liveright & Co’., I930T, p. II6 .
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the cable between the United States and Germany.

Now,

with the perfection of the wireless still a matter of
months in the future, American newspapers were com
pletely dependent upon English newsgatherers, and the
American historian did not get even his occasional dis
patch out of Germany to temper the pro-Entente news
releases.

The cutting of the cable came at a time when

public opinion in the United States was crystallizing,
and the Germans were never able to catch up.

When normal

communications between this country and Germany were re
stored, it did little to affect public opinion.

"The

first publication is that which is formative of pub
lic opinion and affects public emotion."®
The efforts of the few correspondents who were in
Europe representing American newspapers proved to be
of little avail in trying to present "the other side
of the story" since most of their copy passed through
the British mail censors.

Associated Press correspon

dent Schreiner estimated that three-fourths of the dis

patches written by American newspaper and magazine
correspondents were "perishing under the shears of
English censors."^
The above represented only the negative steps
taken by the British government pursuant to the first
®Peterson, p. I4.6 .
^Walter Millis, The Road to War, America, 191^-

1917 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935)> P* l47.
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positive step in September, I91I4.

In that month, the

War Propaganda Bureau was established in a London
edifice known as Wellington House, the name by which
the organization has since been popularly known.

Sir

Gilbert Parker was placed in charge of the subdivision
directing propaganda in the United States, and he pro
ceeded to take up where Shakespeare, Chaucer and Byron
had left off.

Wellington House, which existed con

currently with numerous other quasi-official and
independent propaganda agencies, busily engaged itself
in the dissemination of literature in the United States.
Ironically enough, many of the publications which re
ceived wide circulation in America at the behest of the
British propaganda machine were the very ones which
the American Historical Review recommended to its
subscribers as being of such "character as to deserve
the student's attention.
Allied propagandists fashioned their appeal to all
classes, but of prime importance were the intellectuals.

With this respected segment of the populace adhering to
the Allied cause, the British hoped others would follow.
In the final analysis, the English plans called for
American recruits to do the actual field work in the
United States, and it was for this reason that the
^^Am^rican Historical Review, XX, No, 2 (January,
This comment was made in reference to a
list of early publications purporting to relate the
origins of the war including Why We Are at War by members
of the Oxford faculty of modern history. See below.

1915)» 4^2.
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historian,

journalist and politician was each subjected

to an extra measure of British pressure.

Although the

written word was a powerful weapon In the British cam
paign to sew the American literati firmly to the Allied
camp. It was not the only device resorted to by the
masters of propaganda.

Both the English and French

entertained American men of Influence regally In their
respective countries, the British soon outstripping
their continental cohorts.

American newspapermen and

Interpreters of the European scene were wined and dined
In the best of English tradition.
Most United States citizens Invited abroad by
Wellington House were admittedly lukewarm supporters
of the Entente when they left New York City.

When they

returned from their all-expense paid sojourns, during
which they were treated to "proof" of German atrocities
In the form of Allled-gulded tours of the Belgian
battlegrounds, they were violently pro-Entente.

By the

end of 1915, all but a small portion of the nation's men
of letters had been successfully recruited to the Allied
camp.

Strangely enough, many of these very men had

earlier recognized Allied propaganda for what It was-a force to be reckoned wlth--and repeatedly announced
that they would not be swayed by the English and French
efforts.

It may be coincidental, but those who Initially

had borne the brunt of the Allied propagandizing efforts
were those who first fell victim to the psychological
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trap.11
How the British obtained the names of prominent
Americans at whom their propaganda might be most profit
ably directed would make an Interesting study In Itself.
After his appointment as director of the American
branch of Wellington House, Sir Gilbert Parker proceeded
to carefully analyse American public opinion through
newspapers and periodicals.

On the basis of his study

and through a discriminate use of Who’s Who, Parker
was able to compile a mailing llst.^^

It was these men

who, knowingly or not, kept the British Informed as
to the course of American public opinion so that they
were always aware just how far their government might
go In violation of American neutral rights before
Invoking the wrath of the people.

Clearly, this was a

facet of propaganda to which German psychologists
had given little thought.
Some of the best ammunition for Wellington House
came from the pens of American writers.

There Is, however,

little evidence to support a charge of widespread collusion
between American authors and British propagandists.
more suitable explanation for the similarity between
the wartime writing In the United States and the
official line of Wellington House Is the American
Ü Q . Hartley Grattan, Why We Fought (New York:
The Vanguard Press, I929 ), p. 62.
^^Davld Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd
George (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. , 1933)> ÏÏ1 113.

A
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cultural heritage which compelled writers in this
country to emulate their British colleagues.

The two

exceptions where the British actually underwrote the
expenses incurred in the dissemination of works by
Americans were James M. Beck’s The Evidence in the
Case and The American Verdict on the War by Samuel
H.

Church.
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While these were the only two examples

of open Anglo-American literary cooperation, there
can be little doubt that Parker and company welcomed
the prolific output by a whole "school" of American
historians and would-be historians who insisted on
delving into the causes of the war before adequate
documentary evidence was available to tell the whole
story.

It might be mentioned that the American Histor

ical Review cited Beck’s book as one of the better
secondary sources on the background of the war and
condoned the 1915 position of the ex-United States
Attorney General with the comment, "Enough documentary
evidence is available to make a judgment permissible,
even to the historian.
The immediate purpose of the intensive British
propaganda campaign was to create an atmosphere
compatible with the allocation of United States economic
IS

James D. Squires, British Propaganda at Home and
in the United States, IÇlIpJlçib (Cambridge; Harvard
University Press, 1935), p^ 16'.
^^American Historical Review. XX, No. 3 (April,
1915), 694-95.
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aid.

The ultimate objective, of course, was that the

economic aid would be followed by men and machines of
war.

To accomplish both the short and long run objectives,

it was mandatory that an ordinary power conflict appear as
a life and death struggle between good and evil.

Beyond

this, the Allied "mission" must be made to appear synony
mous to that of the United States.

Since the interests of

Great Britain and America--the salvation of the world
for democracy--were ostensibly identical, was it not
natural that they should be members of the same team
at Armageddon?

To those who subscribed to the English

"mission" line, the presence of Russia, the most
autocratic of all European nations, on the team must
have led to no end of uneasiness.

Still, Russia was

a Christian nation, and to the near-sighted individuals
propounding the "Holy War" myth, her adherence to the
Entente could be reconciled.
By culling from the writings of the "Prussian
School" of historians, notably Traitschke and Droysen,
Allied propagandists, supplemented by the works of
American historians, were able to convince the American
masses that Germany perpetrated the war in the inter
est of Prussian autocracy and was prosecuting it with
a calculated brutality.

The speech differences between

the United States and Germany and the clannishness of
German-Americans were played to the hilt in an effort
to convince the American public that the German nation
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inherently stood against everything held dear by citizens
of the free world.
The ’’Holy War” or ’’crusade to save the world for
democracy” line was particularly appealing to Protestant
ministers of the Gospel, and they proved to be an
excellent media through which the seeds of racism were
sown among the masses.

President Wilson also proved

highly susceptible to the ’’righteous" cause preached
by the progenitors of the holy war line.^^

The propa

gandist, be he British or an unwitting tool of the
British in the guise of an American scholar, aimed
directly at emotion since,

in the final analysis, emo-

tion is the common denominator of all propaganda.
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Always opportunistic, the British propaganda
machine directed its efforts along two additional
lines.

By effective use of the legalistic appeal,

always attractive in the United States, many Americans
were convinced that since Germany had broken the law
when she invaded neutral Belgium, she must be punished,
and it was the place of the United States as one of the
guardians of international law to participate in the
administration of justice.

Another objective for which the

British propagandists strove in the early months of the war
was the creation of an atmosphere of confidence regarding
Alex M. Arnett, Claude Kitchen and the Wilson War
Policies (Boston; Little, Brown & Co., I927), p. 121.
l?Squires, p. 38 .
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an eventual Allied victory.

Such a belief was basic

to the success of the overall British plan since it was
unlikely that the United States would invest either
economically or militarily in a losing cause.
By all odds, the most notable achievement of the

early efforts of Wellington House in the United States
was the general acceptance of the myth of sole German
war guilt.

Despite the fact that the fable was exploded

by serious historians in the 1920's, American education
has been seriously blighted by the earlier interpreta
tion until the present day.

It was not only the American

public that fell victim to the British assertion but also
the great majority of American historians.

The British

cry of guilty was echoed by Americans in all walks of
life until the verdict was accepted as fact.

There was

little the Germans could offer in rebuttal.
To the host of American historians writing in I914,
the Sarajevo incident came like a deluge.

’’BangJ went

Principes pistol...and bangJ went all the professors.”
By the end of July, the historians were firing.

By the

end of August, they were in "violent e r r u p t i o n . T h e
few American historians who kept their intellectual
equilibrium such as Professors Sill of Cornell, Schevill
and Thompson of Chicago, and Sheperd of Columbia were
denounced as "intellectual traitors."^9
l^Grattan, The American Mercury, XI, No.
l^Barnes, A History of.... p. 279*

1|15*

19
Beginning with German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg’s
unfortunate slip of the tongue in referring to the
treaty guaranteeing Belgian territorial integrity as
a ’’scrap of paper” and continuing throughout the war,
German actions, as portrayed by historians and journal
ists alike, seemed to bear out the guilty indictment.
As George Viereck so aptly put it, ’’World War I began
with a ’scrap of paper’ and ended with a million scraps
of paper.”^0
It is impossible in a paper dealing primarily
with historical interpretation to examine minutely
the expert techniques employed by British propagandists
to seduce the American public into the Entente camp.
Suffice to say that the British used all of the propa
ganda gimicks then known to man and added a few of their
own such as the fabrication of pictorial evidence.
President Wilson, like his countrymen, was in
fluenced by the atrocity stories out of Belgium.

This

was particularly true after the circulation of the
famous Bryce Report.

PI

Of all living Englishmen, Viscount

James Bryce, the de Tocqueville of the twentieth century,
was perhaps the most trusted by the President and the
academicians.

When Bryce sponsored the fabrications,

^^Viereck, p. 22.
21
Report of the Committee on Alleged German Out
rages Appointed by His Majesty’s Government and Presided
over by Lord Bryce (Cd. 789^-95) London: His Majesty’s
Stationery Office, 1915*
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there could be little doubt in the veracity of the charges
against the Germans, and the Report was received as gospel
in 191s .22
While excesses such as those listed in the Bryce
Report undoubtedly existed in varying degrees, "every
scrap of evidence serves to exonerate the German army
of the

c

h

a

r

g

e

s

,

"23

indeed, the record of the German

soldiers in Belgium was amazingly clean.

On September

3, 1914* five American newspapermen who accompanied
the invading German armies in Belgium dispatched the
following message to the Associated Press;
In spirit CofJ fairness we unite in declaring
German atrocities groundless as far as we were
able to observe... unable to report single instance
unprovoked reprisal...Discipline German soldiers
excellent. No drunkeness...To truth these state
ments we pledge professional personal w o r d . 4
By the time of the Sussex incident in I916, the
American public, for the most part, was convinced that
all that had been said about the "Huns" was true, and
a veritable war hysteria swept the nation.

With the

"rape" of Belgium, Allied propagandists had begun a
hate campaign, and the harvest of their efforts was
now about to be reaped.

If it did not prove the pen

was mightier than the sword, it at least showed it
could be a powerful supplement to it.
22vsfillard Waller (ed.). War in the Twentieth
Century (New York: Random House, 19lfO), p. 39.
23Lavine and Weschler, p. 2?.
24lbid., p. 27 .
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Besides being subjected to a general feeling of
hostility toward the Central Powers and innumerable
psychological pressures exerted from without the nation
which he might consciously or unconsciously allow to
color his narrative, the American historian exploring the
war guilt problem faced yet another obstacle in his quest
for the truth— a decided paucity of reliable information.
To what could the scholar, particularly the far-removed
American historian of 191^-1920, look if he wished to assess
the relative responsibility for precipitating the war.
He could investigate the diplomatic dispatches and con
ventions to which the various European states were sig
natory after the Franco-Prussian War.

What the American

historian did not know in 19^4 > however, was that the
"open covenant" with which President Wilson was later so
preoccupied had not been held in particularly high esteem
by any of the European powers after I 87I.

If the American

historian had had all available documentary evidence at
his fingertips, which, incidentally, few of them did, he
could still do no better than approximate the truth.

If

he wished to ply his trade objectively in searching for the
causes of the war, he would have to refrain from inter
preting the evidence until it was all in.
Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe,
the American Historical Review quite properly warned its
subscribers to beware of any publication purporting to
relate the history of the war's origins before it was
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humanly possible to do so.

The position of the Journal

would have been defensible had it stopped there, but it
did not.

In succeeding issues, the Review recommended

certain collections of documents and secondary sources
which, because of their character or the standing of their
authors, deserved the scholar’s attention.

That the

standing of an author has very little to do with the
veracity of a particular work written expressly for the
purpose of substantiating the righteousness of his nation’s
actions before the public of the world’s largest neutral
can hardly be debated.

Witness Why We Are at War^^ or

the work of Lord Bryce.
As for the collections of government documents, the
Historical Review recommended the British Blue Book,^^
the first of the so-called colored books, in which was
published only what the British government felt was fit
for neutral and domestic consumption.

If what the

American Historical Review recommended to its sub
scribers can be taken as an index of what American
historians were subjected to as reliable sources in
the early war years, it is small wonder that few German
apologists could be found among American scholars before

1920.

The truth was that the British Blue Book, no more

Z^Members of the Oxford faculty of Modern History.
Why We Are at War. Oxford: Clarendon Press, igi^. See below.
^°Great Britain and the European Crisis, Correspon
dence, and Statements in Parliament, together with an
Introductory Narrative of Events. London: His Majesty’s
Stationery Office, 191^.
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than the early official statements of the other belliger
ents, offered much in the way of concrete evidence.

It

was somewhat less than complete and carefully edited.
Only in the third decade of this century, after revolu
tions had shaken several of the erstwhile belligerent
governments, were the archives opened to historians.

It

was then evident how much had been omitted in the early
official papers.

If any account of the origins of the

war written before I919 at the very earliest had even
a close approximation to the truth, it was only because
of the superior guessing power of the historian, not
because he held superior documentary evidence.
It might be contended that undue attention has
been accorded Allied propaganda in a study devoted
primarily to historical interpretation.

The charge

that propaganda has not been given the place it deserves
in allocating the reasons which prompted American action
in 1917, however, is probably valid.

If it can be

assumed that Allied propaganda played a part in the
ultimate American decision to go to war, it is equally
certain that the psychological weapons utilized by
England in her war of words exercised a profound influ
ence upon American historians then publishing.

The barb

fact is that British propaganda showed the way, and
many American historians of the period 191^-1920
obediently followed.
What emanated from the typewriters of American
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scholars during the war years bearing on the origins of
the war, particularly after I9I 7 when writers were
subjected to pressures of George Creel's Committee
of Public Information, could as well have been spoken
or written in England or France.

Despite the President's

plea for neutrality, the literati little more than
echoed the extremely unneutral sentiments of British
and French scholars.

This is Justification enough for

a discussion of British propaganda techniques and their
effect in a study devoted to the investigation and
comparison of two phases of American historical writing.
The literary output of the period 1914-1920, historically
speaking, overwhelmingly favored the Entente.

This can

be explained in part by the scarcity of reliable infor
mation, but it does not excuse the vindictiveness and
malice with which most American historians writing on
the origins of the war approached the problem of respon
sibility.
After the United States entry, that vindictiveness
became even more apparent than it had theretofore been.
With the declaration of war came the need for mobiliza
tion both militarily and intellectually.

In I917, the

American historical profession submitted itself almost
unanimously to the "high" uses of the Creel Committee.
Leadership in preparing the invective against Germany
came from professional historians Thayer, Chevalier Hazen,
William S. Davis, Munroe Smith, A. Bushnell Hart and
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Bernadette E, Schmitt, all of whose services were enlisted
by the National Security League, a propagandistic sub
sidiary of the CPI.

In addition, a list of occasional

contributors to the "Red, White and Blue" series would
Include such illustrious scholars as: Beard, Barnes,
Becker, Corwin, Pay and West.

Their contribution to the

war effort was "one of the most stupendous jobs of popular
scholarship that this country has ever seen."^?
Unsatisfied with the already heavily biased out
put by the historians, George Creel and James T. Shotwell,
professor of history at Columbia University, collectively
conceived a National Board for History Service to line
up historians for the Allied cause.
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Conformity of

thought was to be the by-word; when Professors John W.
Burgess and William M. Sloane pleaded for consideration
of the German case, they were labeled suspect by their
colleagues.
For their meritorious service on behalf of the
Entente, American historians were rewarded handsomely.
Hazen was delegated by Creel to edit German sources
upon which the wartime historians leaned heavily to
substantiate their theses.

The standard American high

school text on European history was Hazen's, and the
ideas he propounded there were later expanded and embodied
27james Robert Mock and Cedric Larson, Words that
Won the War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, l939)»
p." 159.
2^Barnes, A History of..., p. 280.
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In his Fifty Years of Europe. In the years following
the peace, Hazen served as an exchange professor to the
University of Strasbourg where, to his chagrin, he
found the Alsaciens less contented under the French
than they had been under the

G e r m a n s ,

Besides the

material rewards heaped upon the "kept" historians,
acclamation came in other forms.

For nearly a decade

after the war, the presidents of the American Histor
ical Association were selected from those who had most
advanced the Entente cause during the war,^0
When the historian takes it upon himself to search
for the causes of an event as cataclysmic as the World
War, he accepts a moral responsibility to tell the whole
truth and nothing but the truth.

It cannot be denied

that the earlier war guilt scholars were hampered from
the beginning by the fact that the documents necessary
to assess properly the relative responsibility for
causing the war remained hidden in the archives of the
belligerent powers.

But this factor does not detract

from the contention that those writers who delved into
the causes of the war before it was possible to approxi
mate the truth failed in a grave responsibility to their
own and succeeding generations.
If there is any substance in the assertion that the
^^Grattan, The American Mercury. XI, No, ij-Ij., i|l5*
^^Barnes, A History of..,, p, 280.
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United States might have averted Involvement In World
War I, and It Is the opinion of many students of the
subject that there Is, American historians, as Interpreters
of the events leading to the war, must shoulder at least
a part of the responsibility for the United States entry.
One of the most Important reasons for American Implica
tion In "Europe's War" was the state of mind In the
United States— a product of British propaganda In the
first Instance and later of American historical Inter
pretation.
In general, historical activity In the United States
during the war was characterized by a high degree of
jingoism and patriotic slanting of effort. Intellectual
cooperation with the war effort and the readjustment
of traditional American historical views which placed
the allies of the United States In an unfavorable light.
^^Mathew A. Pltzslmons, Alfred G. Pandt and Charles
E. Novell (eds.). The Development of Historiography
(Harrisburg: The Stackpole Co., 195^)» p. ^20.

CHAPTER II
THE ORIGINS OP WORLD WAR I AS VIEWED
BY AMERICAN HISTORIANS, I91I4-I92O

The ensuing chapter is devoted to a discussion of
American war guilt scholars writing in the period ranging
roughly from 191^ through I92O and to the interpretations
they assigned the events leading to the outbreak of
hostilities in 191^1»

While each of the writers considered

approached the problem from a slightly different angle,
enough homogeneity exists among them that they may be
distinguished from their colleagues publishing after I92O
who were concerned with the same problem.

Before examin

ing the specific works of early American students of
responsibility, however, a brief survey of the type of
source material then available is in order.
During the war and in the years immediately there
after, the discussion of responsibility rested largely on
national prejudices and intuition.

Beyond this, those

who discussed the origins of the war relied on the in
complete collections of government documents, the ’’colored
books.”

Of these, the British Blue Book was the most

complete, but even that apology left a good deal unsaid
that might have reflected unfavorably on the British actions

28

29
of

The Incomplete and unofficial German apology,^

primarily intended for a German audience, was designed
to convince the people that the war was forced upon the
Central Powers by Russia.

It was a convincing statement

of the German position and had the desired affect within
the country.

Never Intended as a complete exposition of

the German case, however, the obvious gaps in the German
statement conveyed the worst possible impression outside
Germany.
The English and German apologies of 191^ were followed
in rapid order by statements from Russia, Belgium, Serbia,
France and Austria.

None of the 191^ apologies, sub

sequent research was to prove, were complete; all were to
a greater or lesser extent misleading.

Because of the

scarcity of documentary evidence from which the whole
story of the w a r ’s origins might be gleaned, American
scholars investigating responsibility accepted some primary
and secondary sources as fact without the advantage of
comparisons by which the reliability of such sources might
be checked.
Besides the "colored books," one of the principal
sources of information on which American students of the
background of the war relied were "eye-witness" accounts
of the European scene which purported to relate the pro-

^German White Book. Aktenstucke zum Kriegsausbruch.
Dem deutschen Reichstag vorgelegt am Ij.. Ü. ’li|.7 lÆit
nachtraglichen ErgSnzungenI Berlin; Liebheit, 191^.
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gresslon toward war as It occurred.

At the same time

publications like Why We Are at War, written by the six
Oxford scholars, were utilized by American writers almost
as primary source material.

The value of a publication

such as the one written by the learned professors,
according to the American Historical Review, lay in the
"character and standing" of its authors.

An examination

of the contents of the volume published in 191^ will
quickly invalidate the contention that the thesis of the
book was in any way affected by the "character" of its
authors.

Having received the blessing of the American
2
Historical Review, it is probably safe to assume the book
was widely read by American historians.

Its importance

for purposes of this study lies principally in the fact
that the interpretation presented by the Oxford historians
was widely reiterated by American scholars publishing in
the ensuing years.
The authors chose the Franco-Prussian War as a starting
point from which to examine the events leading to World
War I.

A knowledge of the remote causes of the war, the

Oxford professors contended, was essential before the
immediate causes could be viewed in their proper per
spective and before the student of history could hope
to understand why Austria-Hungary and Germany "threw down
the glove" to France and Russia and why England intervened
p
American Historical Review, XX, No. 2 (January,

1915 )
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not only as the "protector” of neutral Belgium but as a
friend of France.^
Throughout the period which gave birth to the rival
alliance systems on the European continent, England was
portrayed as innocence personified, yielding at every
turn in an effort to placate the adolescent German nation,
which suffered from a bad case of growing pains.

The

Triple Alliance was the grand cause of the war because it
inspired over-confidence in Germany and the Dual Monarchy
leading them to press their claims both east and west with
an intolerable disregard for the law of nations.
France, the authors conceded, started the continental
armaments race with the Soulager Law of 1886 whereby the
French peacetime army was raised to $D0,000 men, but
Germany soon outstripped her western neighbor, and the

Franco-Russian alliance was the only alternative for
France which faced a nation whose peacetime strength
stood at 5>400,000 in IÇl^.^

Although the armament con

test sounded the alarm well in advance of 19l4 > the carte
blanche Germany presented Austria was evidence enough that
the "startling" events of 191^ had been planned well in
advance of the assasination of the Austrian heir apparent.
The war in which England was then engaged, the invec
tive continued, was fundamentally a war between two different
^Members of the Oxford faculty of Modern History,
Why We Are at War (Oxford; Clarendon Press, I91I)-), p. 29.
^Ibid., pp. ij-O-^E
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principles, raison d'etat and the rule of law.

"One

regards international covenants as 'scraps of paper,'
while the other regards the maintenance of such covenants
as a grave and inevitable obligation."

England stood

for the idea of a public law of Europe and for the small
nations which it protected.

"Our interest is in Right.

We are fighting for Right, because Right is our supreme
interest."^

Nothing short of the German attack on Belgium

could have drawn England in on the French side.

The

average Englishman in IÇl^ could not believe that German
statesmanship had degenerated to piracy; the proof was not
long in coming and the ultimatum was dispatched to Germany.
England, according to the authors, took the only
course compatible with honor.

The Triple Entente was

fulfilling a mission--the destruction of military anarchy.
Russia, who had been forced to accept humiliation at the
hands of the Dual Monarchy in the Bosnian crisis of I 908,
had no choice in keeping with her traditional position as
protector of the Balkan Slavs but to accept the challenge
offered by Austria.

Since the new Russian constitution

was "Anglophile," the Oxford scholars felt Russia's natural
place in the alliance system was with England and France in
the pursuance of the common cause of international arbitra
tion and disarmament.

"Duty and interest compel the Allies

^Members of the Oxford faculty, p. IO 8.
6Ibid.. p. 117.
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in the same direction."
Looking at the work of the Oxford historians from a

1958 perspective, the student finds the legalistic and
moral themes central to the book.

The Allies were por

trayed as the defenders of international law, the prin
ciple of arbitration, of "Right" in general, while the
real issues, the national interests of the European states,
despite lip-service paid to the remote causes of the war,
were largely ignored.

Why We Are at War is only one of

many examples that could be cited as representative of
the early interpretation relative to the outbreak of
World War I.

The reason for its selection is that it was

one of the first to expound a thesis which became in
creasingly popular in America with changes in emphasis but
nearly always with identical conclusions.
My Four Years in Germany, written by former ambassador
to Germany James W. Gerard, was one of many "eye-witness"
accounts by Americans speculating on the causes of the
war.

As a reminiscence, this work has no place in the

bibliography for this study, but the number of American
historians who referred to Gerard’s book indicates a certain
faith in the integrity of the author and should justify an
examination of its contents, if for no other reason than
that it was typical of the type of source on which American
students of the w a r ’s origins leaned heavily.

As stated

in his preface, Gerard’s purpose in writing the memoirs
^Members of the Oxford faculty, p. 56.

of his term as United States envoy to Berlin was to im
plant a realization in the American mind that "we are en
gaged in a war with the greatest military power the world
has ever seen."

The implication, of course, is one of

pure propaganda, but that did not prevent many American war
guilt scholars from using Gerard’s unfounded conclusions
to substantiate their theses.
The defects in the Gerard volume from the point of
view of the scientific historian are immediately apparent.
He took the peculiarities of isolated Germans with whom
he came into contact and applied them indiscriminately to
the entire German nation.

His penchant toward generali

zation would appear to be enough to make the sincere scholar
hesitate in accepting his findings as fact.

Nevertheless,

Gerard’s conclusions were widely cited as creditable
evidence by early American students of war responsibility.
It was not the German leaders alone with whom the
Allies had to contend but the entire German nation.

The

United States, Gerard maintained, joined in a "crusade"
against a nation whose poets, professors and parsons
united in stiring its people to a "white pitch of hatred
first against Russia and England and later against the
United States,"®
Probing the collective German mind, Gerard found that
the Germans psychologically were a simple people whose
®James W. Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (New
York: George H . Doran Co., I9I 7 )» P* x .
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dominant characteristic was an extreme naivete conducive
to the acceptance of a racialist line of propaganda.
A "hereditary instinct," passed on from the Teutonic
Knights, caused the Germans, fearful of their neighbors,
to become tools of a noble class which believed in war for
its own bitter sake.

Moreover, many of the German doctors

with whom the author associated felt that the "heavy eating
and large consumption of wine and beer had an unfavorable
affect on the German national character and readied them
for war.
According to the ex-ambassador, there were countless
facts that pointed to the summer of 1^1^ as the logical
time for the start of a German-inspired European war.
By the time William II left for his Norwegian cruise
July 6, 1914, a definite line of action had been con
ceived after the ruling caste recognized the advantages
afforded Germany by the opening of the Kiel Canal, the
possession of the Zeppelin and the perfection of the
submarine.
The event which finally persuaded the Kaiser and the
ruling oligarchy to resort to war was the attitude of the
people in the Zabern Affair and the fear of a growing
dislike of militarism.

The event in Alsace prompted the

decision by the Junkers that a speedy bloodletting was
necessary to placate popular discontent which, Gerard
^Gerard, p. 57*
lOlbld., pp.

97-98.
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wrote, manifested itself in the Reichstap; through the
Social Democratic opposition.

In other words, Gerard

viewed the war simply as a "safety valve" by which the Ger
man nation, torn asunder by an increasingly strong opposi
tion to the ruling classes, might again achieve unity of
purpose under the guiding hand of the military.

The most

charitable thing to be said of such a view is that it was
short-sighted.
To the student of history today, Gerard’s character
ization of the German nation appears a feeble, amateurish
attempt at mass psycho-analysis aimed simply at inciting
popular indignation in the United States quite in keeping
with the activities of George Creel and company,

Bernadette

E. Schmitt, however, lauded the book as "definitive and au
thentic" and commended the author for his several con
tributions to the claim that Germany had prepared for the
war well in advance of IÇl^.

11

Perhaps as damning as any single piece of evidence
substantiating the oft-heard claim of sole German war
guilt was the I 918 contribution to the international
controversy by Henry M, Morgenthau, former American
ambassador to Turkey.

The author’s purpose in writing

was to furnish the American people with further evidence
that the crime of 191^ was not Just manslaughter but,
in fact, murder in the first degree.

"I do not want to

^^Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Review of My Four Years in
Germany, by James W, Gerard, American Historical Review.
XXIII, No. 3 (April, 1917), 399*
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be an accessory after the fact by having proof of this
crime and not making it public.”

Morgenthau, however,

neglected to clarify why he remained an "accessory” for
more than three years.
After an over-simplified analysis of the events in
the Balkans between 1913 and I9I 7 , the years he repre
sented the United States in Constantinople, Morgenthau
expressed his belief in five basic factors concerning
the German state: (1) Germany had a plan of world con
quest; (2) the existence in Europe of a self-perpetuating
group of raonarchs centered in Germany was a menace to
democracy;
could

(3) The co-existence of autocracy and democracy

never be more than an armed truce;

(Ij.) The Allies

had the physical forces and "internal strength of justice”

to crush the autocracies; and (5) The enemy, autocracy,
was sustained by the German army.

Until it was destroyed,

autocracy would continue its a g g r e s s i o n . T h e above were
not "facts” which required a particularly keen insight.
They were being repeated daily on street corners across
the nation after the entry of the United States in the
European war.

The self-styled interpreter of the German

scene could have easily gleaned his observations from the

works of almost any of the authors whose works on war
^^Burton J. Hendrick, "Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story,”
World's Work, XXXV, No. 5 (April, I918), 120. Morgenthau's
revelations initially appeared serially in the New York
World in October, 1917*
^^Ibid.. pp. 121- 22.

38
guilt had been published before I9I 8 .
Besides the ’’evidence” Morgenthau purported to un
cover through his analysis of German activities in Turkey,
the ex-diplomat rose to the occasion and so distorted an
event concerning the origins of the war that two generations
of historians have been unable to completely expunge from
the record the effects of the exaggeration.
Morgenthau, a Crown Council

According to

was convened July

1^1^,

at Potsdam to which nearly all German ambassadors, members
of the general staff, naval commanders, bankers, the cap
tains of German industry and Austrian dignitaries were
summoned.

The sleuthing American ambassador's suspicions

were aroused a few days after the Sarajevo incident when
the German ambassador to Turkey, von Wangenheim, failed
to appear at a requiem mass in honor of the late Austrian
Archduke and duchess.

The explanation for his conspicuous

absence was freely offered by the boastful German ambass
ador a few days later.

His

the "epoch making” imperial

presence had been required at
conference.

To each of those present at the meeting, the Kaiser
purportedly put the following question:
for war?”

"Are you ready

In each instance, the answer was in the affirma

tive, except in the case of the financiers who needed
about two weeks to sell foreign securities and float loans.
The conference decided to do nothing to arouse suspicion in

^^Henry M. Morgenthau, "Ambassador Morgenthau's
Story,” World's Wo r k , XXXVI, No. 1 (May, I9I8), 72- 73 .
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order that the bankers might have the time needed to readjust their finances for the coming war.
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This was

offered as an explanation for the alleged increased
activity on the world’s stock exchanges.
Morgenthau concluded his series of articles with
the statement that the "colored books" flooding Europe
made little impression on him.
fragmentary evidence.

I know."

"I do not have to study
As von Wangenheim had

proudly admitted, the conspiracy that caused the Great
War was "hatched by the Kaiser and his imperial crew at
the Potsdam Conference July

19li|-."^^

Here was conclusive proof of the "blank check"
theory as well as nearly every other charge which had
been hurled at the German nation since 191^> and the
American historian and layman alike received Morgenthau’s
testimony with receptive ears.

An indication of how

Morgenthau's revelations were sensationalized by the
American press can be seen by looking at any one of a
number of periodical articles.

The Literary Digest com

mented editorially, "If there is any question in your
mind as to who precipitated the greatest of all human
tragedies, see the enlightened facts as revealed...by
Henry M. Morgenthau.
^^Morgenthau, World's Work, XXXVI, No. 2 (June,

1918), 170.
l^Ibid., p. 171.
^'^"How von Wangenheim Proudly Spilled the Beans,"
Literary Digest, LVII (June 15, I9I 8 ), 50»
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At this point, it is proper to note that subsequent
investigation proved that a series of conferences were
called by William II July 5 and 6, but that discussion
did not concern a general European war which both Germany
and Austria hoped to avert.

Morgenthau, when later faced

with the facts, conceded that there was no Crown Council
where the decision was made to wage war, but, he insisted,
those who conferred with the Emporer on July 5 were the ones
who would have been present had such a war council taken
place.
The Disclosures from Germany, published under the
auspices of the American Association for International
Conciliation, comprised but a small part of the pat
riotic editorial work done by American historians during
the war.

The Disclosures purported to be confessions by

Germans who were supposedly in a position to know whereof
they spoke and who openly admitted German war guilt.

The

first of the "confessions," "The Lichnowsky Memorandum,"
was a statement by Prince Lichnowsky, pre-war German
ambassador to England, admitting before the world Germany’s
guilt in precipitating the war.

According to Lichnowsky,

the retirement of Bismark led to the German decision to
press her search for colonies in the Balkans and the Near
East.

To realize her ambitions in both areas, it would be

necessary to put the force of the German Empire behind the
^^George Viereck, Spreading Germs of Hate (New York:
H. Liveright & Co., 1930), p. 210.
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wedge Austria was driving into the Balkans and to acquire
a dominant influence in Constantinople.

That this in

evitably meant war with Russia was fully realized, but
such a war was not

f e a r e d ,

^9

xjp to this point, the ex-

ambassador had added little to the story of German in
trigue related by Morgenthau and others.
The chief value of the Lichnowsky papers to the
historian was the German ambassador's rejection of the
stand taken by wartime German apologists, namely the
"encirclement theory," which held that the FrancoRussian alliance was aimed at choking Germany economically
on two sides.

Germany was not isolated by the wiles of

her neighbors, Lichnowsky asserted, but by her own conPD
duct.
For the view held by some Germans that Serbia
had inflicted upon Austria’s honor a stain that could only
be wiped out by blood, Lichnowsky substituted the charge
that the extermination of Serbia was mandatory because
she stood in the way of Austro-German ambitions.

The

theory which held Russian mobilization tantamount to an act
of war was dismissed by the former German diplomat on the
ground that it was purely a military notion which had never
PI
stood up in the diplomatic world.
Lest Lichnowsky’s repudiations appear overly conl^Munroe Smith (ed,), "The Lichnowsky Memorandum,"
The Disclosures from Germany (New York; American
Association for International Conciliation, I9I 8 ), p. 7»
2°Ibid. , pp. 10- 12.

Zllbid., p. 15.
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elusive, cognizance must be taken by the student of the
ambassador’s position at the time of the outbreak of
hostilities.

The reason he gave for his initial assign

ment in London was his adherence to antiquated Bismarkian
theories in which colonies played an insignificant role.
Lichnowsky claimed ignorance of the Pan-German movement.
By his logic then, it was only natural that his govern
ment assign to England a man who was unaware of the plan
to create German "hegemony" in Europe by means of a war
"long on the drawing boards."

How Lichnowsky’s ignorance

of so-called Pan-German schemes was reconciled with his
revelations bearing on alleged German aims in the Balkans
is an obvious contradiction upon which the editor of the
"confessions" failed to elucidate.

Furthermore, the stu

dent must bear in mind that Lichnowsky had been repudiated
by his own government.

Under these circumstances, his

testimony might well have been dismissed by the serious
historian.

Perhaps the reason for Lichnowsky’s ignorance

of German plans for aggression was that there had been no
plans on the drawing boards of which he spoke.
Few reservations were held by historians then pub
lishing.

Lichnowsky’s testimony was used as evidence to

substantiate all that had theretofore been written about
Germany.

They concurred unanimously with the Lichnowsky

assertion that "it is not surprising the whole civilized
world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for
P?
war."
The problem, of course, was that of accepting as

22smith, pp.
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fact the testimony of one Anglophile ambassador who had
been denounced by his government and was, in fact, guilty
of treason and using it as a basis for condemning his
superiors.
Lichnowsky's revelations were corroborated by a
Dr. Meuhlon in letters also published at the behest of
the American Association for International Conciliation
p-5
and edited by Professor Munroe Smith. ^ Dr. Meuhlon, a
pre-war member of the Krupp board of directors, was,
according to the editor, one of the relatively few Germans
who knew from the outset that the Central Powers had forced
an unnecessary and unjustifiable war on Europe.

Unwilling

to further German military activity, the munitions maker
took the only course compatible with his alleged pacific
views and exiled himself to Switzerland.

His confessions

gave further substance to charges previously made and
confirmed to the satisfaction of most American war guilt
scholars the inference that full agreement on the course
to be taken had been reached between Berlin and Vienna.
According to Meuhlon, the outcome of the Kaiser’s
"Moroccan adventure" had left him in a war-like frame of
mind.

The failure of diplomacy at Algeciras and Agadir

had convinced him that in the next crisis he would "un
sheath the

sword.

"^4

Meuhlon attested also that the

^^Smith was a professor of international law at
Amherst College.
^^Munroe Smith (ed.), "Memoranda and Letters of Dr.
Meuhlon," The Disclosures from Germany (Hew York; American
Association for International Conciliation, I9I 8 ), p. I 86.
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Kaiser went on his Norwegian cruise July 6 for appear
ances only.

The evidence to substantiate such a charge

was admittedly hearsay, but. Professor Smith maintained
summarizing accurately the attitude of most American
students of the war guilt problem, the historian could
not exclude all evidence that was barred by English judi
cial procedure.

The value of hearsay evidence depended

upon the position and character of the immediate witnesses,
which, in this case, were allegedly good.

Moreover,

hearsay evidence was "creditably enhanced when the testimony
fit in with the established f a c t s . T h e

logic by which

such a conclusion was deduced is certainly open to question.
Who was it that established the "facts" of which Smith
wrote?

The answer is persons of the same stamp as those

who provided the corroborating evidence.
Meuhlon refuted the charge

heard in some German

quarters that the Belgian government had arranged to
cooperate with Great Britain in an aggressive war against
Germany.

According to the munition tycoon's statement,

the assertion was absurd because Belgium had made herself
dependent upon the Krupp Works in Germany for military
supplies.

Proof that Belgium had erred in placing her

trust was evident when the German refusal to deliver
arms already paid for was considered.
The "evidence" cited above is merely illustrative
^^Smith, p. 187.
2&Ibid., p. 188.

4^
of the type of sources which early American war guilt
scholars used to bolster the verdict arrived at after
scrutiny of the incomplete "colored books."

There are

obvious defects in accepting any of the testimony as
fact upon which to convict the German nation, but American
writers were wont to accept any statement that might
somehow fit or be made to fit into their general scheme
of things.
The early students of war responsibility, those
publishing between 19l4 and I920, reverted from conven
tional historical methodology whereby a thesis is estab
lished empirically from an examination of all the facts.
Most of the American writers concerned with the beginnings
of the war had formulated their theses long before de
ciding to write, and from their preconceived notions,
they often arrived at the facts deductively, discarding
any information that might not square with their original
hypothesis— that Germany was solely guilty.
II
One of the most popular central themes around which
the earlier American students of war responsibility built
their theses was that of the "war to save the world for
democracy,"

That writers of this type were but little

concerned with intellectual honesty or historical fact
is evident; that their work complied with the literary
requirements of the Committee of Public Information is

1+6
equally evident.

One of the most scurrilous examples of

this type of "history" was Why We Went to War by Christian
Gauss.

In his preface. Professor Gauss of Princeton

University wrote that he had done what others had main
tained could not be done--advanced an indictment against
a whole people for their complicity in the "crimes of
their rulers."

In this respect. Gauss represented a

minority report among writers concerned with war res
ponsibility, most of whom preferred to distinguish between
the governed and the governors.
Wars, Gauss maintained, were the final expression
of fundamental antagonisms between nations, and the rea
son for World War I was not the boundaries at stake but
the ideals of the opposing camps.

Real causes then were

not to be found in the Balkans or Near East but in the
basic differences between autocracy and democracy.
Prussian detested democracy.

The

The German ideas on the

mission of Germany, the morality of the state and the
place and function of the military in society were "not
only divergent, but absolutely incompatible with those
of the West.

We must not delude ourselves that the

gulf between democracy and Prussianism can easily be
bridged.
Gone is the fair-haired German who loved his pipe
and his fiddlers three. Gauss argued.

The German people,

^^Christian Gauss, Why We Went to War (New York:
Scribners & Sons, 1Ç18), pp. 3-4*

1+7
however, were still docile, or they would never have been
willing to submit to the yoke of autocracy.

The acceptance

of the military junkers in Germany was easily understood.
Very simply, there was no difference between the ruled and
the rulers in Germany.
Germans and Americans.

The difference was between the

28

The central and ineradicable difference between
the West and Germany, Gauss contended, was the differ
ence between freedom and autocracy— between feudalism and
democracy.

The most serious mistake the people of the

United States could make. Gauss warned, would be to be

lieve that the German autocracy existed through the force
of the ruler.

The German state was not an amalgam forced

into cohesion by pressure from
requisites to longevity:
from below.
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above.

It had the two

power from above and confidence

The spirit inculcated in the German people

was the secret of World War I.

The German fought not for

humanity, but as the Mohammedan fought and died for Islam.
The people were laboring

under a sort of mass hypnosis by

which the mission, power and privilege of

the German state

manifested themselves in an area above the American con
ception of right and wrong.

Prussian fanaticism and

mysticism were the real causes of the war.
To understand German diplomacy and German psychology,
the Princeton professor wrote, it must be understood that
28

Gauss, pp. 10-11.

Z^Ibld., pp.

15^ 17.
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the Prussian regards all other states as rivals.

The life

of the state came not from its own strength but from the
livelihood of other states.

From such a theory came the

Prussian justification for war.

Too long a peace was

considered a national calamity, and Germany had been at
peace for more than forty years in 1^1^.

"The time had

come for the great catharsis which would restore the state
to its primitive health.
Americans insisted upon a German inability to under
stand the psychology of other peoples.

An understanding

of German psychology was, the author claimed, an absolute
necessity for the well-being of the United States.

They,

the Germans, were a different people, nationalistic and
imperialistic in temperament, who believed in the sup
eriority of their mission.

Their young had not been raised

to respect "a Washington or a Lincoln."

Their national

heroes were "men of force who succeeded through deceit.
Gauss assimilated the testimony of Morgenthau,
Lichnowsky and Meuhlon to substantiate his charge that
Germany gave to her "cat's paw," Austria, an unconditional

"blank check."

His Inferences to the effect that, if

Germany was successful in Europe, the United States would
next bear the brunt of Prussian autocracy was conjecture
pure and simple.

The argument that Gauss, as a professor

in modern languages, cannot be viewed as representative of
30Gauss, p. 1|6.

31lbld.. pp. 73-74.
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the American historical profession is tenable only until
his thesis is found echoed in the works of other more
"scholarly" writers, including those of some of the most
eminent of American historians.

Like Gauss, nearly all of

the early war guilt writers tried their hand at psycho
analysing the German nation, and in each instance, the
conclusions drawn were strikingly similar to those of
Gauss.
That the Princeton professor bore out popular senti
ment was evidenced by a review in the New York Times
lauding his diatribe as a "calm, well-resolved and con
vincing book."

A review in the American Historical Review

recommended the volume to historians interested in the
origins of the war. and complimented the author for the
skill with which the material was handled and for his
"sobriety of judgment" which resulted in "one of the best
volumes on the war.
The European Anarchy by G. Lowes Dickinson was pub
lished initially in the British Isles and proved so popular
and successful, propagandistically speaking, that it was
reprinted with appropriate additions and deletions for the
American audience in 191?«

Its importance, other than

seconding previously made unfounded charges, lies in t h e '
fact that American historians leaned heavily on Professor
Dickinson’s conclusions.

According to Professor Oliver P.

^^Samuel B. Harding, Review of Why We Went to War,
by Christian Gauss, American Historical Review, XXIV,
No. 3 (June, I 919), 520-21.

^0
Chitwood of University of West Virginia, one of the leading
American students of the war guilt question, Dickinson’s
work was essential to any understanding of the period
leading up to the outbreak of hostilities.^^

With all

due credit to Dickinson, it should be added that he
was not one to ’’stand pat” after his 191? thesis had been
invalidated by subsequent scholarship.

In I926 when it

became apparent that his wartime view of responsibility
was no longer tenable, Dickinson revised his earlier
interpretation under the title. The International Anarchy.
In his earlier volume, however, Dickinson viewed
the events leading up to World War I with the same sub
jectivity that infected the work of his American colleague,
Christian Gauss.

The spirit of Bismark, Dickinson wrote,

infected the whole of German public life.

It gave a new

lease to the political philosophy of Machiavelli.^^

Ad

mitting that jingoism existed in all nations, the author
asserted the ’’brand” found in Germany was peculiar both in
intensity and in its character.

Germans were romantic to

the extent that they did not see willingly things as they
were.

Their temperament raangified, distorted, concealed

and transmuted everything.

Because of these peculiarities,

^^Chitwood referred the student to the "charming”
Dickinson thesis in the introduction to his The
Immediate Causes of the Great War. See below.
3^G. Lowes Dickinson,

The International Anarchy,
Co., 1Ç26.

190^ - 191^ ° London: The Macmillan

3^G. Lowes Dickinson, The European Anarchy
(New York: The Macmillan C o " I917), p. i^-1.
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the German character was unique, and one found a romantic
enthusiasm, a willful blindness, toward the realities of
war.

One peculiarity In German jingoism uncommon to that

of other western nations, Dickinson argued, was Its emphasis
on an "unintelligible and unreal abstraction of race."

The

Germans viewed themselves as the "salt of the earth,"
and their mission took form In efforts to spread the
Teutonic "enlightenment" to their less fortunate neighbors.
Dickinson concluded his psychological analysis of
Germany with the stock assertion that Germany was guilty
of giving the Dual Monarchy a "blank check" after June 28,

191^..

He conceded, however, that most Germans conceived

the conflict as a "preventive war," meaning If Germany
did not fight In 191^, she would be compelled to do so
later and under less advantageous circumstances.
Frank H. Slmonds, In his multi-volume series.
The History of the World War, adopted a similar central
theme for the first volume devoted In part to a discussion
of the w a r ’s background.

In Its Inception, Slmonds wrote,

the war seemed no more than another war, more terrible
than those In the past, but one comparable to them In
origins and purposes.

As the struggle progressed, how

ever, It became clear that the German attack was more
than a bid for world power.

Germany had attacked the

whole fabric of our common civilization and all the pre
cepts and doctrines of humanity.

Together with anger and

detestation of German violence. It became recognized In
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the United States that the war was, after all, a stand of
autocracy against democracy.
Simonds purpose in writing was to set forth the
"development of the world verdict against Germany. "
made one concession to the German

He

nation that few of his

colleagues were willing to acknowledge with his assertion
that the actual outbreak of hostilities was largely
accidental.

He quickly retrenched, however, writing that

the conflict was an inevitable consequence of the new
visions and purposes of the German people.

That Germany

actually brought on the war in the critical days of July,

191^, was an unsupported allegation; that her whole course
after the Kaiser came to the throne was one of ruthless
aggression was, according to Simonds, hardly to be mis
taken.
The "cause" for which the Allies were fighting pro
vided the central theme for a series. Readings in Con
temporary History and Literature, published originally
for use in a special "war issues" course at the United
States Haval Academy and later disseminated to the gen
eral public under the auspices of the Creel Committee.
According to the introduction to "World War and Ideals,"
one in the series edited by two members of the Academy
faculty, the purpose of the book was "to enhance the
■^^Prank H. Simonds, The History of the World War
(New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., I917)s Ï1 vii-viii.
37lbid., p. 62.
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morale of the members of the Corps by giving them an
understanding of what the war is about and the supreme
importance to civilization of the cause for which we
are fighting.”
In setting forth the thesis around which the book
was centered, the editors wrote that the democracies of
the world were pitted against the last stronghold of
autocracy in a conflict thrust upon them by the dynastic
policy of a set of rulers who used the "Divine Right"
38
concept to further their personal ends.
To support
their basic premises, the editors chose those authors
who best illustrated the democratic tendencies of the
Entente powers.

Probably written before the Bolshevik

Revolution, Russia was portrayed by the authors as having
finally seen the light and having thrown off the chains
of autocracy, was developing upon a basis of universal
sufferage and republican institutions.
Innumerable additional examples of authors who
analysized the events proceeding the war from an
"autocracy versus democracy” perspective could be
cited.

This was not history in any sense of the word.

In each of the apocryphal accounts considered above,
autocracy, exemplified by Germany, occupied the center
of the stage in the role of a villain whose "mission"
was the domination of Europe or, as Gauss suggested,
^^Walter B. Norris and Morris E. Speare (eds.),
"World War and Ideals", Readings in Contemporary History and
Literature (New York; Ginn & Co., I 9I 8), p. 20
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the world.

The Entente powers, on the other hand, were

cast in the role of heroes fighting desperately to pre
vent further autocratic depredations against the "free"
world.

To relate the history of Europe between I87I and

1914 in terms of good and evil as Gauss and others did
would indeed have required a vivid imagination, although

the scarcity of reliable information bearing on the war's
origins no doubt helped.

Besides an incredible quality

of subjectivity which permeated each of the volumes examined
above, the outstanding characteristic of each of them was
the penchant of their authors to blacks and whites.
Generalizations which might have been substantiated in
isolated instances were indiscriminately applied to answer
a multitude of problems.

That human beings act differently

under varying circumstances apparently never occured to
these writers who deduced the origins of the war from
the original hypothesis that Germany was guilty.
Ill
Another popular line taken by writers then dealing
with the causes of World War I was the legalistic approach
first set forth in the United States by James M, Beck in
The Evidence in the Case.

Beck's argument was in the form

of a legal brief based on "evidence" gleaned from his less
than acute analysis of the early "colored books."

The

folly of drawing historical interpretations from the 19l4
belligerent apologies has already been noted.
Fundamentally, Beck's thesis was built around the
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assumption that Germany, as a violator of international
law, was as liable for punishment as the criminal under
civil law.

Having designated himself prosecuting attorney.

Beck assimilated into a concise brief the "evidence" by
which the "Supreme Court of Civilization" might arrive
at a verdict.

In developing his case, the former United

States Attorney General found "conclusive proof" that the
German foreign office was not only consulted by Austria
previous to the ultimatum to Serbia, but that Germany,
in fact, gave to the Dual Monarchy an unlimited "blank
check,"

Like most of his colleagues publishing on the

origins of the war. Beck distinguished between the ruling
caste and the German masses since "this detestable war is
not merely a crime against civilization but also against
the decried and misled German people." ”
The writings of Bernhardi, Nietzsche and Treitschke
nurtured German Junkerdom which was based on the philosophy
of Machiavelli, the first to recognize that the state was
power.

There was, according to Beck, an emotional and

mystical element in the advanced German thinker which
made him capable of accepting in full sincerity intellectual
and moral absurdities which Intellectuals of other nations
would never think of accepting.

"The irrefutable proof of

the acceptance of those philosophies was Belgium.
39james M. Beck, The Evidence in the Case as to
Moral Responsibility for the War (New York; Grosset
la%
& Dunlap,
1915)» p. xxvi.
1|.0.
Ibid., pp. 9-11

^6
Because the German government never officially repudiated
the ideas of individuals like Nietzsche and Treitschke,
their words were seen as the guiding lights for all modern
German thinkers, an assumption Beck would indeed find
difficult to substantiate.
While the IÇl^ apologies of the Entente powers did
not show evidence of suppression of facts, the obvious
inaccuracies in the German White Paper disclosed an un
mistakable purpose "amounting to an open confession that
they intended to force their will upon Europe even though
this course involved the most stupendous war in man's
history.Without

informing their conferees in the

European family of nations, Germany and Austria "tor
pedoed" civilization.

Austria could not possibly have

proceeded in a war which would inevitably incur the wrath
of Russia without absolute assurances of German support.
Germany felt that Austria should be allowed to proceed
against Serbia unabetted but denied the right of any
state to support Serbia.

This, according to Beck, was

Germany's "tragedy of errors.
During the "Twelve Days," every proposal to preserve
peace came from the Entente camp, and every such sug
gestion was met with an uncompromising negative from
Austria and either that or obstructive quibbles from
Germany.

The Kaiser gave his assent to the Austrian

^^Beck, p. 30.
^^Ibld. , p. i|0.
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coup In the hope that some of the German prestige lost
In North Africa might be regained.

Russia, William II

felt sure, would follow the same course she had in the
Bosnian crisis and acquiesce in the Dual Monarchy's
action.

Realizing he had gone too far, the Kaiser

hastened back from his Norwegian cruise, but it was too
late.

"A Washington would have saved the situation, but

the Kaiser was not a Washington.
Beck pursued his almost totally indefensible in
dictment concentrating on German actions in the last few
days before the declaration of war on Russia.

Although

Germany was urged by England and France to await the

result of the Austro-Russian conversations, her declaration
of war rendered peace impossible.

The German justification

for her actions based on the argument that she did not wish
to forego the advantage of speed in mobilization against
the Russian numerical superiority was the "clearest dis
loyalty to civilization."

It must be assumed. Beck sur

mised, that, in tendering the German ultimatum to Russia
protesting that nation's mobilization, the Kaiser wished
war.

"Such will be his awful responsibility...and the

verdict of history.
The thesis propounded by Beck, as baseless as his
charges may seem today, gave impetus to others writing in
a similar, though often less vituperative, vein.
^^Beck, p. 112.

^^Ibid.. p. 189.

One of

S8
these was Ellery Stowell of Columbia University»

He at

tacked the German defense which held that the premature
Russian mobilization made Impossible the acceptance of
British Foreign Minister Grey's eleventh hour proposal
for mediation.

German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, Stowell

Inaccurately pointed out, cherished the belief that England
and France should have compelled Russia to desist, while
Germany refused at every turn to restrain Austria.

To

the everlasting honor of England, Stowell wrote, she re
fused to back France In any aggressive war.

To Germany's

dishonor, she refused to take a similar stand In regard
to the Dual Monarchy, Insisting that German Interests were

iiB

such that support of Austria was mandatory.^

The fact that Bethmann-Hollweg had been unable to
discover any evidence to lessen his nation's responsi
bility was, according to Stowell, less Important than
the fact that the effort was made.

"It Is an Indication

that Germany recognizes her responsibility before the bar
of the world's opinion.
Other examples of historians and pseudo-historians
who viewed the war guilt problem legallstlcally might be
mentioned, but It would serve no purpose since most of
them merely echoed what the progenitor of the thesis,
James M. Beck, had written In 1915*
^^Ellery C. Stowell, "Responsibility for the War,"
The New Republic, IX, No. Il6 (January 20, I917), 328.
^^Ibld., p.

329.
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IV

After the publication of Roland G. Usher's PanGermanism in 191^» there was a great vogue among American
historians to base their analyses of the causes of the war
on the central theme of alleged Pan-German activities.
Prepared for publication prior to the outbreak of the war,
there are throughout the book evidences of an objective
survey of the subject matter.

Before its appearance,

however, the manuscript was edited and chapters were added
in the light of what transpired in l^l^ with the result
that the study took on a pro-Entente flavor.
It was Usher's contention that Germany aimed at
nothing short of world dominion.

Known to all Eur

opean diplomats, it was this factor that compelled the
belligerents of IÇl^ in the courses they had charted
after I87I,

The historian too, according to Usher, was

in the "enviable” position of knowing of the plans or longrange schemes of the various European states far more
certainly than he did the minutiae of their execution.
In other words,

it was not only the statesmen of Europe

who were aware of the German

"plan” of world conquestj

it was also apparent to the w o r l d ’s scholars.

Only the

method by which the plan was to be executed remained a
mystery.

Because of the extraordinary position of the

historian. Usher,

a professor at Washington University,

advised his colleagues to be prepared to interpret current
events in the light of schemes or ends which were known

6o
to be in the minds of s t a t e s m e n . U s h e r ,

in effect,

openly advocated a reversion from the empirical method
applied to history where the facts form the foundation
for the hypothesis in favor of the Cartesian method where
by the premises are formulated first, and the facts follow.
The danger inherent in such an approach is the tendency to
make the facts fit neatly into a preconceived thesis.
This methodology was not unique with Usher, but he was
one of the few professional
such a technique to

historians who admitted using

analyse the origins of the war.

Such

an approach to history admittedly is valid in certain
instances w^here the basic premise is an accepted fact, but
to apply the deductive method of reasoning to the study of
the causes for any war, especially while hostilities are
in progress, leaves the scholar wide open to criticism.
Having established the use of the deductive method for
solving a problem, the question which inevitably poses
itself is, "What was the basic hypothesis from which the

student began his investigation?"

In Usher's case, it

was admittedly that

Germany had

quest of the world,

and the war was viewed

mination of German dreams.

long planned for the con
as the cul

With such a "fact" established,

it goes without saying that Germany was guilty of pre
cipitating the war.
Although Bismark was the first German statesman
^^Roland G. Usher, Pan-Germanism (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 19li+), pp. 115-1?.

6l
to see the possibilities of Pan-Germanism, Admiral von
Tirpitz and William II "were responsible for bringing it
to its present state of perfection"— an excellence which
was achieved after an evolution through three stages.
After unification, German p o l i c y aimed; first, at terri
torial and economic aggrandisement in the form of colonies;
secondly, at attempting to secure markets in the East by
the establishment of a trade route through the Balkans and
Turkey; and thirdly, at the determination of an aggressive
scheme for the forcible conquest of the world,
Usher conceded that Germany may not have wished the
war on the particular day that it came, but, since the
holocaust was "inevitable," the German position was such
that prosecution of a war in 1^1^ gave her an advantage
over her adversaries.

Whether the decision to strike

was reached because the moment seemed propitious or because
longer delay would be damaging. Usher speculated that the
details of preparation that were completed by August 1
required at least six weeks for execution.

The decision

to go to war then had to be reached in Berlin and Vienna
not later than mid-June, I91I4., two weeks before the murder
of the Austrian heir apparent.

Although the assasination

of Archduke Francis Ferdinand came as a surprise to PanGermans, Usher charged that it was better adapted to
their needs as a casus belli than anything they could

^^nsher, p. 119.
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have possibly devised,
Usher's two-sided approach to his problem can be
seen in those portions of his work written before the
outbreak of hostilities in Europe where he recognized
Pan-Germanism, not as a movement threatening civiliza
tion, but as an expression of the national determination
to preserve and strengthen the corporate life of a great
people.

The two nations promoting Pan-Germanism, Usher

wrote in contradistinction to ideas interwoven into other

parts of his work, were not different from others in either
morals or aims.

Historically speaking, Usher's position

would have been more easily defended had not a duality of
approach been the transcendent characteristic of PanGermanism.
Through the periodical medium. Usher pursued the
thesis initiated in his book and pointed out that the real
causes for the outbreak of the war "lie less in the
domestic relations between the two countries, Austria and
Serbia, than in the general European situation in the
fourth week of July, IÇlI)-»"^^

At first glance, such a

statement appears to be a recantation of some of the
absurdities given expression in his book.

The impression

is unwarranted, however, since Usher quickly lapsed back
^'^Usher, pp.

263-6^.

^Qjbld.. p. 295.
•^^Roland G. Usher, "The Reasons Behind the War,"
The Atlantic, GXIV, No, I4 (October, 1914), 445-
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into his earlier thesis.
To the Austrian, he wrote, the war appeared as a
struggle for self-preservation since a large segment of
her population looked to pesky Serbia for leadership.
It was, as far as the Dual Monarchy was concerned, a
war to end forever the attempts by Serbia to disrupt the
Empire, a legitimate endeavor prompted by Austrian national
interests.

d2

differently.

By the German, however, the war was viewed
The Pan-German had long dreamed of the

creation of a confederation stretching from the Baltic
to the Mediterranean under German protection.

Hence, she

welcomed the Austrian activity in the Balkans since control
over that area was requisite to a successful consummation
of the German-dominated Balkan confederation, the first
step in Germany’s "world plan."
The time seemed favorable for an Austrian move in the
summer of 191^ before the small Balkan states had had an
opportunity to recover from the ravages of the two recent
wars.

Usher suggested two basic causes for the Austro-

Serbian war: the disadvantage of the moment to the Triple
Entente and its advantage to the Triple Alliance, and the
current belief in Germany and Austria that the balance of
power might swing so decisively in the opposite direction
that action in the future might become impossible.
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The carte blanche was given Austria by Germany in
^^Usher, The Atlantic, GXIV, No. i}., ^^9°
Ibid., p. ii-51.
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the 1908 Bosnian crisis, not in 19l4 as most historians
contended,

Austria would never have undertaken the annexa

tions with such vigor had not the alliance with Germany
'oil

been of unlimited extent.^

The promptitude of support

and the decidedly "unquestioned harmony" between Austria
and Germany was such by I 914 that little doubt could be
held by the "serious student" of the war's origins that
the demands made on Serbia by the Dual Monarchy had the
complete approval of Germany.

Those demands. Usher sur

mised, constituted irrevocable proof that Austria and
Germany wished to collectively precipitate a general European war.
Usher's sentiments were echoed in a Living Age
editorial entitled the "Origins of the War."

The real

cause of the war was the seizure of the German nation
by an impulse prompted by the thought of "now or never."
The Pan-Germans held it a crime not to strike when they
were convinced that their nation had a preponderance of
power.

Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of the Austrian

army in Serbia led to the logical conclusion that it never
had been the intention of the Dual Monarchy to punish Serbia but to plunge Europe into a war at Germany's behest.
Sk

Roland G. Usher, "Austro-German Relations since

1866," American Historical Review, XXIII, No. 3 (April,
1918),
^^Ibid., p. 5)95»
^ 6 "The Origin of the War," Living A g e , CCLXXXII,

No. 3362 (September 12, IÇl^), 684»
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6^
For a defense of the above explanation for the outbreak
of the war, the editor reasoned that it was the only
interpretation that could be substantiated by ’’facts,"
but what those facts were was left to the reader's
imagination.
The war could not be thought of intelligibly, wrote
another pseudo-historian in a similar vein, unless it was
assumed that Germany and Austria were seeking to achieve
world domination.

Whatever the true cause of the war,

the "vital interests" with which the Pan-Germans toyed
at the outset were little more than an excuse for the
hostilities.

What became of Serbia after being made the

scapegoat for the cause of the conflagration was as un
important to Austria as the fate of Princip, "the halfforgotten hero of Sarajevo."
Herbert A. Gibbons in The New Map of Europe listed
the causes for the war, the first of which was the
alliance system which evolved out of German activity
following the Pranco-Prussian War.

The second. Gibbons

wrote seconding Usher’s groundless contentions, was the
Vfeltipolitik [world policy] or Pan-Germanism which brought
Germany into conflict with Great Britain and France out58
side Europe and with Russia in Europe,
There was, according to Gibbons, a "striking anology"
^^"Vital Interests a Year Later," The New Republic,
III, No. 38 (July 2^, 1915), 298.
<8
Herbert Adams Gibbons, The New Map of Europe,
1911- 191^ (New York; The Century Co., I9IY), p. 22.
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between the Germans in 191^ and the Jacobins of Revolu

tionary France.

As In 1793» the love for humanity had

turned into blood lust and the battle for freedom into
a search for booty and glory.

The profound thinker in

German universities and the visionaries on the working
m e n ’s forums were following the same path as the French
Revolutionaries, and the "mission" of I 87I had been per
verted,

The idea of the German mission was not unique

to the nineteenth or twentieth century, however.

Since

the beginning of history Germany had been a "war man,"
always asserting himself by force.

"The leopard cannot

change his spots; so it is natural for the Germany of
the twentieth century to use the sword as it was for
59
Germany of the tenth or first century."
Adopting a Gauss-like approach to German guilt.
Gibbons disputed the contention that it was members of
the German ruling clique who were responsible for pre
cipitating the conflict.

A review of German newspapers

substantiated to Gibbons’ satisfaction the charge that
German public opinion more often than not forced the hand
of the foreign office and caused its high-handed actions.
"German public opinion...is for this war to the bitter
finish.

It is the war of the people, intelligently and

deliberately willed by them."^^

The Gibbons invective

then was not directed at the rulers of Germany; like his
—

Gibbons, pp. 32-37*

60lbld., pp. 56-57 .

6?
Princeton colleague, he charged the entire German nation
with a crime against humanity.
A third cause for the war was Pan-German activity
in the Ottoman Empire which resulted in the elevation of
Germany to the position previously held by Great Britain.
The most conspicuous thread in the web woven in Constanti
nople was the Bagdadbahn,

German intrigue in Morocco, the

aftermath of which was an increase in naval and military
armaments and the creation of a spirit of tension, merely
added fuel to the fire already built by the Pan-Germans in
the Balkans and made inevitable the clash between Teuton
and Gaul.
The situation in June, 1913» was as grave as that of
July, 1914» and in both cases, Serbia backed down.

In

1914» however, Germany and Austria were determined to pro
voke a war which would end the nemesis of Serbia and spell
the end of the traditional Russian "protectorate" over the
Balkan Slavs.

In the final analysis. Gibbons maintained

that there could be little doubt that the war was delibera
tely willed by the German government, motivated by PanGermanists and public prodding, and that the chain of cir
cumstances which brought on the holocaust was carefully
linked together by officials of Germany and AustriaHungary.

After the Moroccan and Persian settlements, the

question most heard on German street corners was not, "Will
there be a war?," but "How soon will it come?"^^
^^Gibbons, p. 367.

In
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supporting the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, Germany was
not responding to an overt act by the enemy.

She cal

culated carefully the cost, awaited the favorable moment
and then deliberately provoked the war.

The only way the

war might have been avoided would have been to allow
Germany to "draw a new map of Europe.”
The outstanding characteristic of Gibbons work was
the conspicuous absence of annotation.

He excused him

self on this count and for his failure to include a
bibliography to which the student might refer with the
comment that his references were too numerous— a novel
explanation to say the least.
The Pan-German theme was central to The Roots of the
War written collectively by William Davis, William Anderson
and Mason Tyler, professors of history at the University
of Minnesota.

The most noticeable difference between this

work and those of other early war guilt students was the
attention accorded "remote” causes.

Although consideration

was given only those events which fit comfortably into their
general thesis, the acknowledgement by the Minnesota
historians that underlying as well as immediate causes
were important gives the work a more scholarly appearance
than those of most of their colleagues.

While the ack

nowledgement of the importance of remote causes is commend
able and worthy of mention, the introduction to the volume
casts unfavorable aspersions on the interpretations reached
by the authors.

Published after the United States decision
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to go to war, the authors introduced their work saying the
book was written with a due sense of historical as well
as patriotic responsibility.

Had the result of the re

search been unfavorable to the "justice" of the Entente
cause, the work would not have been published until the
w a r ’s end.

A discussion of whether or not the passing of

moral judgments is an integral part of objective history
lies outside the scope of this study.

Suffice to say that

such a statement leads logically to the conclusion that the
work, which purported to be an objective survey of the
events leading to the war, was but another subjective
interpretation of those events.

Three factors, hate between Germany and France over
Alsace-Lorraine, hate between Germany and Great Britain
emanating from commercial rivalry and the disposition of
the Ottoman Empire, the authors contended, played simul
taneously into the hands of Pan-German schemers.

Manip

ulating the three factors, the German imperialists set
out to deliberately precipitate a war which was seen as
the first step in the establishment of a world empire, an
"Empire of Teutonia," more universal than that of Rome.
After pointing out the importance of understanding the
diplomatic history of Europe from I 87I to 191^, the authors
reverted to the stock Pan-German, "autocracy versus dem
ocracy," explanation of the w a r ’s origins.

In their

discussion of the diplomacy leading to war, the authors
pointed out some of the evidence used by the later re-
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vlslonlsts to acquit Germany such as the "encirclement
theory."

Although the Franco-Russian rapproachment kept

alive French hopes for a successful war on Germany, the
authors insisted that the "real" causes of the war were
to be found elsewhere.
Between I 87I and l^l^, the democratic ideal made
progress in every civilized state save Germany.

If her

"intelligent monarchy" was to prove a lasting success, it
would be a set-back to democracy which would be branded
as incapable of governing the most formidable and pro
gressive nation in Europe.

For a new lease on life the

despotic foes of democracy could thank Otto von Bismark
for the foundations he errected in Germany.
William II began to reign.

In I 888,

In I 89O after the retirement

of the "Iron Chancellor," he began to govern.

The strong

arm of Bismark had paved the way for an "unenlightened"

despotism.

The unification of Prussian Junkerdom and the

monarchy in Germany put democracy on the defensive all over

the world,

"People were beginning to doubt whether the

democracies of the United States and Great Britain were all
that was claimed."
The evidence was clear, the authors argued, that
Germany planned a war against France in 18?^, a sup
position disputed by later, more objective historians,
^^William Anderson, William S. Davis and Mason W,
Tyler, The Roots of the War (New York: The Century Co.,
1918), p. 135.
G^Ibld., p. 199.
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Because of English and Russian objections, however, Bismark
subsided, but the Chancellor had found that he could no
longer reckon on steadfast Russian support despite the
League of the Three Emporers.

Russian vacillations re

sulted in Bismark’s "smashing" of the Treaty of San Stefano,
increased German intrigue in the Balkans and Turkey and
eventually in the Austro-German alliance.

Austria had

been substituted for Russia as Germany's vassal.

Had

Germany chosen to ally herself to Russia, the authors
maintained, it would have had to be as an equal, but Austria
could easily be subjugated by her senior partner.

Recent

historians have cautioned against acceptance of the "horse
and rider theory" as the motivating factor behind the
errection of the rival alliance systems.
The reason for the failure of The Hague Conventions
on armaments in 1899 and I 907, according to the authors,
was the refusal of Germany to accept the recommendations
of the commissions.

Since no clause could be found which

did not raise a German objection, Germany was the death of
arbitration.

She made certain that Europe would continue

to be governed by fear— the growing animosity between Eng
land and Germany, the German dread of Russia and Germany's
abhorence of everything for which France stood.

The feel

ings between the nations of Europe were reciprocal, but, the
authors maintained, the hatreds in Germany were stronger
toward her neighbors than were those of her neighbors
toward her.
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The Pan-German, at whose door the Minnesota his
torians ultimately placed the blame for World War I, found
his teachers In Prlederlch Nietzsche and Heinrich von
Treltschke,

The former did not create Pan-Germanism, but

he did supply It with a philosophic stimulus and a sem
blance of Intellectual authority which fertilized Its soil.
Treltschke was far mightier than Nietzsche.

The Influence

he wielded from the University of Berlin was equal to that
of the Kaiser’s ministers.

Together, Nietzsche and

Treltschke pointed the way for three groups, the Prussian
Junkers, the university professors and the great manu
facturers.

The seeds of Armageddon, originally sown by

Treltschke and Nietzsche, were later cultivated by
Bernhardl, von Moltke and William 11.^^
The fruits of the Pan-German propaganda were har
vested In the Moroccan crises.

The German position In

respect to North Africa was largely determined by her
late arrival as a colonial power.

It seemed to the Pan-

German that the last "white m a n ’s country" was passing Into
the arms of France.

By the time the ’’unnerved’’ Pan-German

moved, the real question, the dlspostlon of North Africa
was lost, and the larger questlon--the division of the

world--remalned.

At bottom, the authors surmised, It was a

question of prestige that motivated the Pan-Germans.
After the loss of face In Morocco, German ImperlalAnderson, Davis and Tyler, pp. 354-^6»
^Ibld., p. 407.
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Ists began a vigorous prosecution of the means by which
their ends might be attained.

According to the Minnesota

scholars, the Bosnian crisis of I908 was a "direct sowing
of the dragon's teeth."

The two Kaisers had rattled their

swords, and England and Russia alike declined to fight.
If not directly, at least indirectly, German intrigue in
the Balkans was responsible for the First and Second Balkan
Wars,

In IÇl^., the dreams of all Pan-Germans were about

to be realized.

The war machine that had stood silent for

forty-three years was to resume its appointed and glorious
task.

From the inception of Pan-Germanism, Austria had

demonstrated her servility before her infinitely more
masterful and intelligent ally.

The more the "plot" of

July, 191^ was examined, the authors argued, the more
fixed became the conviction that the Pan-Germans had
adopted a deliberate project for achieving world domination
through three separate, but remotely connected stages:
(1) the defeat of Russia and France and the subsequent
establishment of Teutonic influence across the Balkans and
Turkey; (2) the defeat of Great Britain, the seizure of
British colonies and the substitution of German for British
seapower; and (3 ) the violation of the Monroe Doctrine to
permit German dominance in Latin America,

Had Great Britain

stood aloof, the "plan" called next for the conquest of the
United States.
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Anderson, Davis

and Tyler, p.

&?Ibid., pp. 515-17»

Ik 
on the question of whether or not Germany gave her
ally a "blank check," the Minnesota historians hedged, but
they disputed the honesty of German officials who denied
knowledge of the contents of the Austrian note.

The

evidence then available led the three authors to assume
that the German government knew that Austria intended to
precipitate a conflict menacing to the peace of Europe and
that she encouraged her ally to accomplish her selfish
ends.

"Such evidence would be enough for the densent

«68

jury."

Prederich C. Howe, noted American lawyer and author,
examined the origins of the war from essentially the same
perspective but did not exhibit a sense of patriotism
equal to that of the Minnesota scholars.

The Pan-German

moves in the Balkans, initiated in 1888 when concessions
for building the Bagdad Railroad were obtained, were seen
by Howe as the cause for the economic rivalry between
Great Britain and Germany which eventually led to the
war.

The protection by the two nations of what each of

them considered her exclusive rights in the Hear East led

to an environment conducive to war.
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An attempt has been made in this section to outline
the theses of some American historians and would-be his
torians who were wont to explain the origins of the war

^^Anderson, Davis and Tyler, p. ^02.
^'^Prederich C. Howe, "The Heart of the War,"
Harper's M agazine. CXXXVI, No. S (April, I 918), 729.
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primarily in terms of alleged Pan-German activities.
Although some of the authors considered looked to the more
remote causes of the war, their conclusions did not deviate
from those of their colleagues who examined only the im
mediate causes.

In each case, it was the intrigue of the

Pan-Germans at home and abroad that was seen as the prin
ciple cause for World War I.
V

One segment or "school” of early American war guilt
scholars defies classification.

The w o r k

of this group

is, however, characterized by one common denominator, a
tendency to examine only the immediate causes in assessing
the responsibility for World War I,

Most of them felt there

was no need to consider remote or fundamental causes since
the traditional antagonisms, which had for decades dis
rupted European tranquility, had subsided by 191^.

Indeed,

many authors, after the Moroccan and Persian settlements,
felt Europe was witnessing a new dawn of international
understanding.

Since the century-old national animosities

were seemingly settled, they reasoned, it was the immediate
causes— the events between June 28 and August 1, 191^—
that were of primary interest to the student of the w a r ’s
origins.
Publishing in 191$, Ellery C. Stowell, unaffected
by American implication in "Europe’s War," took a position
which approached that of the later revisionist historians,
although he was concerned principally with immediate causes.
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Looking at the problem of war guilt from a legalistic
perspective, Stowell discussed the ’’unnatural, perpetual
neutrality” of Belgium which, in 1839» had been forced on
the Francophile nation by the astute Lord Palmerston.
Since Germany violated Belgian neutrality--a situation to
which she had pledged her adherence--she was guilty of a
crime against the family of nations.
In a sense, the author here examined a "remote”
cause of the war, but the fact remains, Stowell used only
those events from the diplomatic history of nineteenth
century Europe that fit comfortably into his thesis, and
his attention was primarily directed at the diplomacy of
the year 191^..

Although his theme is more palatable to

the student than those of most of his contemporaries, he
still fell victim to the methodology used by some of his
colleagues discussing the beginnings of the ’’Great War."
Deductively from a basic hypothesis, Stowell constructed
his case against the Central Powers.
The major portion of the author’s research was accorded
the Austro-Serbian crisis.

It was inexplicable, even in

the face of a most serious grievance against her, that
Austria should "proceed so far in the abuse of force before
there had been any opportunity for investigation by the
70
powers.’’
Unexposed to the "illuminating" evidence pre
sented the world by Ambassador Morgenthau, Stowell accepted
70

Ellery G. Stowell, The Diplomacy of the War of
I91L (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 191^), p. 95*
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the official German statement that she had not received a
prior communication of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia»
It was, however, evident to Stowell that Germany ’’took
particular pains to be in a position where she could pro
claim ignorance of the note."

The advancement of German

aims in the Balkans would best be served by such a position.
If she were ignorant of the contents of the Austrian
ultimatum, she might refuse arbitration and insist on a
localized conflict.
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The disturbance of the balance of power emanating
from the consolidation of the European alliances was not,
Stowell maintained, a cause for the war.

Rather, it was

the state of mind created by the disturbance of the erst
while balance.

When German leaders recognized the poten

tial of the coalition facing them, they felt it mandatory
that a telling blow be quickly delivered.

When the German

point of view, philosophy of life and the influence of the
large military caste were taken into consideration, it was
inevitable that Belgium would be brushed aside to lose no
time in subjugating France.
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Adopting the "divided responsibility" thesis in pre
ference to the "sole German war guilt" theory, Stowell
anticipated later revisionist assessments of responsibility.
His conclusions, however, were radically different from the
historians writing after 1920.
_

Stowell, pp. 121-23.
7^Ibid., pp. I4.8O- 8I.

Austria, the Columbia
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professor argued, must accept principal blame for the
deliberate manner in which she concealed her intentions
while she prepared an impossible ultimatum.

’’Here, in

the first instance, must be blamed the war in which Europe
73
is now engaged.”
Since arbitration between Russia and
Austria had been the accepted precedent for settling
Balkan disputes, Germany's refusal to allow mediation of
the Austro-Serbian quarrel assured for herself a grave
responsibility.

Adopting the ’’horse and rider theory,”

Stowell explained that Germany, because of her irreconciable
stand and her superior intellectual and material develop
ment, accepted a larger share of the responsibility for
precipitating the general European war than her ally.
’’She risked the peace of Europe in a campaign after pres
tige.
Stowell dismissed Russian mobilization as an immediate
cause for the war because she had had provocation from
both of the Central Powers.

In the final analysis, Russian

action was a direct result of Germany's refusal to allow

the Austro-Russian difficulties to be solved in the manner
applicable to Balkan disputes,

England too was absolved

of any part of the blame since it was ’’unthinkable” that
England might remain neutral in the face of a German
violation of Belgian neutrality.
The actions of all European states were contributory
^^Stowell, p. 483,
T^Ibld., p. ^85.
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causes for the war, but the motivating force behind the
courses charted by each of the various nations, including
the Dual Monarchy, was German provocation.

In standing

between Austria and diplomatic intervention by the powers,
Germany assumed before civilization "the full responsi
bility for Austrian action. [ i t a l i c s mine.J

By her

refusal to cooperate with her sister states, Germany
shouldered by far the heaviest responsibility for the
war.
For an explanation of the German actions in 191^,
Stowell looked to the "state of mind" in Germany after
unification.

Instead of revering a Lincoln or "that

other hero who could not tell a lie," the people of Ger
many paid homage to a man, William II, who trampled the
express provisions of the constitution and a statesman,
Bismark, who knew how to suppress a part of the truth.
The European War offered a vivid example of the mental
mobilization of a whole nation.

The German people united

themselves in. support of the fundamental idea which lay at
the base of German political action — a worshiping of the
national existence expressed in an almost mystical adora
tion of the state.
The futility of attempting to write objective history
within a psychological framework has been alluded to above.
Stowell affor'ds yet another example of an outstanding
^^Stowell, p. ij.91.

7^Ibid., pp. 507-510.
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American scholar falling victim to generalizing on a
nation's character.

In explaining the origins of the war

psychologically, the Columbia professor relegated himself
to the position of a Gauss and left the impression that
his purpose in writing was first and foremost vindictive
and only secondly to throw some light on the events sur
rounding the outbreak of the war.
Arthur 0. Lovejoy, publishing in The Nation, adopted
Stowell's thesis that German actions explained the course
followed by all European powers in the summer of 19li|.
Essentially, Love joy was concerned to disprove the German
assertion that Russian mobilization was the real casus
belli.

Contrary to the official German explanation, the

ultimatum delivered to Russia was a "conditional declara
tion of war."

Officially, Germany had said she mobilized

only after Russian mobilization, that is, on July 31.
According to Lovejoy, the conference at Potsdam on the
evening of July 29, where the German plea for British
neutrality was drafted, constituted proof that Germany
expected to go to war early in the last week in July.
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Subsequent scholarship after 1920 proved that the confer
ence of July 29 where the final plans for war were allegedly
drafted was, in fact, never convened.
Professor Edward R. Turner of Yale University seconded
the stand taken by Stowell that it was Germany which

Arthur 0. Love joy, "What Was the Casus Belli?,"
The Nation. C, No. 2^92 (March i+, I9IS), 2^7.
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shouldered the burden of the war guilt, although Turner
saw Austria as a contributing factor.

The direct cause of

the war was the Austrian note to Serbia, and the nations
responsible were Germany and Austria because of their un
willingness to confer with the interested powers.

Turner

dismissed the possibility that Austria, a vassal state to
Germany, conceivably could have worked independently in
dispatching the Austrian ultimatum.

The eleventh hour

decision at the Ballplatz to mediate with Russia absolved
Austria of the immediate guilt and proved beyond "a shadow
of a doubt” that Germany was the moving force behind the
Austrian actions.

The German refusal to allow arbitration

of the dispute "proved” that the tension between Berlin
and St. Petersburg exceeded that between St. Petersburg and
Vienna.
The war resulted from a fatal series of mobiliza
tions.

Russian mobilization served as the German casus

belli.

Undecided whether or not to allow a partial mobili

zation against Austria at the outset, the German decision
to forbid any mobilization whatsoever was the direct cause
of the Russian mobilization in the north and ultimately the
cause of the war.
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To Turner, with a short-sighted view

typical of the American historian of 19lii--1920, the immed
iate cause of the outbreak of hostilities was Russian
mobilization, but the "underlying" cause was the German

7^Edward R. Turner, "The Immediate Causes of the
War," The Ration, Oil, No. 2&39 (January 27, I916), 101,
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ultimatum forbidding mobilization.

The diplomacy of the

previous forty-three years was inconsequential.
By 1916, Turner wrote, enough material had been
published that it was possible for the historian to write
above and beyond the realm of opinion.

The most valuable

documents upon which to base historical conclusions were
the British Blue Book and the French Yellow Book
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because,

in every case, "they are complete and corroborate one
another."

On the other hand, the German White Book was

"brief, sketchy and inspires little confidence.
Professor Oliver P. Chitwood of the University of
West Virginia was the great exponent of the contention
that an understanding of the remote causes of World War
I was not so important as a knowledge of the immediate
causes.

That nation which "fans a smoldering feeling of

rivalry into an act of hostility has committed a great
sin."^^

In support of his position, Chitwood maintained

that the most serious questions threatening a breach in
international relations had been settled by 191^»

No

question faced Europe that a desire for peace and wise
diplomacy could not have solved.

Still, Chitwood in

practice discussed what other historians called remote

^^France^ Ministère des Affaires Etrangères,
La
Guerre Européenne, 191^» Paris: Imprimerie nationale,

B ^ T u m e r , The Nati o n . CII,' No.

2639, 99.

^^Oliver P. Chitwood, The Immediate Causes of the
Great War (New York; Thomas Y. Crowell Co. , I917), p . v .
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causes, the difference being that Chitwood extricated only
those events, a discussion of which tended to corroborate
his basic premise that it was the immediate cause which
were really important.

The principal direct cause of the

war was Teutonic aggression in the Balkans.

After I878,

that aggression, Chitwood asserted, evolved from dangerous
to criminal.

In I9II and IÇl^, Germany obtained de jure

recognition from Russia and England respectively of her
railroad rights in the Balkans.

The last difference bet

ween England and Germany had been amicably settled prior to
82
the outbreak of hostilities.
Pan-German aims in the
Balkans had been realized, and a dispute in that area
seemingly could be resolved without resorting to armed
conflict.
Chitwood's thesis, after lightly disposing of all
remote causes, was built around the Austrian ultimatum to
Serbia.

He cited evidence designed to prove the charge

that the Serbian note was in reality a German-inspired
document with an Austrian signature.

The sources upon

which he relied were the London Times which, in July,

1917, first enlightened the world with the suggestion
that a war council had been convened at Potsdam July 5>
19ll|<-

The meeting, Chitwood asserted, discussed and

decided upon all points to be included in the Austrian
communication to Serbia.

Since It was probable that

Russia would refuse to submit to another affront to her
U2

'Chitwood, p. li|..
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national dignity as "protector of the Balkan Slavs" and
that war was likely to result, all parties attending the
fateful conference anticipated the subsequent action by
the belligerent powers,

Further substance was given the

"Potsdam myth" by Lichnowsky’s testifying that he had heard
that all present at the Potsdam Conference "gave their
unqualified assent" to the Serbian ultimatum with the fur
ther suggestion that it "would not be a bad thing if war
with Russia should result,"®^

The most damaging evidence

of all, of course, was the Morgenthau tale.
The powers that started the flame were responsible
for the world conflagration.

Since the unreasonable

Austrian ultimatum was the cause of the war. Great Britain^
Prance and Russia were completely exonerated.

Germany,

however, by "her own admission," j^Morgenthau’s testimony]
shared equally with Austria the responsibility for the
demands made on Serbia,

This "fact" established, the

responsibility for the European war fell solely on Austria
and Germany,

The testimony which Chitwood found so damning to the
Central Powers was used by nearly every historian concerned
with the origins of the war after the publication of the
Morgenthau "revelations,"

It was principally from the

evidence offered by the ex-ambassador, Lichnowsky and

Meuhlon that the consideration of immediate causes rather
G^Chitwood, p. 63.

®^Ibld,, p. 6i|.
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than remote causes became the vogue among American war
guilt students.

With such ostensibly reputable sources

upon which to base historical conclusions, it appeared
that the direct causes were indeed more important than the
general diplomatic picture between I 87I and 1^1^.

Of

course, such an approach relieved the historian or pseudo
historian from tedious research entailed in examining and
evaluating the more remote evidence on hand.
From the testimony concerning the Potsdam Conference,
writers deduced a multitude of conclusions, few of which
were warranted even if based upon that falsified infor
mation,

For example, M. Louise McLoughlin, writing in

Current History, intimated that the Potsdam Conference
was not only concerned with the Austrian ultimatum, but
that there, on July 5, IÇl^, a "deep laid" plan was drafted
by the Central Powers in which the invasion of Belgium
was only the first step toward world domination.

Ad

The naivete of a writer who assumed that a plan for
world conquest, even if one did exist, which it did not,
could be conceived in one day or, for that matter, "Twelve

Days" is quite beyond comprehension.

There is absolutely

no evidence, conclusive or otherwise, unless extracts are
taken from the writings of extreme nationalistic German
theoreticians and applied to real political situations, for
the charge that Germany intended to conquer the world.
Louise McLoughlin, "The Beginnings of the
War," Current History, XIII, No. 3 (December, 1917),

493.
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That the German government never officially repudiated the
statements of a few philosophers not even remotely connect
ed to the government does not constitute

"proof" of anything.

The United States has never felt it necessary to officially
condemn the ideas of American expansionists— geopoliticians
like Alfred T. Mahan or politicians like Theodore Roosevelt-because their imperialistic philosophies have not been the
prevailing guiding lights of American foreign policy.
Neither were the ideas

of Nietzsche or Treitschke n e c 

essarily the guide posts by which German statesmen wended
their way diplomatically in the nineteenth and early twent
ieth centuries.

American historians publishing in the p er 

iod 191^-1920, however, were wont to adopt the preachings
of any German whose ideas might fit conveniently into their
general theses,

and apply them as the motivation behind the

actions of the German government.

A case could conceivably

be made that the United States wished to conquer the world
if one were careful to pick and choose the sources upon
which to base his thesis.

lil/hen all of the facts were taken

into consideration, however,

such a thesis would crumble.

This is precisely what happened to much of the

"deathless

prose" produced by American historians during the war years.
Rejecting the interpretation generally accepted by
early students of responsibility, David J. Hill,

a former

United States ambassador to Germany, laid at the door of
one man, William II, the blame for the World War.

Before

the answer to the Austrian note had even been received from
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Serbia, the Kaiser, according to Hill, was arranging to
confine the war to the continent, operating upon assurances,
which Hill contended were never given, from King George
that England would remain neutral.

Despite his promises

to Russia that he would use his influence to restrain
Austria, William II "spoke not a word for peace.
Thinking he could have the war on his own terms, the Kaiser
deliberately plunged the -whole continent into war.

His

role consisted of "flashing his sword in the face of the
Tsar determined Europe would have nothing to say about it."
To the author, the war was a manifestation of the Kaiser’s
personal temperament.

Hill, the diplomat-turned-historian,

not only disregarded all remote causes, but he also wrote
off the usually conceived immediate causes as immaterial,
placing the responsibility solely on William II.
To Munroe Smith, the immediate causes of the war
were of predominant importance since German foreign policy
had changed very little after the retirement of Bismark.
The aim of the Bismarkian policy was the prevention of a
coalition of superior powers against Germany.

Bismark’s

conduct of foreign affairs was quite in keeping with
Theodore Roosevelt’s formula.

If he carried a big stick,

he walked softly.

"Only against France was the big stick
8?
occasionally shaken."

^^David J. Hill, "The Kaiser’s Responsibility,"
Current History, XIII, No. 3 (December, 191?)» 497»
^^Munroe Smith, Militarism and Statecraft (New
York; G. P. Putnam & Sons, I9I 8 ), p. 31

88
That policy was not changed after I 89O except in
relation to Russia,

The lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty

in 1890 provided the event upon which the rival alliances
were forged.

This was the extent of Smith's analysis of

what might be termed remote causes, although he, like many
of his contemporaries, attempted to psycho-analyse the
German nation and applied the nebulous, academic state
ments found in German intellectual history to real situa
tions.

The German actions in 191^, according to Smith,

were attributable to a "state of mind" which evolved from
a modest beginning provided by Machiavelli.
The most decisive of the immediate causes was the
German decision to declare war because of Russian mobili

zation.

The proper answer to mobilization was mobilization,

not war,^^

In the brief time between the Austrian ultimatum

to Serbia and the German ultimatum to Russia, every European
power except Germany and the Dual Monarchy worked toward
averting war.

Even if German apologies were accepted.

Smith argued, the burden of aggression could not be shifted
from the Central Powers to the Allies unless Russian
mobilization was an act of war, which was precisely what
later "revisionists" contended.
The only feasible defense for the Central Powers,
since they could not shift the responsibility to the
Entente, was, according to Smith, the assumption that
war was inevitable and that Germany and Austria engaged
®®Smith, pp. l|6-i|-7o
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in a preventive war in 191^.

Hostile Allied intentions

that would prove such a statement, however, were nowhere
to be found in the

r e c o r d .

Looking at the problem posed by the violation of
Belgian territorial integrity from the moralist vantage
point, Smith maintained that necessity could not Justify
the act.

The only immediate sanction of internation law

was the reaction of general sentiment, and it was difficult
to understand why the nation that found it necessary to
"scrap" her treaty obligations should manifest indignation
when she encountered general reprobation.

On the face of

the record--not the whole record but only those portions
which Smith found compatible with his general thesis—
the responsibility rested solely with the Central Powers.
In 191^5 the Austrian and German governments succumbed to
the mistake Bismark had avoided and sacrificed the moral
advantages of the defensive position in favor of the stra
tegic advantages of a rapid attack.
To Justify expansion through war. Smith searched
German intellectual history for a philosophic doctrine
which would suffice, and he found that Germany very simply
had applied the Darwinian "survival of the fittest" to the
competition among nations.

In "Neo-Darwinism," Smith found

an explanation for all German activity after unification.
The German feeling of superiority, which was realized by
interpreting and reinterpreting history, would be extended
Smith, pp. ^5-59*
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to all corners of the world after the struggle for power
and the survival of those nations best qualified for dom
inion.

Neo-Darwinism found a religious base in the German

assumption that the struggle for power was the method of
progress ordained by God.^O
Professor Smith recognized land hunger, national
allusions of a mission and militaristic sentiment as
contributing factors leading to World War I,

These

sociological phenomena could be seen in any nation at
some time in its development in proper balance, but
exaggeration of any one of them amounted to a "national
mania."

A nation could become temporarily insane, and the

fact that Germany insisted that she had been on the defen
sive in 191^ indicated to Smith that she was afflicted by
a "mania of persecution."^^

Temporary national insanity

was the only plea which would be accepted by the "Supreme
Court of Civilization."
The immediate causes, particularly the diplomacy of
the "Twelve Days," was enough to convince Norman Hapgood,
the "muckraking" editor of Harper’s Weekly., that Germany
was solely responsible for World War I.

The factors, a

knowledge of which Hapgood felt was necessary to properly
interpret the diplomacy immediately proceeding the war,
were as follows:
(1) Austria was not a nation but a dynasty.
^^Smith, pp. 2IO-II4..
^^Ibld., pp. 261-62.

Her
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foreign policy was directed toward holding the dynasty
together.

The murder of the heir apparent gave Austria

the chance she had long awaited,
(2 ) Russia had made it clear after the Bosnian coup

that she would not again allow a Slavic state to be humbled
before the Dual Monarchy.

She would have gladly accepted

any compromise short of the obliteration of Serbia.
(3) The opening of the Kiel Canal doubled the effect
iveness of the German fleet.

Domestic troubles in Germany

and growing Russian strength led German diplomats to
believe that August, igi^ was psychologically the right
moment to strike, despite the knowledge that Austria was
ready to mediate her dispute with Russia.
Germany, Hapgood maintained, forced the war in I91I+,
Austria was merely her ’’c at’s paw.”

Germany encouraged

the insulting tone of the Austrian note to Serbia, and by
the time the naive Austrian diplomats realized they had
been duped, it was too late,
A slightly different, although not particularly

popular, twist was applied the events proceeding the war
in the Catholic World.

To the author, it was perfectly

evident from the terms of the ultimatum that it was framed
with the intent to precipitate a war.

The note merely

served to substantiate the maxim that ’’given the choice
of two courses, Austria is sure to choose the worst.
^^Norman Hapgood, ’’Who Caused the W a r , ” H a r p e r ’s
Weekly, DIX, No. 3011 (September
I9I4), 221- 23 .---

93’’The War in Europe,” Catholic World, XCIX,
No. 594 (September, I9I4 ), 853«
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The Instigator of the step taken by the Catholic Dual
Monarchy, according to the World *s account, was Prime
Minister Stephen Tisza, one of the most active Calvinists
in Hungary.

The German Emporer did all in his power to

prevent the war.

Even the Socialist journal, Vorwarts,

which had been adamant in its opposition to the Crown,
admitted that William II unreservedly worked for peace
during the pre-war decade.

In the instance of the war,

the Kaiser suffered from the evil of all one-man govern
ments— "the influence of an irresponsible back stair
clique,The

tendency among historians undoubtedly

would be to dismiss as baseless the conclusions of a
denominational journal such as the World. Ironically,
however, the analysis examined above more closely ap
proximated the truth, except in reference to the pacific
Count Tisza, than the more "scholarly" works by some
American historians.
VI
The research of Charles Seymour
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into the origins

of the war stands out from the efforts of his contempor
aries because of his multi-visioned approach to the pro
blem of war responsibility.

His methodology very closely

approximated that of later scholars concerned with war
^Catholic W o rld , XCIX, Ho. 99U» 899.
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/
Seymour was in I9I0 a professor of history at Yale
University, the institution of which he later became
president,
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guilt in that he examined both the remote and immediate
causes of the war.

It was obvious, he wrote, that so great

a conflagration could not arise from one assasination alone.
Merely the "occasion" for the conflict, the murder was the
spark which ignited the magazine; if it had not been for
thirty years accumulation of powder, "there could have
been no explosion."
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The fact that Professor Seymour's

conclusions did not conform to those of later scholars can
be attributed in large part to the paucity of documentary
evidence whereby the whole truth might be discovered.

The

addition of several chapters after the outbreak of the war— the bulk of the research was completed before August, igi^—
debased the work since those additions were written with the
knowledge of what the diplomacy of forty years, or what
was known of it, meant in long run terms.
German pre-eminence in Europe was realized under the
strong hand of the "Iron Chancellor;" German hegemony
began with the creation of the Triple Alliance,

What had

started as military primacy with a victory over France in

1870-71 had become political primacy.

In the process,

however, Bismark had made the rapproachment of Russia and

France inevitable since "the farthest is from Germany,
the closer is to

F

r

a

n

c

e

.

Relatively confident that a

peace conducive to her growth could be maintained, the
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Charles Seymour, The Diplomatic Background of
the War, I 87O-I 9I4 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
191b), p. 1,
07

Ibid., p.
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German nation, between I 87I and

underwent an extra

ordinary material and moral transformation which led
directly to the diplomatic crises which characterized the
first decade of the twentieth century and finally led to
the "Great War."^^ German economic expansion was a threat
to the supremacy long held by Great Britain.

Germany,

which heretofore had stood in awe of her European neigh
bors, now entered into competition with them.

When the

ambitious German state arrived on the colonial scene,
however, she found that most of the world had been par
celed out among the other imperialistic nations, chiefly
Great Britain, France and The Netherlands.

Entering the

imperialistic scramble rather late in the game, Germany
concentrated on economic penetration in the Far East, Near
East and Africa,

The Near East looked particularly ripe

after the Austrian rapproachment.

Through Austria and

Turkey, Germany hoped to open a path to Mesopotamia from
where she could compete with the British position in
Egypt.
This far,

the Seymour thesis squared remarkably well

with later historians who were blessed with considerably
more evidence with whi ch to work.
conceivably be a reaso n for the

Searching for what could

"sudden" German adoption

of a "bellicose attitude" in foreign policy, Seymour went
awry,

adding conjecture to fact.

Because Germany felt

the need for a political posit io n comparable to her econ
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Seymour, p. 60.

9^
omic stature,

a "vague desire for power in general" gave

rise to the demand in Germany for a "world e m p i r e . A
moral transformation permitting the erection of a new
value system took place.

Germany,

it was felt,

ought to

play a part proportionate to her wealth and population,
and Germans g enerally realized that goal could be achieved
only through force.

No m atter h o w insistent or sincere

might be the contention that dictates of self-preservation
inspired such an attitude,
frame

Seymour argued,

of mind was undeniably aggressive.

reverted to the popular technique

the German
Here, Seymour

of mass psycho-analysis

applying statements of Nietzsche, Berhardi and Treitschke
to explain German political action.
similar to those of his

His conclusions were

colleagues who indulged in the will-

o-the-wisp and equally as indefensible.
On the w h o l e , the bellicose attitudes

of the German

nation were not m a n i f est ed in international relations

at

the outset, but,

it

despite the Kaiser's wis h for peace,

was apparent that the

"universal demand for expansion" in

Germany would soon bring that nation into conflict with
her Eur ope an neighbors.

Seymour absolved the Kaiser of

personal respon si bil ity for the war and indicted instead
the Prussian Junkers,
people in general.

the capitalists

and the German

William II was m er el y the tool through

which the m ili t a r y caste worked.
The diplomatic rev olution wh i c h witnessed the Franco-

'^^Seymour, p. 88.
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Russian rapproachment and later Great Britain’s adherence
to the Triple Entente ended the Bismarkian system of
’’antagonize and dominate,”

The question to be determined

was whether Germany would peaceably accept such a situ
ation,

The altered international situation caused

Germany to change her official tone from one of concili
ation to one of "bellicose brutality" and resulted in the
atmosphere which characterized Europe during the first
decade of the twentieth century.

After I9OO, three quick

"blows" were struck to maintain German prestige: the
Kaiser’s Tangiers speech in support of the Sultan, the
Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
dispatching of the gunboat. Panther, to Agadir on the
African coast.

It was a similar blow for German prestige

that was largely accountable for the outbreak of World
War I in 19ll|,^°^
After her frustration in North Africa, Germany turned
anew to the Balkans where each of the major powers had an
interest.

For Germany, the outcome of the First Balkan

War was dismal.
badly beaten.

The German-trained Turkish army had been
Nothing would please Austria and Germany

more than to have the victorious Balkan states scrap the
Treaty of London and resume hostilities.

The implication

is that Germany goaded the Balkan states into rebuking the
London settlement and resuming hostilities, an assertion
which Seymour would find difficult to substantiate,
^^^Seymour, pp. I6O-65»
169- 70.

l O l j b i d . , pp.

Al-
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though none of the interested powers were contented with
the settlement of Bucharest after the Second Balkan War,
it evoked even more displeasure in the Central Powers,
because the territorial gains by Serbia represented a blow
102
both to their prestige and their Near Eastern interests.
Austria's political and economic domination of the Balkans
which, after I908, appeared near now seemed threatened,
the factor which determined the future course of the Central
Powers.
By diplomacy of force, the new Serbia, which blocked
German expansionist goals in the Near East, had to be
paralyzed and Turkey strengthened.

Bulgaria had to be

dragged back under German domination and reinforced by the
Macedonian provinces she failed to secure in I913.

To

the Germans, a permanent■league of Turkey, Bulgaria,
Rumania and Greece, backed by the Central Powers, was
mandatory if Pan-German aims in the Near East were to be
103
attained.
Patiently, the Central Powers awaited a false
move by Serbia.

The assasination of the Austrian heir

apparent provided a casus belli better suited to the aims
of the Dual Monarchy and Germany than they could have
possibly devised.

The time was ripe for the permanent

annihilation of Serbia and the realization of Pan-German
dreams in the Balkans.

Toward that end, German diplomacy

of the "Twelve Days" was directed.
^‘^^Seymour, p. 238.
pp. 242-^3.

Austria operated as
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a Teutonic "oat's paw" fully assured of unlimited German
cooperation after receiving the carte blanche.
Seymour contended that it was not for the historian
to "anathraatize the uncompromising tone assumed by Germany
in the crisis of 191^,"^^^ but that is precisely what he
did.

His thesis, after June 28, IÇl^, does not materially

differ from those of his most vindictive contemporaries.
Seymour pronounced Germany guilty as charged on every count,
a rather disappointing conclusion to what began as an ex
tremely objective and scholarly piece of work.

Still, in

spite of its shortcomings, Seymour's analysis of the origins
of the war is distinguishable from the efforts of most of
his colleagues by the attention he accorded remote causes,
Although the writings of nearly every American his
torian and/or popular writer concerned with the subject of
war responsibility between IÇl^ and 1920 condemned the
Central Powers and defended the Entente, all American
scholars were not so sure that the origins of the war
could be painted in blacks and whites.

One of the earliest

to refuse to swallow unflinchingly the medicine offered
by the Entente physicians was H. C. Mercer, a noted anth
ropologist and student of European diplomacy.

In a letter

to the editor of The Nation in I 916, Professor Mercer took
issue with the cut and dried thesis propounded by Professor
Turner in his "Immediate Causes of the War,"
Mercer appealed to the historian to refrain from

10i|.Seymour, p. 287.
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picking and choosing his evidence and to consider all of
the available facts.

He pointed out a few known facts that

Turner "over lo oke d” in his. indictment of Germany.

Turner

did not take cognizance of the so-called Westminister
Telegram from Germany to her ally wherein Austria was
urged to discuss h e r differences with Russia.

Conversely,

neither England nor France had pressed Russia to cease
mo bi lization w h i c h Germany had characterized as "menacing."
Austria's eleventh hour decision to discuss her differences
with Russia was

seen b y Mercer as a direct result of the

Westminister Telegram.

Furthermore, Mercer charged.

Turner had failed to discuss fully the Russian change from
a partial to full mobi li zat ion in the face of German
warnings that such an act would be considered "war
like."

Neither had the Yale historian taken note of

the captured diplomatic letter from Russia to Belgium
telling of the French government's promise of support
to Russia before Germany had made

a move.

The signi

ficance of other published correspondence in which E n g
land's adherence to Russia and France was intimated well
in advance of the German moves

on Belgium had "inadvert

ently" been overlooked b y Turner.
why had three members

Lastly, Mercer asked,

of the B ritish Cabinet resigned

after the Eng lis h decision to go to war?
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As early as I919, George B. McClellan^^^ refuted
C. Mercer,
Oil, No.

"Letter to the Editor," The Nation.,

2690 (April 13, 1916), i+06- 07.

^®^McClellan was a professor in modern European h i s 
tory at Princeton University.
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the contention that all American historians felt Germany
was solely responsible for precipitating World War I.
Unfortunately, McClellan wrote, because of British pre
eminence on the high seas and the cutting of the cable,
many Americans had allowed themselves to be swayed by
bellicose propaganda, lost their sense of proportion and
assumed an open belligerency not In keeping with the
107
American position of neutrality.
There were some
"generous souls" who Insisted that neutrality was cowardice,

that there was a "higher duty" owed civilization.

Those

Individuals, McClellan commented, would throw the nat
ional Interest to the winds and have the United States
enter on whichever side they felt was fighting for human
ity.

In sounding his note of caution, McClellan pointed

out the folly of blaming what had happened on any one man
or, for"'that matter, any one nation.

He preferred to look

to European nationalism as the principal cause of the war.
The feeling than abroad In all European countries that
states and nationalities must be counterminus and that
races be governed as units was, McClellan contended, the
real cause of the war.^^^
The German violation of Belgium was no better nor
worse than Great Britain’s violation of the Portuguese
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George B. McClellan, "The War from an American
Point of View," Scribners Magazine, LVII, No, 38
(March, 1915), 359%
^O^Ibld., p. 360.
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colony of Lourenco Marques during the Boer War; both,
however, were officially explained in terms tending to
make ’’p i r a c y ” respectable.

After hearing the philan

thropic statements by Germany and Great Britain alike,
it was, McClellan noted, refreshing to hear a Latin nation
like Italy justify her imperialistic venture in Tripoli
on the grounds that she simply coveted it.^^^

Because

Germany arrived on the imperialistic scene after the
boundaries of Europe had been rigidly fixed,

it was apparent

that she would have to look beyond the confines of the con
tinent for territorial aggrandisement.
contended,

Still, McClellan

she ’’stole” less than any other modern imper

ialistic nation.
The events of IÇl^ rudely demolished the dreams of
man y observers of the European scene.

It had been widely

felt that a new era of internationalism had dawned,

Now,

it became apparent that twenty-five years of international
ism was due to the force of economic necessity, not to the
call of human brotherhood.

In the same way,

alliance systems were born.

the opposing

It was as absurd to assume

that the powers grouped themselves into alliances because
of international sympathies as it was to assume that either
of the great alliances came into existence purely as ’’pro
tective f o r c e s . E c o n o m i c

rivalry with Germany was the

motivation behind England's entrance into the Triple Entente,
^^^McClellan,

Scribners M a g a z i n e , LVII, No. 38,

llOlbid., p. 363.

361.

102
while La Revanche, the French watchword since I87I, prompted
France in the same direction.

Russia's insistence on

placing herself at the head of the world’s Slavic peoples,
implying a crushing of the Dual Monarchy, impelled Russia
to take the course of Great Britain and France.
The charge of militarism, McClellan contended, laid
with equal force against all of the belligerents.

All

nations, by 191^» were approaching the point where only
two alternatives were open--war or disarmament.

Since the

national hatreds of the powers went too deep to permit the
latter, it was merely a question of who would strike first.
The conflagration might have been prevented in IÇl^, but
it was "inevitable" eventually as the product of the spirit
of nationality which had ruled Europe for a full century.
By 1917, the appearance of T. Lothrop Stoddard’s
Present Day Europe; Its National States of Mind gave
indications that revisionist sentiment had already begun
to take hold among a minority of American scholars. The
112
trend which started with McClellan and Stoddard,
how
ever, did not manifest itself in a majority of American
historians until the fourth decade of the century, but it
is interesting to note what Stoddard did with the same body
of facts his contemporaries almost unanimously used to
indict Germany.

For the point of view expressed in his

book, Stoddard might well be labeled the first American

111McClellan, Scribners Magazine, LVII, No. 38, 3^k'
112),
"Professor in modern European history at Harvard
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revisionist on the causes of World War I.
Germany, he wrote, felt she was fighting to save the
European heritage from Asiatic barbarism.
joined Russia,
civilization,

When England

It was the vilest treachery to the cause of
since Inside Germany,

a German-Russlan conflict.

England,

the war was viewed as
the Germans felt, was

not only fighting on the side of barbarism but also on the
side of moral lnjustlce--unjust because Russia had begun
the war to prevent
murder.”
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"a thorough expiation of a wretched

Serbia was

viewed by Germans as a Russian

"cat's paw" of Pan-Slavlsm which epitomized the lust for
world domination.

To Stoddard must be given the dis

tinction of presenting the first unbiased appraisal of
German public opinion,

and h ow It viewed the war.

Striking the note upon which scores of American h i s 
torians In the next two decades were to launch their studies,
Stowell argued It was absurd to assign Europe's Ills to a
single cause such as secret diplomacy, Prussian militarism,
British navallsm or Pan-Slavlsm and then "verbally demolish
this poor bogey with the announcement of the advent of the
Golden Age."
set of men.

The cataclysm was not the work of any man or
Its substance was the Inexorable legacy of

the past.^^^
The Intention In this chapter has not been to examine
^^^T. Lothrop Stoddard, Present Day Europe; Its
National States of Mind (New York: The Century Co.,
1$Ï7), P* 77.
^^ ^I b l d , . pp. 311-16,
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the works of all writers publishing between IÇlij- and 1920
who concerned themselves with the origins of the ’’Great
War."

Selections were made because they appear representa

tive of the various approaches to the problem posed by war
responsibility.

Moreover, each of the authors considered

above seems to have exerted a marked Influence upon his
contemporaries.
Obviously, a chronological dividing line cannot be
sharply drawn In a study of this sort whereby all historians
or scholars belonging to one "school" will fall on one side
of the line and all those propounding another Interpre
tation on the opposite side.

The year I92O was selected

as a dividing point, not because there was a complete
break with scholars of the previous decade In that year,
but because works commonly referred to as "revisionist"
appeared more often after I 920.

There were American

historians whose views on war responsibility were never
materially affected by the publication of the post-war
diplomatic collections.

On the other hand, the so-called

revisionists began publishing before 1920, despite the fact
that the documents necessary to re-evalute the earlier
historical Interpretations remained hidden In the national
repositories of Europe.
Because of a scarcity of documentary evidence whereby
the whole story might be told and a decided affinity among
American war guilt scholars after 1917 to place their pat
riotic duty above Intellectual responsibility, the theses
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of early writers Investigating the origins of World War I
varied only In approach.

Almost to a man the American

historical profession, seconded by popular writers and
pseudo-historians, rose to proclaim Germany guilty of pre
cipitating a tragedy unequaled In the annals of human
history.
With Europe aflame, the learned professors constructed
a basic text, although the more Imaginative among them
applied a few novel twists.

The growth of Germany was

predicated on diabolical ambition, the Intellectual prophets
for which were Frederlch the Great, Nietzsche and Treltschke,
After 1871, Germany secretly and carefully had plotted a
war, the first step toward world dominion,

Austria was

held under the German thumb, and the Sarajevo Incident
served as an excuse for the German blood bath.

The fatal

decision that the long-awaited moment had arrived was made
at Potsdam July S> l?!^.

After that date, Germany opposed

all offers of mediation and pushed her "cat’s paw” closer
to the abyss where a fall would produce Armegeddon— the
battleground where good, the Entente, and evil, the Central
Powers, would meet at last to determine the fate of mankind.
Because Germany refused all offers to mediate and
consistently frustrated the offers of the peacemakers,
Sazonov and Lord Grey, she was guilty before the "Supreme
Court of Civilization.”

World War I was the product of

German ambition, and because of this, responsibility for
the holocaust rested solely upon her shoulders.

CHAPTER III
REVELATIONS BEARING ON THE ORIGINS
OF THE WAR, 1917-1930

In 1925» a movement backed by prominent British
citizens, including George Peabody Gooch, H. G. Wells,
George Bernard Shaw and Maynard Keynes, was launched to
delete Article 231, the "war guilt clause," from the
Treaty of Versailles.

Although the motives of those

supporting the movement differed, the British scholars
were unanimous in their belief that the document con
stituted an insuperable barrier to international under
standing.

Keynes might feel the need for revision on the

ground that the treaty was economically unrealistic,
while Gooch could sincerely believe that Germany was wronged
by the guilty appelation hung on her at Versailles.
The reaction against the terms imposed by the victors
in 1919 was not confined, however, to Great Britain but
was felt in each of the erstwhile belligerent nations.
The rapid change in sentiment among some of the world’s
leading scholars was attributable to the revolutionary
upheavals in Germany, Austria and Russia.

In repudiation

of the wartime regimes, the new socialist governments
threw open their national archives in hopes that the
world’s historians might find some basis in the secret
documents for placing responsibility for the recent con-
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filet on the previous capitalist governments.
The new evidence convinced a minority of American
historians that the blacks and whites painted by the
Entente propagandists were at best gradations of grey.
Scholars who had retained their sense of balance during
the war aligned themselves with others who had recovered
from the patriotic binge and began a systematic study of
the documentary evidence bearing on the war's origins.
In contrast to the tremendous job of "popular scholar
ship"^ during the war, the research done after the war
constituted "one of the most remarkable examples of productlve scholarship In a century."

A closer examination

of the new documentary material upon which American histor
ians studying the problem of war responsibility were to
rely Increasingly Is In order.

Until World War I, It had

been the practice to keep the diplomatic records relating
to the origins of wars under wraps for as long as fifty
years.

In IÇl^, the documents concerning the Franco-

Prusslan War had not yet been fully published.

But

this was not I 87O, and the first hint of what was to
come appeared In print less than one year after the
outbreak of hostilities.

The Belgian archives were

seized by Germany and extracts published under the edltor^Wllllam T. Hutchinson, "The American Historian In
Wartime," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXIX,

No, 2 (September, 19^2), 153-86.
2
Harry Elmer Barnes, A History of Historical Writing
(Norman; University of Oklahoma Press, 1938), p. 280.
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ship of Bernhard Schwertfeger.^

Entente historians, how

ever, were wont to dismiss the findings of Schwertfeger
until it was found that much in the captured Belgian
documents was substantiated by the state papers from
other national repositories.
In 1919, the Austrian and German governments each
published a collection of documents bearing on the crisis
of 191^.^

J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and

Friedrich Thimme, in 1922, collaborated in editing the
German documents on the period 1871-191^ under the now
famous title. Grosse Politik.
In the same year, a more complete collection was
published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment
entitled Official German Documents Relating to the World
^Belgische AktenstUcke 190S-191^ Berichte der
belgischen Vertreter in Berlin, London und Paris
an den Minister des ^ussern in Brussel. Ed. byBernhard
Schwertfeger. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fur
Politik und Geschichte m.b.h., 191^<>

^Austian Red Book. Diplomatische Aktenstucke zur
Vorgeschichte des Krieges^ 191^. Ed. by Roderich Gooss.
2 vols. Vienna: L. W, Seidel & Co., 1919*
Germany. Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch.
I4. Vols. Charlottenburg: Deutsche Verlagsgesellshaft fîîr
Politik und Geschichte m.b.h,, I919. Coll. by Karl
Kautsky, Eng. ed. Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Outbreak of the World War, German Documents Col
lected by Karl Kautsky. New York: Oxford University
Press. 192^.
g
Germany. Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen
Kabinette 1871-191^, Sammlung der Akten des Deutschen
Auswartigen Amtes. Ed. by J, Lepsius, A. MendelssohnBartholdy and Friedrich Thimme.^ Ij.0 vols. Berlin:
Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fur Politik und Geschichte
m.b.h., 1922-27.

109
W a r This tremendous example of cooperative scholarship
required the collective efforts of scores of historians.
It included: the testimony of Germans from all walks of
life before a committee appointed by the post-war German
government to investigate the war guilt problem; records
of the reaction in Germany to President Wilson's peace
note of 1916; and documents relating to negotiations bet
ween Germany and the United States concerning the sub
marine problem.
After the Austrian archives were opened to scholars.
Professor A. F. Pribram of Harvard published his extractions
under the title. The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary,

1879-191^ »

Later, two Austrian scholars, Ludwig Bittner

and Hans Webersberger, published on behalf of the govern
ment an eight volume collection of the documents bearing
on the years, I908-I9I3 , which threw new light on Austro6
Serbian and Austro-Russian relations.
Russia was the first of the former Allied powers
to open her archives.

The Bolshevik government never

did undertake a systematic publication of all documents
^Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Official
German Documents Relating to the World War, 2 vols. New
York: Oxford University Press, I923.
7
A. P. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of AustrlaHungary.
Cambridge: Ëarvard University Press, 1920-

1921.

^Austria.
0*sterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von
der bosnischen Krise I9O 8 bis^zum Kriegsausbruch I9IË.
Diplomatische Akenstücke des osterreichisch-ungarlschen
Ministeriums des Xussern. Ed. by L. Bittner and Hans
Webersberger. 8 vols. Vienna: A. Holzhausen, 1930.
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relating to the origins of the war, but in the winter of

1917- 1918, the Soviets published the so-called "Secret
Treaties of the Entente" in Pravda exploding the hypo
thesis that idealism had been the motivating factor behind
Allied actions in 191^.^

Later, the Russian revelations

were thoroughly analysized by a number of American scholars
including Ray Stannard B a k e r . T o

the "Secret Treaties,"

the Soviet government added in 1922 a massive collection
of Materials for the Study of Franco-Russian Relations from
_

_

1910- 191^ »

In the early 1920's French and German scholars,
X

^

notably Rene Marchand, Emile Laloy

12

and Priederich Stieve,

gained access to the Russian archives.

From the pen of the

latter came a multi-volume edition of Russian documents and
secondary sources like his Isvolsky and the World War.

13

^The "Secret Treaties" were rearranged and trans
lated into German in Dokumente aus den russichen
Geheimarchiven Soveit sie bis zum Juli I9IÜ Eingegangen
Sind. Berlin; Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft ftir politik
und Geschichte m.b.h., I9I 8.
^^Ray Stannard Baker (ed.), Woodrow Wilson, Life
and Letters, 8 vols. New York; Doubleday, Page & Co.,
1927- 1939.
11
Materialy po Istorii Franko-Russkikh Otnoscenni
za 1910- 191^ . Moscow, 1922.
12/
Emile Laloy, Les documents secrets des Archives
du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Russie. Paris:
Editions Bossard, I919.
Un Livre Noir: Diplomatique d 'avant-Guerre d'après
les Documents des Archives Russes, 1910-191^° Ed. by
René Marchand. 2 vols. Paris; Librairie du travail, 1922-23.

13 Isvolsky, Per diplomatische Schriftwechsel
Iswolskis I9II-I914. Aus den Geheimakten der russischen
Staatsarchivel Ed. by Friedrich Stieve.
Vols, Berlin:
Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fur Politik und Geschichte
m.b.h., 192^.
Friedrich Stieve, Isvolsky and the World War. Trans.
E, W. Dickes, London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., I926,

Ill
Besides the official work done In the Russian archives,
the Slebert p a p e r s , w h i c h purported to be duplicates of
official dispatches between London and St. Petersburg
copied by the wartime secretary of the Russian embassy In
London, fell Into the hands of German scholars and were
published.

They were later edited anew by the English

scholars, Temperley and Gooch, In the British documentary
collection.

15

At the outset, neither the French nor English govern
ments opened Its archives to the scrutiny of the world's
scholars, but the publication of the secret Russian docu
ments exposed the wartime French Yellow Book^^ for what
It was— the most seriously distorted of all the official
apologies Issued during the war.

17

The new documentary

evidence gave scholars a start toward checking the validity
of the official wartime statements.

One of the earliest

studies of this sort was undertaken by a German scholar,
von Romberg, whose work. The Falsifications of the Russian
Orange Book,^^ Included the pre-war diplomatic exchanges
^^Benno von Slebert, Diplomatische Aktenstu zur
Geschichte der Entente-polltlk der Vorkrlegsjabre. Z vols.
Berlin; Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fWr Politik und
Geschichte m.b.h., 1921.
^^Brltlsh Documents on the Origins of the War, I898iT
vols. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1926-I938.

191^ . Ed. by G. Pi Gooch and Harold W. V. Temperley.
16

/

France. Mlnlst&re des Affaires Etrangères. La
guerre européens. Documents diplomatiques 191^. ParTs:
Imprimerie nationale, 191^.
^^Barnes, A History of ..., p. 282.
^^Dle Falschungen des russichen Orangebuches,
Herausgegeben von Frelherrn G. von Romberg. Berlin
& Leipzig, 1922.
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between St. Petersburg and Paris and laid bare many of the
suppressions in the earlier Russian apology.
Despite the widely heard charge that the revelations
were simply German and Bolshevik propaganda, the veracity
of the newly-published documentary evidence was creditably
enhanced when it was recognized that the new releases
attempted to discredit wartime governments.

The authen

ticity of the Russian papers was then acknowledged by
Sazonov, Russian foreign minister under Tsar Nicholas, in
the introduction to How the War Began^^ published in the
early 1920's.

Harry E. Barnes wrote categorically in

1926 that no historian who gave the new evidence a thorough
examination had failed to become converted to the revisionist position on the origins of the war.

20

This, however,

was somewhat of an overstatement as shall be pointed out
later.
In 1928, the French government belatedly agreed
to publish the documents of its foreign office concern
ing the war’s beginnings, but the historians appointed
to the official editorial committee included none of
the revisionist stamp, indicating the possibility of
government suppression.

In I929, however, the first

volume appeared and proved to be far superior to earlier

^^How the War Began. The Diary of Baron Schilling,
Chief of the Chancellery of the Russian Foreign Office.
London, 1925»
20

Harry Elmer Barnes, The Genesis of the World
War (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, I926), p. 66I.
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French collections.

21

Beginning in I926, Gooch and Tem

perley began to systematically edit the eleven volume
British documents, a process which was not completed until

1938. Adding to the flood of new evidence, many of the
principal statesmen of the period in which the seeds for
World War I were sown published their memoirs or letters.
The ambiguities and inaccuracies in the reminiscences of
men like von Tirpitz, Sazonov, Poincare, Asquith, Grey and
Isvolsky were clarified after historians began to inverview
the participants in the drama of 19l4°
German historians, quite naturally, were the first to
approach the war guilt problem scholarly and critically.
The first post-war research into German diplomacy was that
by Erich Brandenburg.

Stieve, as indicated above, studied

the Isvolsky-Poincare exchanges, and Herman Lutz undertook
a study of English diplomacy.

Theodore Wolff’s The Eve of

191^ considered the pre-war diplomacy of all nations in
volved in the war and was one of the first comprehensive
treatments of the war’s origins.

The culmination came
22
in Max Montgelas’ The Case for the Central Powers,
^^Prance. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.
Commission de publication des documents relatif aux
origines de la guerre de 191^. Documents diplomatiques
français (1871-191^)* Paris: Imprimerie nationale, I929.
22
Erich Brandenburg, Von Bismark zum Welkreige.
Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaf t fu'r Politik und
Geschichte m.b.h., 192q.
Herman Lutz, Lord Grey un der Weltkrieg,

1927

.

Berlin,

Max Montgelas, The Case for the Central Powers.
London: G. Allen & Hrwin, Ltd., 19^5.

ii4
described by Professor Fay as "generally acknowledged by
competent scholars (in the l^EO's] as the ablest. <..volume
23
on war responsibility."
In France and England, the only major belligerents
whose governments were left unscathed by the post-war
revolutions, professional historians were rather slow to
accept the revisionist view.

A notable exception in

France was Pierre Renouvin who, in his Immediate Origins of
the War,^^ adopted the new interpretation.

Before the 1930's

dissemination of the revisionist thesis in France and England
was largely left to journalists and former diplomats such
as Georges Demartial.
Sir Robert T, Reid's How the War
25
Game
in I919 first stated the British revisionist view.
He was later joined by Sir Phillip Gibbs, a moderate pro
ponent of revisionism, and G. P. Gooch.

In Russia, out

standing service on behalf of the new interpretation of
the war's origins was rendered by E. A. Adamov and
Pokrovsky, while Barbagallo first presented the new posipA
tion of Italian historians.
^^Barnes, The Genesis of..., p. 662.
^Pierre Renouvin. The Immediate Origins of the War
Hew Haven: Yale University

(28 June-k August, 191Ij.)~
Press, I92B.

29
^
^Georges Demartial, L 'Evangile du Quai d'Orsay.
Paris, 1926.
Robert T. Reid (Lord Loreburn), How the War Game.
London: Methuen & Go., 1919*

26E. A. Adamov, Razdel Aziatskoe Turtsii.
of Asiatic Turkey.) Moscow, 192^.

(Partition

M. Pokrovsky, Das Zaristische Russland im Weltkriege.
Berlin, I927.
Gorrado Barbagallo, Gome si la Guerre mondiale.
Milan: Albrighi, Segati & Go., I923.
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Never before in the history of historiography had
there been so rapid and complete a conversion in histori
cal attitudes.

A few scholars, of course, had never

accepted Allied propaganda at face value, but their views
very largely rested on intuition, not documentary evidence.
The post-war revelations would have been of little practical
value had it not been for assimilators like Sidney Bradshaw
Fay who, as early as 1920, had absorbed what little material
there was available and aroused attention by his articles
in the American Historical Review. Fay sounded the note
upon which numerous American historians in the following
decades wrote.

On the basis of the Austrian Red Book

and Kautsky collection, he exploded the myth that the
Dual Monarchy was Germany’s ’’cat's paw” in 191^.

Still,

it is significant that Pay argued the new evidence did not
exonerate Germany of principal responsibility in precipi
tating the conflict.

In 1920, Pay, like most of his col

leagues, accepted the Morgenthau version of the Potsdam
2?
Crown Council.
Devoted to an attack on the official
Russian apology. P a y ’s second article revealed the real
war aims.

However, he concluded that Russia was justified

in aiding Serbia in view of the German carte blanche to
Austria.
That Pay had not been completely won over to the
revisionist position is obvious in his earliest work on
27
Sidney B. Pay, "New Light on the Origins of the
War,” American Historical Review, XXVI, No. 1 (October,
1920), 37.

ll6
on war responsibility.

A .comparison of Pay during the war

years with the Pay of 1930 is a study of the evolving
revisionist.

During the war, he had been instrumental

in the application of revisionism, but not to the origins
of the war.

While some American historians had refrained

from writing on the background of the war during the con
flict, few practiced the cold objectivity which character
ized the previous decade.

The United States entry in IÇl?

brought a new emphasis on national history and a revision
of the history of Anglo-American and Franco-American re
lations so that the Allies appeared in the most favorable
light possible.

In this, the wartime brand of revisionism,

S. B. Pay was an eager contributor.

28

His evolution toward

the new interpretation was apparent from his comments on
Henry H. Asquith’s The Genesis of the War.

Pay took the

opportunity to censure the British government for its re

fusal to open its archives to scholars with the suggestion
that its wartime position had not been as defensible as
had previously been believed.

29

By I926, the year P a y ’s

two volume work on the background of the war appeared, the
conversion was complete--Pay was America’s leading re
visionist.
Harry E. Barnes, the most uncompromising of all

28
Mathew A. Pitzsimons, Alfred G. Pandt and Charles
E. Novell (eds,). Development of Historiography (Harrisburg;
The Stackpole Co., 195^)V P* ^20.
B.
Fay, Review of The Genesis of the War, by
Henry H. Asquith, The New Republic, XXXVII, No. l|7q(January 2, 192l|), 1^1^.
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American proponents of the new interpretation, represents
another case study in revisionist evolution.

Even he, who

in the 1920's was never considered a "friend” to Great
Britain, engaged in activities sponsored by the Creel Com
mittee,

In 1918, he wrote that there was surprisingly

little in the preliminaries or the events of the American
Revolution that should cause permanent animosities.

30

After the war, Barnes, like many of his contemporaries
reconsidered, but in his case, the reversal was more
astonishing.

So complete was his conversion to revisionism

that he was believed by his colleagues in the American
Historical Association "to be in receipt of a retainer of
$100,000 a year from the ex-Kaiser.
To illustrate how one historian's temperament changed
over the course of nine years, one has only to compare
two statements by Barnes concerning the German Crown
Prince.

The first appeared(in a I917 National Security

League pamphlet and referred to the Crown Prince as "semlImbecile."

32

The second statement appeared in a I926

edition of The Nation describing the same Crown Prince:
During the war we became so habituated to
reproductions of the Crown Prince as a rabbitfaced imbecile with an IQ of 20 that few Am
ericans were capable of imagining him as
possessed of the slightest cerebration...It
__

Hutchinson, Mississippi Valley Historical Review,
XXIX, No. 2, 172 .
G1
C. Hartley Grattan, "The Historian Cut Loose,"
The American Mercury, XI, No.
(August, 1927), i+30.
^^Ibid., p. 426.
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was with astonishment we were to find in his
memoirs.».the most attractive and plausible
apology which emerged from the German official
class after the war...33
While Barnes and Pay each developed into his own
"brand" of revisionism, other American scholars made the
leap more abruptly.

These pathfinders included Frederick

Bausman, William L. Langer and Albert J, Nock.^^

With the

blast at the igi^ theory of war responsibility, American
scholars also levelled their guns at the accepted version
of the United States entry into "Europe's War."

C. H,

Grattan and Walter Millis were notable among many who
dealt with this question to some extent, but it remained
until 1938 and the work of Charles Tansill, an assirailator
the equal of Pay, that all aspects of the problem were
satisfactorily explored,

33

H, E. Barnes, "The Crown Prince as Archivist,"
The Nation, CXXII, No. 3188 (August 11 , I926), 131.
3^Bausman*s Let Prance Explain. London: G.
Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1922 was the first compre
hensive American attack on the Entente apologies.
Langer's early writings on war responsibility
included: "The European Powers and the French Occupa
tion of Tunis," American Historical Review, XXVI, No.
1 (October, 19251 and "The Franco-Russian Alliance,"
Slavonic Review, III, IV, (March-June, 1925).
Nock's Myth of a Guilty Nation represented one
of the initial
American efforts to expose the fallacy
in holding anyone nation responsible for the war.
See below,
3^C. H. Grattan, Why We Fought.
Vanguard Press, I929.

New York: The

Walter Millis, The Road to War, America, I91I1
-Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935.

1917. Boston:

Charles Tansill, America Goes to War.
Little, Brown & Co., 1938.

Boston:
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In reviewing Barnes’ The Genesis of the World War.,
Professor Chevalier Hazen wrote that If the author’s con
tentions were sound, Theodore Roosevelt, President Wilson
Ellhu Root and Ambassador Page had all been wrong, a
proposition few American historians were prepared to
accept.

Hazen was not alone; many American scholars

In the 1920's displayed a decided obstinacy to retreat
from the antiquated wartime version of responsibility.
There are a number of reasons for the aversion generally
among historians toward accepting the revisionist view
even after It had been substantiated by documentary evi
dence,

Perhaps the most Important reason was that In

some cases the proponents of the "sole German war guilt"
theory had acted as technical advisers to those who framed
the post-war treaties.

A paternalistic feeling toward the

treaties for which their scholarship had provided a basis

compelled most American historians along a conservative
course.
That wartime biases among historians were slow In
dying was Illustrated by a 1937 ruckus on the campus of

Yale University.

In that year. Professor Jerome Davis,

an exponent of the Pay thesis on the war's origins,

was Involuntarily retired for his conduct of European
history classes.

In the same year, Charles Seymour, a

technical adviser to President Wilson at Versailles who
had never accepted the revisionist Interpretation, became
■^^Grattan, The American Mercury, XI, No. I4-I4., ^30.

j
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president.

37

During the 1920*3 and 1930*s, American historians
writing on war responsibility could be divided into three
separate categories.

38

The first division, variously

called "bitter-enders" or "die-hards," included those
historians who persisted in upholding the wartime thesis
of the war's origins in spite of evidence to the con
trary.

Among the more illustrious of this group were

Hazen, William Stearns Davis and Carleton J. H. Hayes.
A second classification of American scholars was the
"salvager" who cited the latest documentary evidence but
clung to the view that Germany was primarily responsible
in 1914*

This group included Bernadette Schmitt, Charles

Seymour and Raymond Turner, among others.
The third group--the revisionists--were those scholars
whose work represented sincere attempts, on the basis of
the latest evidence, to modify the obsolete wartime view
of responsibility.

It is incorrect to associate these

men with economists like Keynes who felt the Versailles
Treaty needed revision because it was economically un
sound or with the "debunkers" of the 1920's who often
wrote in that fashion simply because that was the type of
literature the public demanded.

The American revisionists

logically fall into two sub-divisions: those who favored
a divided responsibility, including Pay and Ferdinand
^"^Barnes, A History of..., p. 287.
^^Ibid., pp. 288- 89.
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Schevlll, and those who held the more uncompromising view
that neither of the Central Powers were guilty in IÇl^.
Although the rabid revisionists admitted Germany and
Austria displayed no great dexterity in l^l^, they main
tained that neither power wished a European war.

Further

more, they argued, the military responsibility for the war
lay with Russia and moral responsibility with Russia and
France collectively.

Advocating such an interpretation

in the United States were Harry E. Barnes, Frederick
Bausman and William L. Langer.
In the ensuing paragraphs, the interpretations assigned
to the events surrounding the outbreak of the European
hostilities by representatives of each of the foregoing
categories will be examined.

While that "school" of

American war guilt scholars most commonly labeled revision
ist grew consistently in the 1920's, all learned historians
were not converted to the new interpretation as Professor
Barnes would have his reader believe.

Real inroads were

made into the ranks of the proponents of the "sole German
war guilt" thesis in the two decades following the war
until by 1935j most American historians writing on the
origins of the war favored a divided responsibility.

No

longer was the controversy concerned with the "guilt" of
this or that nation.

As much as the debate still existed,

it was concerned with the "relative responsibility" of
each of the belligerents.

CHAPTER IV
ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR I AS VIEWED BY

AMERICAN HISTORIANS AFTER 1920
I

Contrary to Professor Barnes’ assertion that all
American historians worthy of the name had, by the mid
twenties, accepted the revisionist interpretation of the
war’s beginnings, C. M. Babcock wrote that only one of
every ten had evolved to that point of view by 1930.
Increasing numbers, he added, were moving in that direction
1
influenced by Pay's well-reasoned account.
While there
are several feasible explanations for the conservative
stand taken by most American historians after the war,
Professor A. B. Hart's attitude probably exemplified that
of most Americans,

His resistance was based upon the fact

that to accept the revisionist interpretation of the back
ground of the war, one had to admit that the American
2
people had erred in 191?»
Needless to say, this is hardly the reaction one
would expect from a scholar in the face of empirical
evidence to the contrary, but it is illustrative of the
type of biases with which the contemporary historian must
^C. M. Babcock, "Pedagogues Stand Pat," The American
Mercury, XIX, No. 75 (March, 1930),29O.
^Ibid., p. 290.
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cope before he can see events in their true perspective.
The prejudices

of the post-war American historian were

demonstrated whenever there was a comparison to be drawn
between one of the Entente powers and Germany.
British maintained the world's largest fleet,
resented a force for peace.
to redress the naval balance,
cried,

If the
that r ep

But when Germany attempted
the Anglo-Saxon historian

"WarJ" Great Britain might make military agreements,

and, as Sir Edward Grey said,

they were not binding, but

a similar Austro-German agreement was immediately labeled
a "plot."

In essence, the problem facing American scholars

interested in discovering the real causes of the war was
one of rising above national prejudices and pride and of
considering the evidence relating to the war's origins with
an open mind.

This, American historians, who had so

patriotically fought the war of words on the home front,
were unwilling or unable to do.
Not only were many American historians as individuals
incapable of rising above hatreds and biases engendered by
wartime propaganda, but also ma ny of the so-called scholarly
Journals,

or their editors, refused to acknowledge that there

were two sides to the story of war responsibility.

A few

periodicals were noteworthy in opening their columns to
"salvagers" and revisionists alike.

Among these were the

American Historical R e v i e w , Current H i s t o r y , The Nation and
The New R e p u b l i c .

Periodicals like Foreign Affairs and the

Journal of Modern H i s t o r y , under the editorship of Professor

12j+
Bernadette E» Schmitt, were careful that only the "right”
kind of copy appeared in their columns.

In answer to his

critics, Schmitt maintained throughout the 1920's that all
he had to say on the background of the war would be said in
his book which was belatedly published in 1930.

In the

interim, contributors to his journal closed their eyes to
recently uncovered evidence and wrote disparagingly of those
who entertained revisionist thoughts.
Compared to their European counterparts, American
historians generally were rather slow to adopt a more
objective and realistic view towards the origins of the
/

war.

Although the wartime diplomats--Grey, Poincare,

Lloyd George, Churchill and Sasonov--admitted in their
memoirs that Germany had not "plotted" the war, conser
vative American scholars preferred to look to professional
apologists like the British Serbophile, Seton-Watson, for
evidence to reinforce their theses.

These then were the

diehards, or, as Professor Barnes labeled them, the "bitter
enders," who clung to the Entente guilt thesis long after
it had been invalidated by historical scholarship.

Most

of these men could see no apparent contradiction in the
stand they assumed, because the revelations from the
European archives were conveniently disavowed as Bolshevik

or "radical" propaganda.

This faction, which fortunately

did not constitute a majority of American historians, cited
pre-war evidence to substantiate the interpretations they
applied to the origins of the war.

They were led by authors

12^
who contributed so eagerly to the "Entente myth" during the
war years— Charles D, Hazen, Raymond Turner, Albert H.
Putney and William Stearns Davis.

The stand-pat "school"

of professional historians was joined by ex-diplomats from
the Wilson administration like the former secretary of
state, Robert Lansing, and the wartime Anglophile am
bassador to England, Walter Hines Page.
In his Europe Since l8l^, a revised edition published
in 1923» Charles D. Hazen ignored the bulk of the post-war
scholarship on European diplomacy.

Instead, he referred

his reader to Charles Seymour's The Diplomatic Background
of the War and The Roots of the War by William S. Davis,
both of which had been rendered obsolete by the latest
evidence from the European archives.

It is noteworthy

that Professor Hazen used none of the new documentary
disclosures which might have tended to refute his thesis,
which was materially unchanged from his I9IO edition,
except that in the later work he was more harsh with the
Central Powers.

Writings by revisionist scholars were

evidently inserted in his bibliography to lend an air
of objectivity to the Columbia professor's work.

Had

Hazen heeded the findings of either Pay or Gooch, both
listed as sources, his statements relating to the war's
beginnings could not have been made with such certainty.
After a "careful" examination of the diplomatic
records pertaining to the origins of the war, Hazen con
cluded that the German nation had consistently provoked
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her European neighbors with an eye toward war.

The realiz

ation of German hopes came in 191^, and because of the
carte blanche to Austria, tendered with open eyes as to
what the consequences would be, Germany incurred the moral
3
responsibility for the war.
Furthermore, her dispatch
ordering a halt to Russian mobilization turned an AustroSerbian quarrel into a European conflagration and made
certain that Germany would shoulder also the political
responsibility for the war.
The opinion of the outside world, Hazen wrote, had
already been "overwhelmingly expressed," and the post
war

disclosures gave no reason for a change in that

opinion.

To those historians who favored a divided res

ponsibility, feeling all European nations contributed to
the creation of the conditions in which the war arose,
Hazen replied, imperialisms "do not clash of themselves.
They are not impersonal forces subject to no human con
trol."^

The implication, of course, is that German deliber

ately conspired to create conditions in which the "im
perialisms” might easily clash.
The history of Europe from I 87I until 1^1^ showed
that friction did not necessarily mean war, that it was
possible to keep the peace if nations and the individuals
directing national policies desired peace.

Had Germany

^Charles D. Hazen, Europe Since I 8IS (2d ed. rev.;
New York; Henry Holt & Co., I923), p. 557^Ibid., p. 666.
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and Austria been willing to do what they had done In the
past, Hazen contended, there would have been no war In 191^<
"But...[Germany and Austria] showed no penchant for such a
procedure [arbitration^.
resulted."^

Quite the contrary,...and war

The "sinister and brutal" challenge of Austria

and Germany was accepted by those who had done their ut
most to prevent hostilities.

That the contest was not

merely a material one, but that the "most previous moral
and spiritual interests" were Involved was clearly seen
and stated at the outset by the Entente statesmen, Hazen
wrote emulating the best of the wartime propagandists.
Had the author referred to all of the works listed In his
bibliography, such an interpretation would have been very
unlikely.

The student Is left with the Impression that,

far from surveying all of the evidence available in 1923»
Hazen restricted himself solely to those works published
before I919.
Hazen’s colleague at Columbia, Carleton J. H. Hayes,
applied an antiquated Interpretation to the Immediate
causes of the war, but, unlike Hazen, he blamed the remote
causes on an "international anarchy."

In pre-war Europe,

Hayes wrote In an analysis not unlike the revisionists,
self-interest was the dominant note.

By June, 191^» that

self-interest had degenerated Into cynical selfishness.
This, according to Hayes, was a direct result of the spirit
of nationalism, a hang-over from the French Revolution.

^Hazen, p. 667.
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Instead of producing a sort of internationalism under which
each of the states of Europe might live peaceably, the new
phenomena emphasized the exclusiveness of each state.

The

spirit of nationalism fostered both political and economic
anarchy.

"Modern imperialism became an arc on the circle of

exclusive nationalism."^

It was a vicious circle and the

only way of breaking it was through war.
Throughout the nineteenth century, Hayes contended,
nationalism, imperialism and militarism had walked forward
hand in hand.

The chances for peace were small in a world

where every state was characterized a "power" and those
whose armor was thickest, "great powers."
lying cause was international anarchy.

The war’s under

"Its stakes were

the perpetuation or destruction of that anarchy."^

To

this point, Hayes had no quarrel with the revisionists.
His interpretation of the underlying causes, though
perhaps over-simplified, was not unlike that assigned to
the remote causes by Pay seven years later.

It was with

the immediate causes that Hayes and the revisionists
parted company.
Since Germany, according to Hayes, was the most
perfect example of imperialism and militarism, she was
the most anarchic.

It followed that she was the most

responsible for the war.

By l^l^-; German militarism had

^Carleton J. H. Hayes, A Brief History of the
Great War (Hew York: The Macmillan Co., 1921), p. I4.,
?Ibid. , p. 7
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achieved the highest place in the state.

The successes

of Prussia between I 863 and I 87I had sanctioned the union
of nationalism and militarism.

The instruments of the

militarists were the united capitalists and Junkers,
The Junkers were now serving the capitalists
the the capitalists were honoring the Junkers.
The promise to ’obey’ was left out of the covenant,
for both contracting parties had freely given
that pledge to the high priest who solemnized the
nuptuals— the Kaiser himself,"
After blaming the war fundamentally on an "inter
national anarchy," Hayes placed at Germany’s door the
responsibility for events ranging from the Russo-Japanese
War to the Balkan hostilities.

From I 895 to 191^, Germany

pursued a "bluff" policy in order that her "place in the
sun" might be attained.

While German diplomats shook

their fists in the collective face of the European family
of nations, the German people, Hayes surmised, were coming
more and more under the "psychology of suggestion,"

Russia

was menacing; France was vengeful; and Great Britain was
jealous.

When the three nations drew together, the German

professors of suggestive psychology began to exploit the
words, "encirclement" and "preventive war,"

By 19li|,

Germany was ready, and her class of Junkers and capitalists
were willing and able to precipitate the war.^
Published two years earlier than the Hazen volume,
Hayes' position on the wa r ’s origins was, in a sense, more
^Hayes, pp, 10-12,

9%bid,, p, 13.
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defensible than that of his colleague.
documentary evidence was rather meagre.

In 1^21, the new
What there was,

however, if carefully studied, would have refuted the
Hayes contentions.

The sources upon which he constructed

his diatribe against Germany are alone enough to reflect
unfavorably on the work.

Among the more illustrious of

the authors upon whom Hayes relied for information to
convict the Central Powers were Morgenthau, Lichnowsky,
Chitwood, Stoweil, Gerard, Hill, Gauss and Stoddard.
Not once in the entire course of his volume did Hayes
convey the impression that he was aware there had been
any investigation into the background of the war since
the cessation of hostilities.

The works of the Columbia

professors are merely illustrative of the product of ultra
conservative American historians.

In the latter 1920’s,

it is noteworthy that fewer and fewer books appeared ex
pounding the wartime guilt thesis.

The barrage against

the revisionist historians continued to be sure, but,
unable to refute the new interpretations generally, the
die-hard writers contented themselves in finding fault
in the particulars of the revisionist position.
Raymond Turner was one of those who led the rear
guard fight against a general acceptance of the new in
terpretation of war responsibility.

In 1927, the John

Hopkins professor wrote an article entitled "German War
Guilt Reaffirmed" in which he set forth a hypothesis later
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expanded upon In his Europe Since 1870.^0

In his Current

History article. Turner attacked the revisionists in
general and Pay in particular.

Pay, he charged, demon

strated an increasing tendency to lean to the side of
Germany wherever possible.
on sentiment, not facts.

The new interpretation rested
The latest evidence. Turner

contended, corroborated the wartime view that Germany and
Germany alone was responsible for the war.
Everywhere, Turner wrote, "Germans, radicals and
others" declared again and again that the Treaty of
Versailles was a grevious error--that Germany was not
11
solely responsible.
A discussion of the type of mentality
which traditionally has hung the "radical" appelât ion upon
those who might deviate from their personal belief is beyond
the scope of this study, but Turner's German-radical com
bination is perhaps worth noting.

He accepted the view

that Germany was not solely guilty for creating the con
ditions which prevailed in pre-war Europe, but argued that
she still could be held "guilty" in precipitating the war
in 1914»

In other words, he accepted the revisionist

position that there were many indirect causes of the war
for which Germany could not be held responsible,

Por the

war in 1914» however, German responsibility was "with
1_2
justice primarily assigned."
^^Raymond Turner, Europe Since I 87O.
New York: Doubleday, Page & Co.), I927.

(Garden City,

^^Raymond Turner, "German War Guilt Reaffirmed,"
Current History, XXV, No. 5 (Pebruary, 1927), 649«

^^Ibid., p. 649*
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The revisionist perspective on the importance of
remote causes. Professor Turner argued, was faulty.

It

was the immediate causes--the events between June 28 and
August 1, 19l4--which were of prime importance, and in IÇl^,
there was no doubt that Germany had given to her ally a
’’blank check” and encouraged the Dual Monarchy to declare
war on Serbia.

Furthermore, it could ’’never be denied that

the ’’Great War” began with the German declaration of war
13
on Russia and France.”
From the outset, Germany and
Austria ’’knew” that a general European war would follow
the actions they took, and they abated not one instant in
improvising measures designed to secure their own selfish
ends.

Because mobilization did not mean war in international

law, Russian mobilization did not precipitate World War 1.
There was always the possibility of averting war so long
as it remained undeclared;^^ Germany threw peace to the
winds when she declared war on Russia.
Turner erroneously argued that no scholar ever
charged one nation or people with sole responsibility for
bringing on the war.

That there were many underlying

causes which made the war probable in 191^ was not at all
the point.

The question to be resolved laid in the im

mediate causes for which two nations, Germany and Austria,
were responsible.

For her action in attacking Serbia,

Austria assumed a large part of the blame.
^^Turner, Current History, XXV, No,
^^ I b i d ., p.

The Dual
6^0.

133
Monarchy, however, would not have gone as far as she did
had it not been for the Potsdam pledges.

Because the

greater conflict began with the German declaration of
war on Russia and France, immediate responsibility--that
with which the "sincere" scholar should be concerned—
"lies properly with the German Empire.
In a later article. Turner uncovered what he termed
"New Evidence Corroborating Ambassador Morgenthau's
Account."

The title of the article was somewhat mis

leading since the "evidence" presented was neither "new"
nor "corroborating."

The impression conveyed by the title

is that Ambassador Morgenthau was correct, which, in a
sense, he was.

There was, as all scholars agreed, a series

of meetings at Potsdam July 5 and 6 during which the
Kaiser conferred with minor figures in the German govern
ment and an Austrian envoy.

In the Morgenthau account,

however, the "Crown Council" was distorted beyond recog
nition.

Since, as Turner maintained, no "accurate account

of the conference had yet been offered"— this written a
full year after Pay's heavily documented treatment of the
July 5 and 6 talks--scholars were bound to accept that
account which was best corroborated by subsequent events.
Turner's I929 statement concerning the scarcity of pub
lished material relating to the talks can convey only one
impression.

Either he was relatively unread in the con

troversy over war responsibility, or he simply dismissed
^^Turner, Current History, XXV, No. 5s &55°

13l+
as Invalid any opinion running contrary to his own.

Aside

froTi excusing the ex-ambassador for believing the tale
presumably told him by von Wangenheim,

3.Ô

Turner’s article

did nothing to substantiate Morgenthau’s testimony.

Nei

ther did Turner do anything to clear up the problem raised
by Morgenthau’s decision to wait nearly three years before
revealing the damning ’’evidence” upon which the Versailles
verdict was primarily based.
In 1926, Albert H. Putney

17

asserted that Fa y ’s con

tention that Austrian officials were not informed of the
Sarajevo plot was incorrect.

Because of inadequate pro

tective measures, primary responsibility for Francis

Ferdinand’s death rested with officials of the Dual Mon
archy.

Admitting it was unlikely that Austrian officials

instigated the murder. Putney claimed they did nothing to
protect the heir apparent, knowing his assasination would
foment a war which was necessary if Austro-German aims in
the Balkans were to be realized.

18

Full cognizance of the

’’warning” in which Putney placed so much stock was taken
by the revisionist writers, but the vagueness of the message
and the informal manner in which it was tendered led most
^^Raymond Turner, ’’New Evidence Corroborating
Ambassador Morgenthau's Account,” Current History,
XXXI, No. 2 (November, I929), 270.

17Putney was a wartime employee of the Dnited
States Department of State and later dean of the School
of Diplomacy and Jurisprudence at American University.
l^Albert H. Putney, ’’Denial of Serbia’s War
Responsibility,” Current History, XXIII , No. ij.
(January, 1926), 527»
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of them to conclude that Serbian officials did not wish
Austria to take precautionary measures prior to the Arch
duke’s visit to Bosnia.
Having established the fact that a "warning" had been
given Austria as to what the consequences of the military
inspection tour might be. Putney charged that it was
Austria, not Serbia, as Pay and others had written, that
was criminally negligent.
simple.

The motive for the "crime" was

The Archduke’s death would rid the Dual Monarchy

of an heir whom the Austrian and Hungarian officials hated
because of his liberal tendencies and also give the Austrian
Junkers a pretext for crushing the Serbian nationalist
movement.
Looking at the general question of war responsibility.
Putney maintained that two questions needed answering:
What were the causes that for many years rendered the war
"inevitable?," and 1/Vhat caused it in 191^?

To answer the

first, two underlying geographical conditions had to be
recognized: the Franco-German frontier and the existence
of the "ramshackle" Dual Monarchy.

Compared to other post

war scholars, Putney’s view of underlying causes was short
sighted to say the least.

The first of his "underlying"

causes was lightly dismissed since it had been a breeder
of European wars for centuries.

It was the existence of

the Austro-Hungarian Empire which made peace in Europe
impossible in igiij--^^
l^putney. Current History, XXIII, Ho. !{., 52?.
ZOlbid., p. 228.
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It was, the American counterpart to Seton-Watson
asserted, Austrian mistreatment of subject nationalisties
that caused Slav discontent, not Serbian nationalistic
activity.

But the fact the war came in 1^1^ instead of

in 1908, 1911 or 1913 was largely accidental.

The pre

text presented itself, and in 191^, Germany was ready to
take advantage of the occasion.

"There was no European

statesman who did not clearly understand that the sooner
it came the better it would be for the Central Powers."

21

Ex-Secretary of State Robert Lansing, among other
wartime diplomats, joined the ranks of those resisting
any change in the Versailles version of responsibility.
In 192^, Lansing answered an article by George Viereck,
revisionist journalist, which had been written with the
approval of the ex-Kaiser and which endeavored to prove
William II was in no way personally responsible for the
war.

Nothing the ex-Kaiser could say, Lansing wrote,

in any way lessened "the weight of guilt and contempt
which public opinion imposed upon him and which will be
PP
his portion as long as he lives and after."
The for
mer diplomat took pains to include Viereck in his denun
ciation.

The latter consistently abused officials of the

United States and sought to justify Germany in her "bar
barous conduct of the war.
^^Putney, Current History, SCIII, No. 1|, 529*
^^Robert Lansing, "The Ex-Kaiser’s Denial of War
Guilt Answered," Current History, XXI, No. Ij. (January,
1925), ^ 85*

^^Ibid., p. 1|86.

137
According to Lansing, nothing was published after 1922
to refute the charge of German war guilt.

Obviously, the

ex-secretary was either somewhat behind in his reading or
preferred to dismiss any work, no matter how heavily doc
umented, that did not harmonize with his views on war re
sponsibility.

Since "nothing” had been published to the

contrary, "the responsibility of the Prussian autocracy...
for plunging the world into war has been p r o v e d . A
further discussion of it would be a waste of time.

With

this, the question of responsibility was dropped, and the
remainder of the article was devoted to a personal attack
on the ex-Kaiser.
If William II had borne his guilt quietly, one might
feel remorse for one who had erred, but "no compassion
goes forth to one who strives to cast the blame for his
29
own sin upon those against whom he has sinned."
The
Kaiser’s suggestion that Russia's decision to mobilize
was motivated by her desire to use foreign warfare as
a "safety valve" to avoid an explosion at home was, accord
ing to Lansing, the very technique William II had used
to precipitate the war.
decision for war.

Socialist pressures caused the

To the Kaiser, democracy and all liberal

political theories were anathemas.

A victorious war would

vindicate Prussianism and restore the imperialists to
^^Lansing, Current History, XXI, No. i|, ^86.
^ ^ I b l d . . p. ^ 86.
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popular favor.

26

In essence, this was the extent of the

short-sighted Lansing thesis of the w a r ’s origins.

The

feeble voice of William Hohenzollern, he wrote, could make
no impression on the opinion of mankind.

"The case is

closed...The verdict of guilty will stand through the
coming years as a monument to the colossal folly of the
last of the Hohenzollern dynasty,"

27

So wrote the die-hard American students of war
responsibility.

Generally, they refused to acknowledge

the validity of the most recent scholarship, conveniently
branding it German or Bolshevik propaganda.

Their theses

were constructed on foundations provided them by wartime
writers who, in the midst of war hysteria, had allowed
themselves to explore war guilt with extreme subjectivity.
Since, by the mid-1920’s, it was generally agreed that
responsibility for the remote causes of the war could not
be placed at the door of a single power, the defenders of
the Versailles verdict concentrated on immediate causes.
When scholarship cut the ground from under the "Potsdam
myth," the "bitter-enders" in vain searched for some hidden
testimony upon which Germany might be convicted anew.
When the heavily documented revisionist case became so
impressive that their general outlines and perspectives
became practically irrefutable, the champions of the war
time version of responsibility contented themselves with
^^Lansing, Current History, XXI, No. I]., I[.89-90«
^^Ibid., p. ij-91.
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attacking the particulars of the new Interpretation.
II
When the position of the "bitter-ender” became un
tenable In the face of the deluge of new evidence from
the European archives, many of the erstwhile Entente
apologists began to cite the latest disclosures, but
only those which tended to uphold their preconceived
notions on war guilt.

Ostensibly, the methods utilized

by these scholars was Identical to that of the revision•'N.

Ists.

They examined carefully the latest evidence,

usually concerning the Immediate causes, but from their
empirical consideration of the data, arrived at opposed
conclusions.

In many cases, It Is difficult to separate

the ultra-conservative American historians from the
"salvagers” of the Versailles verdict #10 contended on
the basis of the most recent scholarship that Germany
was still primarily responsible for the war.
By all odds, the most Influenclal of the "salvagers”
was Bernadette Schmitt of Chicago University.

Of all

American scholars of war responsibility, Schmitt must
be accorded a place alongside Fay and Barnes as one of
the principal protagonists In the post-war debate.

His

first major contribution to the controversy over war
guilt was an article entitled "Triple Alliance and
Triple Entente” In which he was "searching for the
connecting link which acted as a chain of powder between

iko
28
the various accumulations of explosive material”
in
the summer of l^l^*
The war, according to Professor Schmitt, came in 191^
because in that year the lines were sharply drawn between
the rival alliances, and neither could yield without
seeing the balance of power pass into the hands of the
rival camp.

Originally founded for peace, the alliance

system seemed, by the turn of the century, to have justi
fied itself, and it appeared that Europe could look for
ward to years of peace and prosperity.

Because of various

German activities in the early 1900's--her refusal to
consider an Anglo-German rapproachment, her "bellicose”
actions in Morocco and her support of Austria in the Bos
nian crisis--however, Russia, France and England drew
closer together.

More than any other individual, von

Bulow, German chancellor from I9OO to I909, "gave the
29
Triple Entente life and being.” ^ The succession of
Bethmann-Hollweg to the chancellorship seemed to ease
tensions, but, according to Schmitt, he was not the "master
of the political situation in Germany,"

In pre-191^

Germany, two groups, the militarist-navalist clique and the
businessmen-industrialists, usurped political authority
from the duly constituted government.

The militarists

saw France and Great Britain as powers to be dealt with
Bernadette E. Schmitt, "Triple Alliance and
Triple Entente, I902-I91I4.," American Historical
Review, XXIV, No. 3 (April, 19%), ^^9.
Z^lbld.. p. i|^6.

while the capitalists longed for German hegemony in the
Near East.

30

The appearance of the Panther at Agadir was no less
legitimate than the French occupation of Fez in Morocco;
the German refusal to limit naval power so long as Great
Britain clung to the Triple Entente was understandable;
the German Near Eastern policy was less repulsive than
most other instances of modern imperialism.

All these

German activities, so often condemned by wartime historlans, Schmitt condoned.

What kept alive the suspicions

and fears of the Entente statesmen and eventually led to
crystallization of cooperation within the Triple Entente
was the pursuance of all three objectives simultaneously.

31

To Schmitt, the whole problem of war responsibility
devolved to one question, "Was war inevitable in 1^1^?"
That no responsible European statesman desired a general
war was acknowledged by the Chicago professor.

Misplaced

suspicions in each of the rival alliances was the primary
cause for the armed peace before igi^ and ultimately the
reason for the war.

When the supreme test came, the break

down was induced as much by panic as by the bellicose
affirmations of any single power.
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The one bright spot

in an otherwise dismal diplomatic picture in pre-war Europe
^^Schmitt, American Historical Review, XXIV,
No. 3 , 4 S 7 .
^^Ibld., pp. ^^7-^60.

^^Ibid., p.

li^2
was Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign minister.

For

his failure In achieving his ultimate goal, an effective
concert of Europe, however, Grey himself was principally
responsible.

Because of his non-commltal attitude toward

Germany and his repeated assurances to France, each side
felt It knew what the British position would be In the
event of war, and each was willing to risk a war to secure
Its ascendency In Europe.

Victory, each camp knew, would

depend upon the march of events In the Balkans and the
Near East.
German plans In the Near East called for vassalage of
the Ottoman Empire, Wille Austrian alms In the Balkans
Included the Isolation of Serbia by a string of alliances.
Neither of the Central Powers, Schmitt wrote. Intended
the outright annexation of territory, but the success of
their plans would have given them political control from
Belgrade to the Persian Gulf.

To Russia, such a situation

would be Intolerable, so she formed the Balkan League which
might be used against either the Hapsburg or the Ottoman
Empire whichever occasion presented Itself.
By the summer of IÇl^, It was apparent that. If
Isolation and diminution of Serbia was achieved by Austria,
and If Bulgaria was won over to the Triple Alliance through
the cession of Macedonia, the Teutonic road to the East
would be secure,
Entente.

Rumania was veering toward the Triple

Such a rapproachment would form a Serbo-Rumanlan

wedge between Austria and Bulgaria and make the Dual

iW
Alliance the arbiter of Balkan politics.

"Thus, Serbia

had become the k e y to the whole Eastern Question."

33

According to Schmitt, measures taken by the Dual Monarchy
enabled the Junkers in Germany, who were already "jumpy,"
to take control.

Bethmann-Hollweg, when he realized war

was imminent, exerted pressure on Vienna, but he had
clung too long to his dream "of scoring a resounding
triumph for the Triple Alliance.
The attitude of Germany in the fateful days of July,

1914 was seen by Schmitt as the major cause of the war.
Her refusal of the Grey proposal for a conference of powers
after it had been accepted by Russia, Italy and France was

the event which finally precipitated the war and ultimately
ranged England on the side of France and Russia.
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That Schmitt's work is scholarly and his method
historical can hardly be questioned, despite Barnes’
assertions to the contrary.

He very simply cited the most

recent scholarship bearing on war responsibility and drew
different interpretations in many cases than did the
revisionist scholars,

Schmitt, in fact, accepted the new

interpretation on many points, particularly in reference
to the more remote causes.

Like many of his colleagues,

however, he felt that war was not inevitable in 191^, so
"^Schmitt, American Historical Review, XXIV,
No. 3 , ^69.

34r b l d ., p. ^72.
33jbid., p. ^73.

144
It was the Immediate causes, those which ignited the inflamable material that had been accumulating for decades,
which were of prime concern.

Here, Professor Schmitt con

tended, the burden of responsibility fell on Germany and
Austria.

But the fact that Schmitt accepted the revisionist

interpretation of underlying causes in his early writings
is an indication that he thoroughly studied the latest
archival revelations and applied his conclusions with due
caution, not as Professor Barnes charged, with his eyes
closed.
As additional primary source material became avail
able, that is after the French and British archives were
opened, Schmitt, unlike Fay and Barnes, adopted an even
more conservative view of the war’s origins.

This tendency,

which culminated in his two volume work. The Coming of the
War, can be seen in a review of the first volume of the
Gooch-Temperley collection of British documents.

According

to Schmitt, the British records revealed that Austria was
the aggressor in igi 4 and that Germany was the "evil genius
of the p i e c e . T h e most vivid impression to be gleaned
from the documents was that the primary purpose of the
British government was to avert war, but, if that was not
possible, to make sure that England joined the "right”
17
side and did so before it was "too late."
Schmitt’s
^^Bernadotte E. Schmitt, "British Revelations
on the Outbreak of the War," Current History, XXV,
No. 6 (March, I927), 8^ 1 .

37lbid., p. 851.

choice of words might have been better here.

The use of

the word, "right," conveys to the student the passing of
a moral judgment and lends authority to the "Anglophile"
appelation hung on Schmitt by some of his revisionist
colleagues.

Is it, it might be asked, the place of the

truly objective historian to pass moral judgments?

Schmitt’s two volumes on the origins of the war were
eagerly awaited by all historians interested in the pro
blem of war responsibility.

By defenders of the Versailles

verdict, the work was received as a God-send, for here at

last (1930) was a comprehensive, scholarly treatment of
the question which held the Central Powers responsible for
the conflagration.

By other American scholars, revision

ists, the work was a disappointment, because it demonstrated

that an interpretation empirically drawn from the latest
evidence other than revisionist might be assigned to the
events leading to the war.
The fundamental reason, Schmitt wrote, that a twonation quarrel developed into a world war was the rival
alliance systems.

Each year, the nations in the Triple

Entente and Triple Alliance drew closer together until
by July, 191^, none saw an escape from a war which
directly concerned only two powers.

In the decade before

191^, there had been four possible sources of an European
war: the century-old antagonism between Germany and
France, the recent rivalry between Great Britain

and Germany, Austro-Italien rivalry and the explosive

ll;6
Near East,
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All national animosities^ howeverj, had sub

sided by 191^, except in the Near East and Balkans, and

there, the situation was relatively simple,

Russia and

Germany were rivals at Constantinople, and Russia and the
Dual Monarchy were opponents in the struggle over the
Balkans.

Russia promoted a Balkan League of Rumania,

Serbia and Greece to thwart Austria's Balkan ambitions,
while Austria worked for a counter-league also including
Rumania and Greece but with Bulgaria as its pivot which
would isolate Serbia and render impossible Greater Serbian
aspirations,

Germany supported Austria's Balkan policy,

because, in that way, her national interests would best
be served.

As Turkey came more and more under German

economic and military influence and since Bulgaria seemed
on the verge of passing into the arms of the Triple
Alliance, Serbia stood as the only barricade to AustroGerman hegemony in the Balkans,

**A victory {pver Serbia]

by either side would mean the turning of the. European
39
balance in its favor,"
For her part in the assasination which precipitated
the war, none of which Schmitt denied, Serbia was excused
because of the "peculiar character of Austro-Serbian
r e l a t i o n s . T h e principal responsibility for the
Bernadette E. Schmitt, The Coming of the War
(New York: Charles Scribner's & Sons, 19301, 1 , 57-59*
^^Ibid., p. 17^..
^^Ibld., p. 2^7.
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murder of Francis Ferdinand fell not on Serbia but on
the shoulders of Austrian officials, because they had been
negligent in taking adequate precautionary measures, having
been forewarned as to what the consequences of the Sarajevo
visit might be.
Emporer William’s words, "Now or never," spoken after
hearing of the murder of his good friend, the Austrian
heir apparent, constituted, according to Professor Schmitt,
a well-thought out expression of German official feeling
toward Serbia.

The K ai s e r ’s affirmations "have to be

considered as a serious expression of the opinion that the
time had come to apply f o r c e . The words, uttered at
a time of grave shock, represented the inauguration of a
policy which was followed through at Potsdam seven days
later.

The Austrian plan presented to William II on July

5 calling for "isolation and diminution of Serbia" could
only be pursued by force and was "admirably calculated
to bring about European complications."
dorsed the plan,

The Kaiser en.

and as "first in order of time, first in

degree of authority among his countrymen, the German
Emporer,..sanctioned the course Austria-Hungary desired

to f o l l o w . I t

was not at all a "blank check" that

Germany gave Austria July 5 since the envoy from the

Dual Monarchy explicitly stated all that Austria-Hungary
hoped to accomplish by the ultimatum.
^^Hchmitt, I, 291.

^^Ibld., pp. 293-9&*

Here, Schmitt
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parted company with most scholarly post-war historians who
claimed the Austrian plans were presented only in the vaguest
terms at Potsdam.
German actions in the summer of 19l4 were dictated by
three considerations:

(1) For once, the Dual Monarchy

presented an united front, and Germany felt the opportunity
to take advantage of that unanimity of purpose after the
murder of Francis Ferdinand should not be neglected; (2)
A good case against Serbia existed; and (3) If this case
were promptly exploited, the other powers, out of sympathy
for Austria, would not i n t e r f e r e . W i l l i a m II and Theobold
von Bethmann-Hollweg were the first "responsible statesmen"
to make the decision which might conceivably have the most
dire consequences.

"They may be acquitted of deliberate

intent to precipitate a European war, but they did elect
to put the system of alliances to its severest test...It
was they who took the gambler's plunge.
Germany was kept constantly informed of Austrian
actions throughout the month of July, an allegation other
historians have questioned.

Furthermore, Germany received

a copy of the ultimatum a full day before the note was
presented to Serbian officials in Belgrade.

If Germany

had sincerely wished to avoid war, why, asked Schmitt,
did she not stop her ally before she dispatched the ill-

fated ultimatum?

Other historians have answered that

^^schmitt. I, 318 .
^^Tbld., p. 329.
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question a hundred times over.
were in

With communications as they

it was literally impossible to do anything

about the note which was already in the hands of the
Austrian ambassador in Belgrade when the duplicate was
received in Berlin,
Austria-Hungaryj Schmitt contended, was immediately
responsible for the consequences of the ’’impossible ul
timatum,” but she would not have gone to the lengths she
did if it had not been for German pledges of unconditional
support,

Germany accepted the Austrian program which had

been ’’carefully” explained, if not with deliberate intent
to precipitate a European war, with a complete willingness
to accept such a war.

Then she and her ally began an

interim program designed to lull Europe into complacency
where acceptance of the fait accompli would be certain.
The Serbian answer to the ultimatum was rejected at Vienna
for one reason--the Central Powers were determined that
this time the opportunity to achieve their economic and
political ambitions in the Balkans would not be passed up.
Although Austria wished to postpone her declaration
of war on Serbia, Germany insisted on prompt action.
’’The declaration of war was issued in order to please
the German g o v e r n m e n t , Simultaneously, German dip
lomats directed their efforts toward a general European
acceptance of the Austrian action and, by overtures to

^^Schmitt, I,
^^Schmitt, II, l^-l6.
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England and France, endeavored to separate Russia from her
allies.

When it was recognized in Berlin that Russia

would not permit Serbia's humiliation, German officials
expressed misgivings over the course events had taken, but
it was too late for regrets.

Having urged prompt action

on the Dual Monarchy, the German Chancellor and Foreign
Minister could not easily have reversed their course by
urging her to moderate.

"They did the logical thing; they

decided to fight the business t h r o u g h . Although Schmitt
admitted German military preparations had not progressed
as far as those of Russia and France, he suspected that
"intellectual preparations" had gone rather far by July
27.

By that date, Bethmann-Hollweg began to doubt the

prospects of British neutrality but advised Austria only
to express an opinion on Lord Grey's mediation proposal.
He did not advise a change of course; he was merely "throw
ing dust in the eyes of Lord Grey."^^
On July 28, Austria-Hungary reached her goal.

There

had been no hypocrisy about Count

Berchtold's conduct

as there had been with Germany's.

Berchtold, however,

would not have taken the fatal step if he had not been
pushed by Austria's infinitely stronger ally.

While many

students of war responsibility cited the Kaiser's assertion
that the Serbian answer to the Austrian note had removed
the causes for war as illustrative of the pacific intent
^^Schmitt, II, 63.
^^Ibldo, p. 71.
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of official Germany, Schmitt saw the Emporer*s words as
one of those ’’sudden changes of mind of which the Kaiser
was capable” and a further indication of his mental instability.

It will be recalled that Schmitt did not view

the emotional outburst by William II at the time of Francis
Ferdinand’s assasination in the same light.

With the

German Emporer then in a virtual state of shock, Schmitt
felt the Kaiser’s words represented a well-reasoned de
claration of intent.
Clearly, Bethmann-Hollweg and the Kaiser desired
the Dual Monarchy to take the plunge so long as England
could be kept neutral, Schmitt surmised.

When this looked

doubtful, they could not renege on the Potsdam promises,

so the German chancellor advised Austria to proceed in such
a way that Russia might be saddled with the war respon
sibility.

When the Central Powers elected to navigate a

course which had for its objective the solution of the

Serbian question in their exclusive interest, they invited
Russian intervention,

”It is therefore as much upon them

and their refusal to make any genuine concessions as upon
the Russian government that responsibility for Russian

5o

mobilization rests.”

Furthermore, Schmitt maintained,

Russia could not be deemed responsible because of her

mobilization since such a military measure was not under
stood in that nation to mean war.
^^Schmitt, II, 122.
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Ibid., pp. 2^5-56.
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The European War came in 191^ because no diplomacy.,
however skillful, could have kept the Dual Monarchy from
attacking Serbia or have thwarted the determination of
Russia to defend the Slavic state.

Although the struggle

directly concerned only Austria and Russia, the rival
alliance systems made certain that it would be extended
to all of Europe.

Most revisionist scholars would contend

that the struggle was not at all between Russia and the
Dual Monarchy but between Austria and Serbia, and that
Russia had forfeited her hypocritical position as "pro
tector of the Balkan Slavs" in the Isvolsky-Aehrenthal
talks of 19080
The fundamental and irreconcilable difference be
tween Schmitt and the revisionists was a divergence in
the perspective from which war responsibility was viewed.
If, as Schmitt felt, the war was not inevitable in 191^,
then it was the immediate causes with which the scholar
wishing to establish responsibility must concern himself.
The revisionists, on the other hand, viewed the moves
made on the diplomatic chessboard in IÇl^ as relatively
inconsequential and looked to the remote or indirect
causes, the events of the decades prior to the outbreak
of hostilities, for the real reasons for the war.
How the most rabid of the proponents of revisionism
received the Schmitt findings is illustrated by Harry
E. Barnes’ review of the work.

Schmitt’s volumes, Barnes

wrote, represented the "last, frantic effort" of the

1^3
leader of the salvagers of the Entente verdict to confirm
51
the wartime version of responsibility.
An incredible
"Anglomania” amounting to a "fixed idea" was the over
riding characteristic of the two volumes.

In analysing

the causes for the war, Schmitt had overlooked the most
important single event of all— the Buchlau Conference
of 1908 where Isvolsky gave the Russian blessing to the
Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In what

was without a doubt an overstatement of the case, Barnes
charged that not a single major contention of Schmitt
"possesses the slightest v a l i d a t i o n , P r o p h e t i c a l l y ,
Barnes cautioned that Europe could not "safely" go on
maintaining the "absurd lie."

In 1930, the friehds of

peace in Europe were appealing to Hindenburg to save them
from Hitler.

What would be happening in 1933 if the spirit

of Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Poincaré' still ruled
Europe?
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Another of the more distinguished scholars among
those who maintained a defense of the Versailles verdict
on the basis of the latest documentary evidence was
Charles Seymour whose Diplomatic Backgrounds of the War
was examined above.

Seymour, it should be noted, did not

Harry E. Barnes, "Salvaging German War Guilt,"
Review of The Coming of the War, by Bernadette E,
Schmitt, The New Republic, LXIV, No. 852 (October 22,
1930
270

), .

^ ^Ibld., p. 273.
^^Ibld., p. 273.
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rewrite his earlier account of the diplomacy leading to
war In the light of the post-war disclosures »

After the

war, the Yale historian's principal Interest shifted to
American diplomacy during the period of neutrality»

In

his periodical articles on the war guilt problem, however,
one finds that Seymour, an adviser to Woodrow Wilson at
Versailles, retained essentially his I916 view of the
German nation, although he accepted the revisionist view
on some points.

Reviewing the newly published British

documents In 1927, he acknowledged that the disclosures
tended to confirm the conclusions of the moderate revision
ists»

Also confirmed by the Gooch-Temperley collection

was the view that Germany did not "bulldoze" Austria Into
war, and that Austria, not Germany, was primarily re
sponsible»

Furthermore, It was "true that Russian moblll-

zatlon forced the Intervention of Germany.

But It Is

certain that long before military factors entered the
situation...Austria-Hungary, In cold blood, decided upon

violent action against Serbia ,"^4 and In spite of Imminent
Russian Intervention, she held to her decision.

It Is

perhaps worth mentioning that the same Interpretation,
whether rightly or wrongly, could have been gleaned from
any one of a dozen documentary collections, but Charles
Seymour was unwilling to acknowledge the validity of such
a view until It had been corroborated by the belated
^4oharles Seymour, "Austria-Hungary In 19lif,"
Saturday Review of Literature, III, No. 38 (April
lb, 1927), 730.

publication of the British documents.
That the Anglophile Seymour retained his wartime
view of the German nation was confirmed by an article in
Current History.

Germany, he contended, looked upon the

straightforwardness and candor of British Foreign Minister
Grey, whose outstanding characteristic was absolute honesty,

as a masque concealing intrigue.

Not only were the German

characterizations of Grey erroneous, but their suspicions
of British understandings with France and Russia were illfounded.

The Entente Cordiale with France in IÇOlf- and the

Anglo-Russian accord of 190? were, in fact, moves to
prevent war, but in Germany, they gave rise to the "myth

of encirclement."^^
Grey's greatest triumph, according to Seymour,
was the 1913 Conference of Ambassadors by which the

British Foreign Minister averted a war in circumstances
more provoking than in I91I4.

In the latter year, however,

the civil rulers of Germany were not permitted to meet
the situation in the same manner, and the militarists
were not willing to forego the opportunity presented by
the Austro-Serbian quarrel.
After considering all of the diplomatic evidence
to the contrary, Seymour in 193^ still maintained that
Entente statesmen had felt their's was the cause of
Charles Seymour, "Secrets of British Diplomacy,"
Current History, XXIII, No. 3 (December, I925), 329°

5^Ibld., p. 329.

1^6
Justice and democracy In

He asserted that most

historians would agree with President Wilson that the war
was a conflict of principles.

No amount of new light on

war origins could alter the difference in political philo
sophy that in 1^1^ had separated the Central Powers on one
side and the Allies on the other.

After the failure of the

'[|.8er's and the triumph of Bismark, Germany had accepted
the Hegelian doctrine by which the state was made an entity
apart and above the collective mass of indivudual citizens.
The state was personified in one man, the Kaiser, and drew
on the loyalty of the military caste.

Such a philosophy

was antipathetic to Great Britain, France and the United
States o
That no particular government willed a European war
in 1914 is a platitude with which Seymour would not argue.

Once in the war, however, the European statesmen looked
about to see what advantage for the future might be gained
from the disadvantage of the present.
the war aims were formulated.
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be passed over without comment.

Thus, wrote Seymour,

Such a statement cannot
That Seymour could pos

sibly believe Allied war aims were formulated after I914

betrays either an extreme naivete or a decided ignorance
of some aspects of the problem posed by war responsibility.
^^Charles Seymour, American Diplomacy During the
World War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1934)»
pp. 262-63.
98
Ibid., pp. 19- 20 .
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Ibid., p. 254°
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To accept such an explanation for the origins

of French and

Russian war aims, namely Alsace-Lorraine and the Straits,
would be to render the years of productive scholarship in
the European archives invalid.
The task of defending Russia in the face of mounting,
incriminating evidence was undertaken by several writers.
Robert C. Binkley of Stanford University suggested that
historians refrain from attempting to find "war guilt,"
a term which indicated criminal intent,

and concentrate

upon determining which nation was most responsible for
creating the conditions

out.

in which the European War broke

In the light of his suggestion, Binkley produced

evidence which he felt exonerated Russia of "responsibility,"
From the Hoover War Library, he introduced a document

in

which Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov urged caution on
Belgrade before receipt of the ultimatum.

Since the

/

French mission headed by Poincare was in Russia when the
pacific memorandum was drafted and since it was

"probably"

collectively conceived by Russian and French diplomats,
Binkley argued that it illustrated the peaceful intent
of both nations.

The memorandum "strongly testifies that

the original intent of the Russian government

France

by implicationJ was honorable and pacific.
Charles Altschul also offered a solution to the
semantics problem which arose in discussing war guilt,
^^Robert C. Binkley, "New Light on Russia's War
Guilt," Current History, XXIII, No,
(January, 1926),

233.

1^8
When considering the responsibility for the mar* he sug
gested,

it should be made clear whether or not one is

thinking of responsibility for fundamental conditions of
war or for precipitating the war.

For the fundamental

conditions of the war of IÇl^, all European nations were
responsible,

and the debate was merely over relative

responsibility.

The Treaty of Versailles charged Germany

with causing the outbreak of the war, but not for causing

the circumstances of the war.

6l

Efforts by revisionists to attach the blame for
the war on Russia were seen by Altschul as no more than
a continuation of German wartime propaganda.

The Franco-

Russian alliance was always "defensive," and it "remained
with Germany to commit the overt act which alone forced
the Entente into war."^^

If one resisted the temptation

to stray from the ultimate goal-~an understanding of the
tumultuous days in June and July, lQl^--one would find it
difficult to escape the impression that Russia and France
"were not in the least

inclined to provokehostilities."

Mobilization was not tantamount

to war. Such

A^

a thesis was

solely a German m ilitary and administrative conception
which had been abandoned in Russia by

1^ 12.

The conclusion

that mobilization meant war was absolutely untenable in

^^Charles Altschul, "The War Guilt Controversy,"
Current H i s t o r y , XXIV, No. 3 (June, I926), 391-92.

62

Ibid., p. 393»

^^Ibid., p. 393.
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the light of the latest evidence, Altschul charged.
Reviewing the newly-published British documents,
Michael Plorinsky of Columbia University wrote that the
unfounded charge of Russian war guilt was further "exploded”
by the English revelations.

In regard to Russian res

ponsibility, the Gooch-Temperley collection emphasized
the straightforward and conciliatory attitude of Russian
Foreign Minister Sazonov in his struggle to avert war at
any price compatible with Serbian territorial integrity.
If the baseless accusations brought against Sazonov and
the Russian government by a "few American sympathizers"
needed refutation, Plorinsky suggested it would be found
in the British documents.
Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of the "sal
vagers" was their acceptance of the dictum that the war
was not Inevitable in IÇlij- or at any time.

With the

remote causes thus disposed of, they could honestly devote
their attention to the immediate causes of the war— causes
which most revisionists saw as secondary in assessing

responsibility.

These war guilt scholars, unlike those of

the Hazen stamp, considered the latest documentary evidence,
but used it to substantiate and defend the justice of the
Treaty of Versailles.

Unlike their wartime colleagues,

however, many of the "salvagers" accepted the divided
responsibility thesis applied to the indirect conditions
^Michael Plorinsky, "Russia's Responsibility,"
Saturday Review of Literature, III, No. 39 (April 23,
1927
750

),

.

i6o
of the war, but felt that Germany„ on the basis of immediate
causes, was guilty of precipitating the war in

1914°

Citing

the same evidence as the revisionists, the Seymour-Sohmitt
"school" often arrived at diametrically opposed conclusions.
Their method was essentially the same, but their respective
findings were poles apart as shall be illustrated below.
Ill
The revisionists logically fall into two loosely
defined groups,

those who favored a divided responsibility

feeling all of the belligerent powers were guilty of con
tributing toward the outbreak of the war,

and those who

took the more uncompromising position that neither of the
Central Powers were guilty in I914, and that responsibility
should be collectively shouldered by Russia, France and

Serbia,
By general historical consensus, the most outstanding
of the former group, the moderate revisionists, was Sidney
Bradshaw Fay,
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Originally published in I928, Fay's The

Origins of the World War expounded the thesis of war r e 
sponsibility which has been accepted by most scholarly

American historians.
undergone revision,

The two volumes have several times
the latest in 1948 when Pay wrote

that there was no need to change the general outlines of
his work although recent scholarship had necessitated
^^In 1928, Pay was a professor of European history
at Smith College,
Later, he became a member of the
Harvard faculty.

i6i
some revision of detail.

In other words, the Pay thesis

of 1928 was sound In 19^ 8, and one can safely assume It
will remain equally valid In I968,
Fay deprecated both those who contended that Germany
was solely guilty In 191^ and those who attached responsi
bility only to Russia or France.

All parties to the

dispute were responsible, for the basic guilt lay In the
events of the century proceeding the outbreak of hostili
ties.

No serious historian. Fay wrote In 1928, any longer

accepted the dictum of the Allied victors In 1919 that
Germany and her allies were solely responsible.

All agreed

that the blame was divided; the only question was over how
the responsibility was to be divided.
The underlying causes could be traced to national
sentiment engendered by the French Revolution.

Fay ar

ranged the complex and Interrelated factors underlying

World War I under five general headings: the alliance
systems, militarism, nationalism, economic Imperialism
and the newspaper press.

Of these, the greatest single

cause was the European alliance systems which came Into
existence after I 87I,

The systems, while they lasted,

did much to preserve peace, but they also made certain
that any war Involving one major power would Inevitably
Implicate all Europe.
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Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War
(2d ed. rev.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 19^8),
I, 12-16.
^^ Ibld., pp. 32-3^^
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Having examined "fundamental causes" generally* Fay
began his chronological narrative with the Pranco-Prussian
War.

Els discussion of the events between I87O and

1^ 1^

Is Intensive but only so far as Is necessary for an under

standing of the problem.

In addition to assimilating all

of the pertinent documentary evidence, he considered the
most Important of the secondary sources relating to respon
sibility.

In cases where evidence f ro m two or more sources

was contradictory. Pay examined each thoroughly,
weighing the merits or demerits

carefully

of each, before revealing

his reasons for accepting one document and rejecting another
There are no a priori judgments evident in Pay's work.
The Pranco-Prusslan War reversed a situation which
had existed In Europe for two hundred years.
not Germany, was weak and In danger of attack.
than a defeat for Prance,

Now Prance*
But more

the war provided the occasion

for Bismark *3 gravest blunder--the annexation of Alsace
and Lorraine.

"The provinces remained an "open sore

threatening the peace of Europe for forty years."

68

After the war, the "Iron Chancellor" devised a
scheme whereby France might be indefinitely Isolated
to prevent future ravages on the Infant German state.
In 1882, France's Isolation was ostensibly complete,
and German progress was guaranteed by the Triple Alliance.
Bismark, however, had not considered the possibility of
the Pranco-Russlan rapproachment of 189^,

68

^"Pay,

I,

5^ - 52.

"the natural

163
result of suspicions... and irritations against Germany
existing in both countries,"

69

Like the Triple Alliance,

the Dual Alliance was defensive.

The Pranco-Russian

alliance, in its early years, strengthened rather than
threatened peace, because it established a healthy counter
poise to the Triple Alliance.

The decade, 1894-1904,

however, witnessed two changes that tended to destroy the
European equilibrium— England's exchange of diplomatic
isolation for an Entente Cordiale with France and Italy’s
vacillation and dubious loyalty to her allies.
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Before

her adherence to the Dual Alliance powers, England had
offered an alliance to Germany, but the Kaiser and von

BÜI 0W were not receptive,

Germany was not worried about

an Anglo-French entente since such a move, it was felt,
would undoubtedly lead to a breach in the Dual Alliance.

In 190^, the Entente became a reality with British and
French diplomats delimiting their respective spheres of
interest with little regard to "rightful" German claims in
Morocco,

The division of the North African territory

precipitated the Tangiers crisis and the subsequent Algeciras Conference of I906, the importance of which was
that it illustrated the close ties between Great Britain
and France,

Chancellor von Bulow’s Moroccan policy, os

tensibly a German diplomatic victory, was, in fact, worse
than a defeat because it led to the feeling in France that
^^Fay,

I,

10^,

7°Ibld,, pp. 123-2^,

i6ijwar would be preferable to another humiliation at the
71
hands of Germany,
The informal, secret naval and military agreements
following on the heels of the signing of the Pranco-English
Entente became very binding.

Although Grey insisted that

English hands were free, he permitted France to feel that
England was bound to support her.

It was extremely dangerous

Fay pointed out, to allow military authorities to develop
strategic plans which necessarily involved diplomatic obliga
tions of which Parliament remained ignorant until IÇl^.
"Herein lies Grey's responsibility for the war."
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Mili

tary conversations, however, had progressed a good deal

further than even Parliament suspected in 1914»

As early

as 1911, Pranco-British talks had advanced to the point
where it was said in Russia that the French army would

in the event of war, as quickly as the German

concentrate,

army, and that from the twelfth day, it would be in a po s i 
tion to take the offensive against Germany with the aid of

the English army on its left flank, the Belgian frontier.
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Apparently that frontier was more sacrosanct to the British
parliamentarians than to the foreign office.

While the

von Schlieffen plan and the German "rape" of Belgium r e 
ceived wide notoriety in the world press,

little notice

was given the minature Anglo-French "Schlieffen" plan.

7^Fay,

I, 190-91.

72lb i d ..

pp. 192-93.

73lbid.,

p. 213.
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Isvolsky's accession to the portfolio of minister
of foreign affairs In Russia heralded the drive toward

the Anglo-Russlan settlement of 1907? and the Triple Entente
became a fact.

Germany was diplomatically Isolated, and

in the next seven years, the lines between the Triple
Entente and Triple Alliance solidified.

The crystallizing

of the rival systems was accompanied by four sets of
"tendencies:"

(1) Each alliance evolved from a strictly

"defensive " coalition and espoused "offensive" character

istics; (2) Attempts were made by both Germany and France
to strengthen the bonds of their respective alliances;

(3) Friction within each system necessitated concessions
or "blank checks;" and (I|.) The armaments race was pursued
with renewed vigor.

As Churchill so aptly put it, "Where

the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente had stood side by
side.

In 1914 they

stood face

to face."^^

Although Germany was on the road toward more amicable
relations with Russia after the Potsdam conversations of

1910-1911, her relations with the other Entente nations
steadily worsened.

The French occupation of Fez rendered

the Act of Algeciras a dead letter and set the stage for
the appearance of the German gunboat. Panther., at Agadir.
Fearing a possible bilateral agreement would come from

the "direct conversations" between France and Germany
whereby the latter

might gain an Atlantic port in Africa,

Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, threatened
_

Fay,

-

I, 22S-26.
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Germany in his ’’Mansion House” speech.

Germany came out

of her ’’Moroccan Adventure” more isolated than ever.
The fall of the pacific Gaillaux ministry and the

1Ç 12

formation in

of the Poincare ’’Great Ministry” including

Delcasse bode ill for Franco-German relations.

With the

help of Isvolsky, now Russian ambassador in Paris, the
bonds of the Triple Entente grew steadily stronger.

Prior

to 1912, Fay maintained, Russo-French cooperation toward
war was not so close as the uncompromising revisionists
would have us believe.

After the elevation of Poincare

to the premiership and subsequently to the presidency,
however, France actively supported Russian aggressive

intentions in the Balkans and assured her of support in
76
case of war with Germany.
The demise of the pacific
Georges Louis, French ambassador to Russia,

and his re-

placement in 1913 by the bellicose Delcasse, who encouraged
Russia in her uncompromising Balkan policies, was one of
the principal reasons the war came in IÇl^»^^
Triple Entente grew stronger,

As the

the vacillation of the Triple

Alliance's ’’weak sister,” Italy, materially weakened the
Central Powers.
Although the armaments race was intensified as a re
sult of the Balkan crises of I912 and 1913, the two wars
provided one beneficial result--an attempt at creating a

75Ray,

I, 312.

7&Ibld.,

pp. 330-31.

77lbld., p. 3^2,
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concert of Europe to transcend the rival alliance systems-for which Lord Grey and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, more
than any other European statesmen, worked unceasingly.
The failure of their efforts. Fay wrote, stemmed directly
from the inepitude of European statesmen to see beyond the

confines of their own system.

While such an anarchic at

mosphere prevailed, Franz Ferdinand’s assisination posed
a new threat in the Balkans.
There was. Pay contended, absolutely no truth in the
charge that Austria was pushed into the annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in I9O 8 by Germany to expedite the comple
tion of the Bagdad Railroad.

"If anyone pushed, it was
78
Russia" in the person of Isvolsky,
The major effect of
the Bosnian crisis, besides further alienating Italy from
the Central Powers, was that it encouraged Russia and
Serbia to regard the annexation not as a fait accompli
79
but as a Serbian Alsace-Lorraine,
Germany did back
Austria in I908, but only because she was her only depend
able ally.

Between I908 and 191^, the German influence

on Austria was one of moderation.

To represent Germany as

having complete control over her ally as so many did. Fay
argued, was incorrect.

It was not until well into the war

that Germany, recognizing the Dual M o n a r c h y ’s general
administrative incompetence, assumed control over her
a l l y ’s destiny,
^ Fay,

I, 385^88.

79lbld., p. 399.
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The settlement of the difficulties caused by the

General von Liman mission to Turkey in early 191^ indicated
to Pay that the war was not inevitable.

Of all world

problems, however, the Balkan question was the most nearly

incapable of peaceful solution.
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After Isvolsky had

failed to open the Straits diplomatically in I9II, he
worked persistently for the only alternative to open
"Russia's back door"--a general European war.

By IÇl^,

he had convinced Foreign Minister Sazonov that only by a
European conflagration could Russia’s historic mission be
realized.

In the spring of that year, the bonds of the

Triple Entente were further strengthened by Anglo-Russian
naval agreements.

Entente solidarity was a fact, and

Isvolsky could say in August, igi^,

"C ’est ma guerre 1 "

R"l

The "immediate occasion" for the World War was the
murder of the Austrian heir apparent.

Had it not occured.

Pay wrote, there would have been neither an Austro-Serbian
war nor a World War, and European diplomacy, as incompetent
as it was, might well have averted a war for years.

On this

ground. Pay justified his intensive study of the plot "which
was to have such awful and world racking consequences."
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From his investigation of the plans for the assasina
tion, Pay concluded that the combination of activities by
the "Black Hand," a secret organization dedicated to the
—

Pay, I, ^^6.
^^Ibid. , p. ^26.

GZibid.. II,

23 .
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union of all Serbs by whatever means necessary; the Narodona
Obrana, a "cultural” organization, disseminating antl-

Austrlan propaganda; and the Serbian government, a number
of whose officials knew of the plot and did nothing to
prevent It, were responsible for the Archduke’s death.

The

so-called warning from Serbia to Austria was very vague
and did not In any way "relieve the Serbian government of
the guilt of withholding Information concerning a plot to
commit murder...a crime known In private life as ’compounding a felony.’"
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Pay subjected Ambassador Morgenthau’s allegations,
cited at Versailles as proof of German war guilt, to care
ful scrutiny proving beyond a doubt that the Potsdam
Council, as the American diplomat portrayed It, was
largely a myth.

That the Kaiser held separate meetings

July 5 and 6 was acknowledged.

To William II, the Austrian

ambassador related Count Berchtold’s Intention to make the
Sarajevo Incident the occasion for a final reckoning with
Serbia.

The principal topic of discussion was not, however,

the difficulties with Serbia but the prospective Inclusion
of Bulgaria In the Triple Alliance.

How the "blank check"

was given In Berlin, and how It was used In Vienna were
two different things.

By letting Austria Judge for her

self with Implicit assurances of German support, Germany
placed Europe In the hands of the unprincipled Austrian
Foreign Minister.

"The Kaiser and his advisers on July 5

^^Fay, II, 166.
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and 6 were not criminals plotting the World War ; they were
simpletons putting a noose about their necks I

I

n

so

doing, of course, they Incurred a grave but not the primary
responsibility for what later happened.
Before the ultimatum was finally drafted, Austria
kept Germany Informed, but after July lij., the Dual Mon
archy paid little heed to German advice «

Germany was

not shown the precise terms of the Austrian utllmatum,
merely a general outline.

The assertion heard In some

quarters that she had no prior knowledge of the note's
contents was a lie.
same thing.

So too was Grey's assertion of the

On July l6, he too had been Informed as to

the substance of the Austrian note.

Unfortunately, Pay

commented, diplomatic lying was not the monopoly of any
one country In July, IÇl^.^^

When German officials were

shown the exact text of the ultimatum, the general con
sensus was that It was "too sharp," but that was July 22,

and It was too late to do anything since the note was
presented In Belgrade the next day.

Peeling the war could

be more easily localized if Austria was energetically
supported, Germany accepted the fait accompli.

The Serbian reply to the note, which Entente his
torians maintained was more conciliatory than could be
expected under the circumstances, was. In fact, more
conciliatory In form than In substance.
^^Pay, II, l66.

G^Ibld., 260-64^

Actually, Serbia
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accepted only two of the demands unconditionally.

After

the diplomatic break bet wee n Austria and Serbia, proposals
came from all quarters to preserve the peace.

The first

was G r e y ’s suggestion for direct conversations between the
Dual Monarchy and Serbia which was vetoed by France as
"very dangerous."

G r e y ’s proposal for mediation between

Austria and Russia was accepted by Germany but refused by
Russia.

G r e y ’s suggestion for four-power talks was refused

by both Germany and Russia,

not Germany alone as Entente

writers so often attested.

Finally,

the German appeal for

direct conversations was thwarted by the Austrian declara
tion of war which was designed to "cut the ground from any

86

attempt at in tervention,"

Russia could no more desert Serbia than Germany could
Austria,

and Sazonov devised a plan of partial mobilization

to prevent the Dual Monarchy from striking Serbia,

Until

July 2^, Sazonov worked for peace, but on that day, he and
the Tsar conceded general mobilization to the Russian mili87
tarists.
The Russian mobilization, generally held in
p r e -1914 Europe to be tantamount to a declaration of war,
subverted B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g ’s eleventh hour attempts to
pacify Vienna.

France had pledged her support July 28,

and with this in mind,

the Tsar consented on July 29 to

official general mobilization.

The order was rescinded

by Nicholas, who was convinced of the genuine efforts of
^^Fay, II, 4^0-16.
^^Ibld., pp. 327-28.
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the Kaiser to placate Austria, but Russian militarists
continued the mobilization which was officially re-ordered
the following day.
Entente writers,

Contrary to the assertions of pro-

there was,

according to Pay, no Potsdam

Council on July 29 where final German plans for war were
formulated.

Instead,

the German Chancellor,

on that day,

applied the brakes to von Moltke's plans for a swift blow.
It was Russian mobilization, not military discussions,
which determined German action and plunged Europe Into

war.
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In 1914 , none of the European powers wanted a war.

It broke out because In each nation leaders did things that
should not have been done,
to have done.
slble."

and did not do things they ought

"All of the European cou ntl res .,.were respon-

The dictum of Versailles very simply was untrue.

It was a confession exacted by the victors from the van
quished.

Pay disavowed efforts by any historian to affix

the exact responsibility for the war.

Even If It could be

assigned, he maintained that It would be different for the
Immediate causes from the remote causes.
S e r b i a ’s failure to prevent an assasinatlon of which
she was aware was a grave responsibility for the Immediate
origins of the war.

Berchtold gambled on a localized war

for "self-preservation" and lost.

The one m a n who might

have been able to conciliate the diverse nationalities In

GGpay, II, Sl^.
G^lbld., p. 5^ 8 .
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the ’’Ramshackle Empire" short of war was the victim of the
occasion for the war.

Germany did not plot a European

war, and she made genuine efforts to prevent the holocaust.
Austria, however, would probably not have gambled on a
localized war had she not received assurances from her
stronger ally, however innocently they might have been
tendered,

"To this extent,

sibility for the war."^^

Germany must accept respon

Germany was,

in fact, the last

of the European powers to accept the fact that the war was
’’inevitable."

It was not inevitable until the premature

Russian mobilization,
France, by her encouragement of Russia, was as guilty
as Germany for her assurances to the Dual Monarchy.

Finally,

everything else having failed, an explicit declaration of
the English position would probably have averted a European
war.

The refusal to commit England until after hostilities

had begun was the responsibility shouldered by Grey.

Furthermore, Germany’s eleventh hour effort to urge moder
ation on Austria received little notice in England.

There

were, by July 29, indications that Downing Street already

had made up its mind that war wit h Germany was probable.
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In the forty years after I 87O, Fay concluded, Europe
was divided into two opposing camps whose hostility toward
one another was increased by armaments, economic rivalry,

9 °Fay, II, 549-523 .

91S. B. Fay, "Germany’s Part," Saturday Review of
Literature, III, No. 38 (April I6, I927), 729 .

174
nationalism and the newspaper press.

Still, if there had

been no assasination on June 28, igi4, Europe probably
would have had peace for a number of years.

That factor

consolidated the elements of hostility and started a suc
cession of events which ultimately led to war.
factor,

For that
92

Serbian nationalism was primarily responsible.

In a later periodical article.

Professor Pay eluci

dated upon what he felt was one of the principal fundamental
causes of the war,
European press.

the poisoned atmosphere created by the

For this cause. Fay considered the London

Times under Lord Northcliffe,
one of the more guilty.

later of Wellington House,

Northcliffe and his staff were

obscessed wi t h the idea that Germany posed a threat to
Great Britain and conveyed that impression to government
officials by their constant extractions from the PanGerman press which in no w ay reflected German public
opinion.
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Nor was the German press

Innocent in this regard.

Some of the smaller papers, particularly in South Germany,
launched outrageous attacks on England beginning with the
Boer War and continued them through World War I.
difference between the two presses,

The

according to Pay, was

that the German press criticized its own government as
scurrilously as it did England, but, because few English

^^Fay, The Origins of..., II, 558.
93
6, B. Fay, "Pre-War Diplomacy and the European
Press," Current H i s t o r y , XXXII, No. 2 (November, 1930),213,

17^
diplomats read German,

they were aware only of the samples

of German journalism reprinted in the Times

British

diplomats who were most accurate in their evaluations
German public opinion such as Frank Lascelles

of

and Edward

Goschen, both ambassadors to Berlin were dismissed because
of the press comment contradicting their reports.

Fairfax

Cartwright, British ambassador to Munich and later to
Vienna,

on the other hand,

extracted the most Anglophobe

comments that could be found in the German press and for
warded them to London,

British officials had more faith

in C a r t w r i g h t ’s reports because their contents compared
favorably with what appeared in the English press than in
the more truthful dispatches from Goschen and Lascelleso
Suspicion of Germany was

the overriding characteristic of

British thought between I907 and IÇl^o

The press attacks

whic h gave bir th to the suspicions. Pay maintained, went
far in explaining the prompt British entry into the war

in 1914.
Although Professor P a y is generally considered
A m e r i c a ’s outstanding revisionist historian, he was not
the only scholar who attacked the Versailles theory of
war guilt.

He was not even the first.

As early as 1922,

the journalist, Albert J. Nock, charged the Treaty of
Versailles with gross inequity.

Propounding what at that

date was an extremely unpopular and ’’r a d i c a l ” view, Nock
'^^Pay, Current History, XXXII, No,

9^Ibld,, pp, 216- 17,

2 , 215,

l?6
might properly be called the first of the moderate rev is
ionists»

He did not assume for a moment that Germany had

bee n innocent in 1^1^,

an assertion Barnes and other scho

lars defended.

She was, however,

the only guilty

p

responsible,

a

r

t

y

.

"^6

"far,

very far from being

since Germany was not solely

the verdict of Versailles was not only inde

fensible, but It was economically, morally and legally a
farce.
Nock cited the figures
ditures

on military and naval expen

to refute the Allied claim that the Entente was

unprepared for the war.

In IÇl^, the combined armaments

expenditures of England, France and Russia totaled |ll(.2
million compared to $92 million for the Central Powers.
Furthermore, he argued,

the suppressed telegram from the

British ambassador in Vienna telling of the substance of
the Austrian ultimatum belied Lord G r e y ’s assertion that
the Entente nations were taken by surprise by the action
of the Dual Monarchy.
Nock compared two statements by Lloyd George which
"put the lie" to the Entente m y t h of war guilt.

The first

concerned what the later English prime minister called
"the most dangerous conspiracy ever plotted against the
liberty of nations;

carefully, skillfully, insidiously,

clandestinely p l a n n e d , „.with ruthless,

cynical determin-

9&Albert J. Nock, The Myth of a Guilty Nation
(New York: B. W. Huebsch^ Inc., 1922 ), p. o.
97
7 'ibid., p. 25 .
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at lon,”

The Prime Minister's

second statement was delivered

December 23, 1920 after the hatred bred by war had subsided
and rendered propaganda unnecessary:
The more one reads memoirs and books written
in various countries on what happened before the
first of August, 1 9 1 ^ . ..the more one realizes
that no one head of affairs meant war at that
stage...A discussion, I have no doubt, would
have averted it.9°
Nock took to task the official British wartime
apology for Joining Russia and France.

E n g l a n d ’s rela

tionship to Belgium revealed no obligation to protect
Belgian territorial integrity, merely to respect it h e r 
self.

"Belgium was not thought of by A s q u i t h ’s cabinet

before August 2 , 191^.
means

She was brought in then as a

of making the war go down with the British

Revelations by the Soviet government

p e o p l e .

"99

in I9I8, Nock argued,

should at least reopen the question of responsibility.
As early as I 912 , Poincare promised that Russia would
have the support

of France in the event of a Balkan

war in which Austria was supported by Germany.
in the same year,

Isvolsky,

received similar assurances from Lord

Grey and King George.
Nock succinctly stated his interpretation of the
orogins of the war as follows:
A train of gunpowder...had been laid from
Belgrade through Paris and London to St. Peters
burg;... the engine of that train was Pan-Slavism.
A spark in the Balkans would cause the train to
'^^Nock, pp. 38- 4 0 .

99 Ibid., p. 46.
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flash into flames throughout its entire

l e n g t h .

100

Albert J. hock will never be accorded the place of
a Fay,

a Schmitt or a Barnes as an analyst of the causes

of World War I, but as one who provided an early insight
to the American public that the blacks

and whites of

Versailles were after all greys, he deserves mention in
any study of the historiography of the war's origins.
After the publication of Fay's classic

in I 928 ,

American historians began increasingly to apply a "mod
erate revisionist" interpretation to the origins of the wa:

No longer was it only the "Twelve Days" which were n e c 
essary to understand the world's greatest cataclysm to

date; historians showed an increased interest in the in
direct or fundamental causes dating generally from the
French Revolution, but more particularly from I 87I 0
Walter C. Langsam of Columbia University is illustrative
of this trend.

In his The World Since 191^3 Langsam wrote

that the morbid action of the psychopathic Bosnian was
merely the occasion for the war.

First among the f u n 

damental or real causes which provided the tinder for

Princip's spark were the twin curses nationalism and
irredentism, the legacies of the French Revolution and
the Age of Metternich.
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The diplomats at the Congress

of Vienna,

according

lO^Nock, p. 103.
^^^Walter C, Langsam, The World Since 191^
York: The Macmillan Co., 1933
p. 3«

(New
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to Langsanij, shaped the course of European politics between

1815 and 191^»

ThereJ

the doctrines of nationalism and

democracy had been repudiated.

By IÇl^, m a n y of the

territorial maladjustments of the shortsighted statesmen
had been rectified, but several nationalistic sore spots
remained plus a f ew new ones.
Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Including AlSace and Lorraine,

Trieste

and Trentlno,

the "polygot*

character of the Dual Monarchy and the rivalries over
" E u r o p e ’s sick man."
Suppressed nationalism,
or less dangerous

Langsam noted, was no more

to peace than exaggerated nationalism.

To be a patriot In nineteenth century Europe meant to

scoff at foreign cultures and view o n e ’s own nationality
as a "chosen people,"

While Treltschke and Bernhardl lent

a special flavor to German patriotism,

"the Germans at

worst suffered from only a slightly more severe attack of
nationalism than did England and France.
The vogue of militarism was another underlying cause
of World War I,

Langsam defined a militaristic state as

one In which the people permitted military power to overawe
civil power.
ified.

By 1^1^,

all European states could be so class

Military alliances were sought first by Bismark and

later by all leaders until Europe was gradually divided
Into two hostile camps.

"Both sides were strong...Each

was ready to resort to sword-rattllng to Intimidate the
other.

Should either group call the o t h e r ’s bluff, war would

102_

Langsam, p.

^

5«
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be inevitable.”

The immediate affect of the crystalli

zation of the alliance systems was a series

of internat

ional crises beginning with the Moroccan incident of igo^
and culminating in the assasination of Francis Ferdinand.
With each crisis,

armaments soared until by 19li|, there

were more than four million men under arms.
was obvious

By then,

it

that another crisis could not be weathered

peaceably.
The third fundamental cause,

as Langsam viewed the

origins of the war, was economic rivalry and imperialism.
The world's history during the nineteenth century was
characterized by a search for markets

and sources of raw

materials which were necessitated b y the Industrial R e v 
olution.

It was G e r m a n y ’s misfortune to appear on the

imperialistic scene late after the world had be e n divided,
but she made great strides in spite of her handicap,

and

by the i B B O ’s there was widespread apprehension that Great
Britain might be outdistanced by the upstart.
suffered a veritable

'made in Germany'

"England

complex.

The fourth underlying cause for the war was the lack
of any machinery to control international relations.

The

worst of the "international anarchy" was secret diplomacy.
Where cabinets before had been kept informed of the inter
national situation,

they were no w kept in the dark.

Thus

it was that Sir Edward Grey on August 3 , IÇl^ could deny
^^^Langsam, p. 9 »

lO^Ibld., pp. 12-13.

I8l
that Commons had any restriction of action, while in actual
fact,

there were commitments of the utmost importance to

France.

The German ambassador to Paris,

von 8 chon,

described the European situation when he said,

accurately

"Peace

remains at the mercy of an accident.
After the assasination at Sarajevo,

a result of the

historic Austro-Serbian enmity, Austrian officials sus
pected Serbia of gross neglect if not connivance.

Austria,

Langsam maintained, believed that unless severe retribution
was demanded, Russo-Serbian subversive machinations against
the tottering Dual Monarchy would continue.

The Austrian

plan was to frame an "unacceptable" note to which Russia,
as in 1908 , would yield,

and then strike quickly so that

the war might be localized.
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On July 5s Germany endorsed

the plan but cautioned against making unreasonable demands
on Serbia.

By the time Germany was shown the precise terms

of the ultimatum,

it was too late to modify it, and she

could not easily retract her pledge of July 5»
declaration of war,

The Austrian

according to Langsam, was made in the

sincere belief that it was the only way to save the Dual
Monarchy from extinction.
While Germany did her utmost to restrain Austria,
Russia prepared in secrecy and haste.

The general Russian

mobilization of July 30 forced Germany into a declaration
of war which drew in all of the European powers.

lOS?Langsam, p, Iq.
lOGlbld., pp. 16-17.
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to blame Is hard to say, but in every belligerent capital,

the people went wild with joy."
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Erik Achorn^^^adopted a similar thesis to the one
propounded by Pay and Langsam but with certain modifica
tions.

To Achorn, the fundamental or real causes of the

war appeared to be four in number: economic factors, the
affect of universal military service, secret diplomacy and
the rival alliance systems.

In addition to these four

"basic" causes, there were seven other forces which served
to intensify international hostilities:

(1 ) the spread of

nationalism and the so-called dictates of national honor;
(2 ) the nationalistic trend in history;
press; (Ij.) irredentism in all nations;

(3 ) the jingoistic
(^) international

anarchy, the outstanding characteristic of which was the
assimilation and application of the ideas of Darwin and the
ethics of Machiavelli by politicians in all nations; (6 )
exaltation of war; and (7) mob

psychology,

The majority of Europeans in IÇl^ wished for peace.
In Great Britain, the people were apathetic to inter
national affairs.

Although official France wished the

restoration of Alsace, the peasantry was largely uncon
cerned.

In Russia, the great masses were unaware of

international relations.
107

A numerically insignificant,

Langsam, pp. 20-21.

^^®Achorn was a professor of European history at
Harvard,
lO^Erik Achorn, European Civilization and Politics
Since l8l5 (New Torlc: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Iy3l|.), pp.

38^-86.
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although strong, minority was involved in the activities
of the Serbian secret societies dedicated to the dissolu
tion of the Dual Monarchy.

One could easily visualize

the feelings of Vienna, however.

’’Imagine the feelings

in Washington if Mexico decided to annex the American
110
Southwest.”
German officials feared the envy of Great Britain,
the vengeance of France and the overwhelming preponderance
of the Slavic hordes.

The idea was current in Germany

that the three rivals had leagued together under Edward
VII to throw an ’’iron ring” around Germany and keep her
from her ’’rightful place in the sun."

Achorn condemned

those who accepted the loose-mouthed utterances of the PanGermans as credible evidence of responsible policy.
Nietzsche, Treltschke and Bernhardl helped create an
atmosphere and a public sentiment detrimental to the peace
of the world, but Achorn noted, there were similar ex111
ponents in every nation in the world.
Since it was not the masses of the belligerent nations
that precipitated the war, Achorn next analysed the posi
tion of each of the individuals close to the center of
things in 19li|«

Grey knew England but not the continent,

and because of this, he was unable to see beyond the
principles of British policy laid down by his predecessors,
Poincare, a "Lorrainer of '71," may not have willed the war,
^^^Achorn, pp, 378- 88,

^^^Ibid., pp, 388-90,
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but he believed it was inevitable which was just as bad.
The Kaiser was a ’’pathological” case for whose actions
neurosis was the only suitable explanation.

He surrounded

himself with incapable advisers among #iom was Chancellor
Bethmann-Hollweg, a ’’well-intentioned bureaucrat over
shadowed by militarists,”

Francis Joseph, like the Tsar

in Russia, was incapable of ably discharging his duties
which was his contribution to causing the war,

Sazonov and

Berchtold, the ’’ardent chauvinists” who occupied the center
of the stage, directed affairs in their respective count112
ries,
The assasination of Francis Ferdinand was merely the
occasion for the war.

If he had not been murdered, there

would have been no Austro-Serbian war and consequently no
World War in the summer of IÇlij- or perhaps ever.

Clearly,

Achorn argued, Serbia was guilty in countenancing the antiAustrian activity that led to the assasination.
was an ’’accessory after the fact,”

Serbia

Those who believed

the Serbian cause was just, Achorn maintained, must accept
assasination as a rightful means toward attaining national
ends,
Because Austria did not adequately prepare her case
for the ultimatum in the accompanying dossier, inter
national public opinion did not realize Serbia was the
guilty party and looked on Austria as an aggressor,
^^^Achorn, pp. 390-93 .
I13ibld,. p. 397.
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Throughout the "Twelve Days," Achorn contended, Germany
was dragged along the path to the abyss by her ally
who presented her with one fait accompli after another.
Germany, however^ laid herself open to such treatment by
her July 5 promises and her insistence that the quarrel
nil
concerned only the Dual Monarchy and Serbia.
Assessing relative responsibility, Achorn pointed
out that since the primary cause for the outbreak of
the war was the Austro-Serbian quarrel and since high
Serb officials shared in responsibility for the first
blow, Serbia shared heavily in the blame for the larger
conflict.

Because of her actions, the Dual Monarchy

shouldered some of the blame.

She was, in contradistinc

tion to Russia, however, fighting for her life.

Because

the Dual Monarchy was Germany's only dependable ally,
the latter, perhaps foolishly, backed her.

When the

war became imminent, however, Germany made sincere
efforts to avert the calamity.

Russia was responsible

because she encouraged anti-Austrian propaganda from
Belgrade and prompted Serbia to reject the ultimatum.
France was guilty in that she, as much as Germany,
tendered a "blank check" to her ally.

Without assur

ances of French support, Russia would not have mobilized.
Grey's "unofficial" promises to France bound England to
her across-Channel neighbor and Russia although Belgium
was used as the selling point.

Achorn, pp. 399-qOO.

If England's position
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had been made clear,

ii'o
there might not have been a w a r .

That the moderate revisionist thesis of the import
ance of fundamental causes vis-a-vis immediate causes is
as tenable in the 1950's as it was in the 1920's is borne
out by a number of contemporary historians.

C. E. Black

and Eo C. Helmreich looked to what they labeled the "spirit
of the age" for the real reasons behind the outbreak of
hostilities in 191^.

After l8l5, this spirit manifested

itself in an adulation of progress and a trend toward
materialism in which the state took over many of the
functions formerly exercised by the Church»

Nationalism,

which filled spiritual needs heretofore taken care of
by religion, was also characteristic of the age pro
ceeding the war.

Nationalism nurtured a new liberalism

brought on by the victory of the bourgeoisie over the
aristocracy in which personal liberties were sacrificed
to the national interest.

In the nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries sovereignty versus interdependence
loomed as a problem to be resolved, and the scramble for
colonial possessions was but a manifestation of the
conflict.

But imperialism failed of its major objective--

economic and political security.

Unable to find security

iraperialistically, the European nation-states turned
to alliances, a trend which culminated in the Triple

^^^Achorn, pp. ij.05-08.

Alliance and Triple Entente.

187
il6

It was futile, the authors contended, to try to
fix the blame for the war on any one nation.
was the product of the age.

The war

Its real origins lay far

back in the past and to view it in any other way was short
sighted.

Because of the rivalry of the Great Powers, an

Austrian-Serbian clash developed into a great inter
national war over how the continent was to be organized
117
and how the balance of power should be weighted.
Ferdinand Schevill of Chicago University, whom H. E.
Barnes somewhat erroneously aligned with himself as an un
compromising revisionist, provides a logical transition
from the moderate exponent of the new interpretation to
the more uncompromising revisionist.

In his A History of

Europe from the Reformation to the Present Day first pub
lished in 1925 but revised in 195^1» Schevill carefully
distinguished between remote and immediate causes.

For

the serious historian, he wrote, the fundamental causes
were far more important than immediate causes, despite
the importance attached to the latter by the general
public.
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C. E. Black and E. G. Helmreich, Twentieth Century
Europe (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1954)* PP* 23-25.
Black is a professor of European history at Princeton
University, and Professor Helmreich is on the faculty of
Bowdoln College,
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Ibid., pp. 55^5:6.

ll8Ferdinand Schevill, A History of Europe from the
Reformation to the Present Day (2d ed. revised; New
York; Harcourt, Brace & Co., 19^4)* P« 705«
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To anyone versed In the processes of history, the
Chicago professor wrote, it was obvious that an epochal
event like the World War could not have sprung from
other than the spirit and forms assumed by a changing
civilization.

He enumerated the fundamental causes as

follows: (1) Europe had evolved into a body of competitive
states, a process which had begun with the Reformation;
(2) Nationalism was exaggerated in all European states;
(3) The Industrial Revolution gave rise to the third
cause, imperialism, which often took the form of a "civi
lizing mission" to extend material benefits to less
fortunate nations; (ij.) The export of capital and the
accompanying search for new sources of raw materials
and markets also could be traced to the Industrial Revo
lution; (5) Since each of the European powers felt war
was a legitimate tool of policy, each desired a strong
army and navy which led to competition in armaments;
(6) The alliance systems replaced the Concert of Europe;
and (7) The European mind was diseased and dominated by
119
fears and hatreds.
Discussing the immediate causes of the war, Schevill
discarded any view that held one man or group of men
responsible.

"All five powers immediately involved,

Austria, Russia, France, Great Britain and Germany must
assume some measure of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . E a r l y in
^^9schevill, pp. 705^ 07.
izoibid.. p. 708.
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July, 191^., Germany worked toward localizing the war,
hut on July 28, realizing the Russian attitude made such
a policy unrealistic, Germany took a new stand.

On the

one hand, she warned Russia not to mobilize generally,
and on the other, she brought strong pressure to bear on
Vienna to accept mediation.

Unfortunately, it was too

late.

Following Russia’s Initiative, the other powers
121
mobilized, and war was a certainty.
Despite his general condemnation of Russian activities
during the critical "Twelve Days," Schevill warned that it

is a short view to try to explain the causes of World War
I on the basis of moves made during July and August, IÇl^.
At best, those moves may be said to have caused the war
at that particular moment.

That the war was prepared

generations before I91I1 was the only view worthy of the
serious historian.

The war was a plunge Into disaster

by civilization owing to the growth of certain unfortunate
trends which the leaders In Igl^ had neither the will nor
122
the wisdom to control.
So wrote the moderate revisionists, moderate when
compared to the Barnes brand of revisionism.

The out

standing characteristic of these scholars was their
recognition of the importance In looking beyond the
events of the summer of I91I1
- for the real reasons for
the war.

Most of them would agree that the diplomatic

^^^Schevlll, pp. 712-13»

122%bid,, pp. 7i^_i^_
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moves made In

did no more than start a conflict which

had been brewing since at least I 87I, or perhaps as some
would have It, since the French Revolution or the Reforma
tion.

Each of the scholars considered above can be labeled

"moderates" on the basis of what has been generally accepted
as the correct thesis of World War I responsibility, al
though several of them, notably Nock and Schevill, were
viewed as "radicals" In the years In which their works
were published.
Needless to say, the lines between the moderate and
more unyielding revisionists are not as sharp as this
study might Indicate,

Some of Pa y ’s Interpretations,

which today are considered quite conservative, were, In

1928, viewed as the worst kind of radicalism.

Although

Barns likened the Schevill Interpretation to his own In

1926, from a 1958 perspective, the Intellectual relation
ship between Fay and Schevill seems much closer than that
between Schevill and the rabid revisionists. While the Barnes
"school" may have had many declples In the 1920's, few
scholars can be found today who accept the Barnes thesis
which Is characterized primarily by absolutes, the blacks
and whites so evident In the writings of the earlier stu
dents of responsibility.
Barnes admittedly accepted the Entente version of
war guilt until he was awakened from his "dogmatic slum
bers" by the I92O-I 92I periodical articles by Fay.

"Pro

fessor F a y ’s demolition of the ’Potsdam myth’ was equlva-
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lent to the loss of Santa Claus In my y o u t h . B a r n e s ’
purpose In writing was to show that there was no basis for
the Treaty of Versailles since Article 231 was a farce.
The work also represented a protest against the Dawes
Plan which had merely reduced the penalty on an "innocent
man ,Barne s

predicted the course later taken under

the Lausanne settlement of 1932 when reparations were
terminated, but not, however, for the reason he had sug
gested.
Like his more moderate colleagues, Barnes recognized
that no adequate understanding of the w a r ’s origins could
be limited to a study of the diplomatic exchanges between
June 28 and August 3, 1914»

Furthermore, he argued, a

study of the diplomacy of the generation proceeding the
war would not suffice to solve the problem of responsi
bility.

The biological, psychological, sociological,

economic and political causes of war in general must first
be understood.

Only after one recognized the inherent

qualities in mankind which were conducive to war could
one hope to view the diplomacy of 18?1 through 1914 in a
proper perspective.
Having disposed of these, the "basic" causes of all
wars, the sociologist-historian enumerated the remote

causes of the World War under four broad and interrelated
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Harry E. Barnes, The Genesis of the World War
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1925), p. xii.

^^4Ibid., p. 705,
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headings: economic and commercial rivalry, nationalism
and patriotism, military and naval armaments and the
rival alliance systems.

129

Economically, Great Britain bore the greatest guilt.
The Industrial Revolution hit Germany, and in manufact
uring, commerce and shipping, she challenged the erstwhile
British monopoly and evoked animosities heretofore re
served for France.

Moreover, Germany was gradually replacing

Russia as Great Britain’s greatest competitor in the Wear
East.

The term, ’’guilt," however, was not correctly

applied to either England or Germany in this instance
since the former merely wished to retain the status quo

against the ambitions of the latter.

126

Nationalistically,

none of the European states had a clean bill of health.
Perhaps, Barnes suggested, France was most guilty, but her
guilt was merely one of degree,

Militaristically, Germany

was no better nor worse than the other European powers.
The German Army Bill of 1913# generally credited by Entente
historians with starting the armaments race anew, was, in
fact, implemented sixteen days after the French Army Law
was laid before the Chamber of Deputies.^^7

After 1902

when the Italo-French conversations had the affect of
extricating Italy from the Triple Alliance, the systems
were not equal.

During the decade immediately proceeding

^^^Barnes, The Genesis of..., p.
1 pA
Ibid.. pp. i)-9-5o.

^^7lbid.a p. 66.
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the war, the Triple Alliance had become an "empty shell"
even for purposes of defense, while the Entente grew
steadily stronger.

It was no wonder, Barnes commented,

that Germany balked at suggestions of armament control,
"The encirclement theory had been vindicated."
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Of all possible sources of friction in Europe bet
ween 1871 and 191^, the French desire for revanche was
the most important just ahead of the Russian desire to
control the Straits,

Poincare and other French militarists

exploited the Russian desire for the Straits, equating it
with the French demand for the restoration of Alsace and
Lorraine,

Another source of unrest was the Moroccan

question in which Germany did no more than demand an inter
national conference before the partition of the North

African territory.

The chief significance of the Moroccan

question was that it strengthened the bonds of the Triple
Entente.
Barnes, however, pointed to the Bosnian crisis of

1906 as the most significant of all single events in the
diplomacy which led to the war.

Repudiating her historic

position as protector of the Balkan Slavs, Russia, through
her foreign minister, Isvolsky, proposed to Austria-Hungary

that she annex the Serbian provinces in return for Austria's
support in securing the Straits from the "Sick Man."
Austria forthwith annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, but to
Isvolsky's chagrin, Britain prevented Russia from attaining
^^®Barnes, The Genesis of..., pp. 70-73.
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her end of the bargain.

Isvolsky then secured the appoint

ment as Russian ambassador to Paris where he Immediately
began to "plot" with the French Revanchards led by Poln-

car^.

The French Prime Minister and the Russian Ambassador

designed a joint program through which the Straits might
be secured for Russia, and Alsace and Lorraine would be
restored to France.

The negotiations between Isvolsky

and Poincare, according to Barnes, constituted the most
Important "phase" In the genesis of the World War.^^^
The basic thread connecting the underlying and Im
mediate causes, according to Barnes, was the Russian
desire to control the Straits,

When Isvolsky joined

hands with the "Poincare clique," the peace of Europe
was threatened.

To Insure permanence In his bellicose

foreign policy, Poincare resigned the premiership In
favor of the presidency.

Complete cooperation between

Russia and France was made certain when Delcasse re
placed Georges Louis as French ambassador In St. Peters
burg.

England was brought Into line by the Grey-Chambon

correspondence In I912, and the Anglo-Russlan naval con
vention In 1914 set the stage for the World War.

All

that remained was the casus belli which was quickened
when. In 19l4> the Tsar received the Serbian premier and
encouraged Serbian nationalistic ambitions, promising
Russian aid In the event of war.

The casus belli was

short In coming.
^^'^Barnes, The Genesis of..., pp. 83- 87.

19^
The Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum, accord
ing to Barnes, was drafted in form if not in detail in
the French foreign office.

The reply which ostensibly

accepted the Austrian demands, was in reality an outright
rejection.
action.

Still, Austria was not justified in her rash
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Germany, Barnes admitted, did tender her ally a
"blank check" on July

but it was not a blanket en

dorsement of all future Austrian actions.
only to the Serbian question.

It referred

When Russian mobilization

threatened a general European war, Germany pressed Austria
to reconsider her action, but Berchtold was irreconcilable
until July 31 when it was too late because of the "fatal"
Russian mobilization.

The Austrian war on Serbia did not

necessitate a European war as was so often charged.

On

the contrary, it was the "unjustifiable" Russian inter
vention that produced the wider conflict.
Germany, Barnes maintained, had absolutely nothing
to gain from a European war in 1914j she had everything
to gain from peace.

The Anglo-German rivalry had for the

moment subsided after agreements concluded in 191^-j the
German imperialistic venture in the Balkans, the Bagdad
Railroad, was running smoothly.

The best indication of

German public opinion, the I912 elections, proved that
the German masses were pacifically inclined.
^^^Barnes, The Genesis of,,., pp. 221-23.
^ ^ ^ I b i d , , p.

22ij.,
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year, eight of eleven million votes went to candidates
from the Center, Radical and Social Democratic parties,
each of which was inalterably opposed to militarism.
Although the Kaiser looked upon Serbia as a "band of
132
robbers that must be seized for its crimes,"
the
German ruling classes generally opposed war.

William

II favored only a punitive war against Serbia.

In grant

ing his "blank check," he emulated Poincare’s 1912 and

1914 guarantees to Russia, the difference being that
Poincare gave his later assurances knowing full well a
European war would result,

133

Germany worked steadily for peace throughout the
crisis of I914»

Although mobilization was acknowledged

by Germany, France and Russia as tantamount to a declara
tion of war, Germany did not declare war until forty-eight
hours after what amounted to the Russian declaration.
The Kaiser then tried to localize the conflict in the East
by obtaining French and English neutrality.

Two days

before Germany’s invasion of Belgium, however, France and
Great Britain had promised Russia support.

More than any

other European diplomat, William II endeavored to preserve
the peace in the critical days of July and August, 19l4»^^^
The responsibility for the hasty Russian mobilization
rested on the shoulders of the Tsar, Isvolsky and Sazonov
^^%arnes. The Genesis of..., p. 2^0.

133lbid., p. 222.
13^Ibid., pp. 300-03.
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who, in 1916, admitted that the war was brought on by
France and Russia to humiliate Germany.
The accession of Poincare to the premiership in

1912 had committed France to a program of revenge.

By

October, 1914, England was congenial to the general pro

gram which called, in addition to the restoration of
Alsace and Lorraine, for the seizure of the Saar Basin
and the creation of an independent Rhineland under French
protection.

Because French obligations to Russia under

the Dual Alliance were not even debated in the Chamber
of Deputies before plunging into war, Barnes charged
that responsibility for the French actions rested solely
upon the shoulders of Poincare and a few of his lieutenants
The autocracy over foreign affairs was more stringent in
-1g ^

France than in Russia, Austria or Germany in 19l4«
Although Russian mobilization actually precipitated the
war, France was equally guilty.

She was not bound under

the terms of the Dual Alliance; Russian prior mobilization
released her from her obligations, a fact Poincare kept
carefully hidden from the French masses in 1914.^^^
The key to British action, Barnes maintained, was
the determination to go to war if France did.

Grey him

self was for peace in the "abstract,” but he promised
France and Russia aid and led Germany to believe England
IB^Barnes, The Genesis of..., p. 373»
13&Ibid.. p. 438.

^^?Ibid., p. 441•
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would remain neutral.

Great Britain, by the end of July,

however, refused to pledge her neutrality even in the
face of German promises to keep clear of Belgium and
France,

Since the offer had been made, England was not

bound by her Entente commitments.
except for world opinion.

Belgium was no issue

The case of Grey in IÇl^,

Barnes asserted, was illustrative of the "disasters which
befall a country which entrusts its destiny to a wellmeaning but vacillating and indecisive man and an ignorant,
stupid and naive diplomat."
That the Barnes thesis of war guilt was not accept
able even to some other revisionists was illustrated in
a review of his book by Charles A. Beard, a moderate ex
ponent of the new interpretation.

Accepting Barnes* view

of the remote causes of the war. Beard parted company with
the uncompromising revisionist when the transcendent im
portance of personalities in his work became apparent.
From the incisive Barnes account, Beard wrote, the "Sunday
school theory," that which maintained three innocent boys,
Russia, France and England, were suddenly accosted by
two villains, Germany and Austria, who had long been
plotting cruel deeds in the dark, was "exploded,

No "sane" person could feel the guilt clause of the peace
^^^Barnes, The Genesis of..., pp. 579"80.
^^^Charles A. Beard, "Heroes and Villians of the
War,"Review of The Genesis of the World War, by Harry
Elmer Barnes, Current History, XXIV, No, 5 (August,
1926), 733.
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treaty was just.

Beyond that, all was debatable,

"If

there is peril in the attempt to enforce the Versailles
theory of responsibility...there is equal danger in attempt
ing to whitewash the German ruling classes.
From the materials on hand in 1926, Beard wrote that
it was clear that the German government, egged on by the
Kaiser, a "Divine Right" monarch angry over the death of
a member of the Hapsburg ruling house, granted Austria a
"blank check,"

That Entente politicians refused oppor

tunities by which peace might have been maintained was
true, but the evidence did not substantiate Barnes’ con
tention that the attitude of the German governing class
mal
iterlally advanced the cause of peace In
Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow were no better nor worse
than Poincare, Grey or Sazonov.

Barnes' effort to con

vince Americans that European quarrels should be viewed
with open eyes was commendable, but "to shift heroes and
villains only confuses the issue.
In a review entitled "Menckenized History," Barnes
was taken to task for succumbing to the temptation to
"debunk" simply because that was the literary vogue.
Vociferous and sweeping denunciations of
existing beliefs, customs, standards and insti
tutions is the current mode, and 'revisionism'
is merely one of its phases...Never before has
the fretful energy of the slam-bang and slap^^^Beard, Current History, XXIV, No. 5s 733»
l^^lbid., p. 73l|.
ll(.2ibid,, p. 735.
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dash radicals been so amply rewarded.
The only value of the book, according to the re
viewer, was that It might stir some historians out of
complacency so that the problem of war responsibility
might be considered by someone other than a "revision
ist.”

The book, which was not the Intended "bombshell"

but a "dud," was not history.

It was a violent harangue

to a jury which was asked to shift the blame from the
defendants to the accusers,

Barnes, the reviewer charged,

was overladen with his material and could not Intelll]li%
gently use It.
In 1927, Barnes maintained that the revisionist
view had become thoroughly vindicated, particularly with
respect to the guilt of France, Russia and Serbia.

While

the case against those powers was materially strengthened,
Barnes contended that the case against the Dual Monarchy
had become less strong.

Austria faced three alterna

tives In 191^: acquiescence In gradual extinction, sec
uring Serbian submission to the ultimatum or war against
Serbia,

The most damaging fact to the Entente thesis

of Austrian war guilt to come to light since the pub
lication of The Genesis of the World War, Barnes maintained,
was proof of the Austrian promise to Russia to refrain
from dismembering Serbia permanently, a fact Sazonov
j, Ghent, "Menckenized History," Review of
The Genesis of the World War, by H. E. Barnes, The Outlook,
GXLIII, No. 1 (June 23, I92 6 ), 286.

l^^Ibld., p. 287.
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carefully concealed from St, Petersburg and Paris,
Barnes abandoned the position he had assumed in a IÇSij.
periodical article wherein he placed Austria first in
relative responsibility.

In 1927* Austria was fourth

after Serbia, Russia and France in that order.
After it became evident that Germany could no longer
be considered solely guilty of precipitating the war,
Barnes wrote, the defenders of the wartime verdict aban
doned their defense of Article 231 and based their indict
ment on the charge that Germany was principally respon
sible for creating the conditions in which the war arose
in 1914*

Germany was in no way exonerated from her share

of the blame in creating the fundamental causes, but far
from first in relative responsibility, Barnes argued, she
stood with England as least g u i l t y . R u s s i a was the
one great power immediately responsible for the war.

Her

decision for mobilization was made July 24, a full three
days before the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia,
In spite of her precipitate mobilization, Russia’s posi
tion might have been defensible had h e r ’a been an "honor
able cause," but it was not unless the forcible seizure
of the Straits was considered honorable,
^^^Harry E, Barnes, "A Revised Verdict on the Guilt
of Nations for the World War," Current History, XXVI,
No. S (August, 1927), 684-85.
^^^See Harry E. Barnes, "Assessing the Blame for
the World War," Current History, XX, No. 2 (May, 1924),
171-95.
^^^Barnes, Current History, XXVI, No. 5, 685.
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Barnes* 1Ç27 opinion of Grey was somewhat Improved over
that expressed in his book a year earlier.

Neither was

the British Foreign Minister the knight in shining armor
portrayed by Schmitt nor the Machiavelli claimed by the
most Anglophobe historians.

Grey and his advisors were

constant sources of encouragement to the French and
Russians, although "probably inadvertently."^^®

If it

was in the British national interest to enter the con
flict on the Entente side, the British documents proved
that Grey and company played their cards with great skill.
If, on the other hand, they wished to avoid war, the Eng
lish diplomats behaved with "the utmost--even criminal'—
stupidity."

Had Grey chosen to declare England's position

publically, there would probably not have been a war.^^^
Serbia, France and Russia, Barnes asserted, were the only
states that desired a general European war; Austria wished
only a punitive war; Italy, England and Germany opposed
any kind of conflict, and after July 26 , IÇl^, "Germany
withdrew her support from Austria.
Europe, Barnes maintained in 1927, was still gov
erned by wartime prejudices and hatreds.

It was, he

noted, somewhat incongruous to attempt the erection of
Locarno on the foundations of Versailles.

^^®Barnes, Current History, XXVI, No.

The chief

693-94»

^^^Harry E. Barnes, "England Arraigns Herself,"
The Nation, GXXV, No. 324 (August 17 , 1927 ), I63.
^^^Barnes, Current History, XXVI, No. 5» 697*
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obstacles to peace, as he prophetically viewed them in

1927, were the South Tyrol, Macedonia, the Polish Corridor,
Silesia, Bessarbia, a dismembered Hungary, the forbidden
Austro-German customs union and an outlawed Russia, all
l*7l
"products of a peace treaty founded on flagrant lies." ^
Barnes was not the sole exponent of the uncompromising
revisionist position, although he was the most productive.
Perhaps as vocal in his defense of Germany was Francis
Neilson, an English editor transplanted on American shores.
As early as 1923, Neilson urged that scholars in all
nations search deep into the workings of the pre-war
European system to discover what it was that made it
possible for "ministers and diplomats to wreck a con
tinent and destroy its y o u t h . A t

the start of the

war, Neilson noted, the American people had been rela

tively open-minded concerning the causes of the war.
The change had been a direct result of the many-sided
efforts of the war propagandists to instill in the Am
erican mind one "fact"--sole German war guilt.
Russia, Neilson contended, was immediately respon
sible for the war.

No matter how much Austria was to

blame for her obstinacy in refusing to accept the Serbian
reply to her ultimatum, Russian intervention rendered
any attempt at peaceful solution impossible.

In the

^^^Barnes, Current History, XXVI, No. 5, 697-98.
^^^Prancis Neilson, Duty to Civilization (New York:
B. W, Huebsch, I923), pp. 11-12.
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end, after Austria accepted the proposal for mediation,
it was Russia, not Germany, that drew England, France
and Belgium into the conflict.

1S3

Neilson preached the necessity of reopening the
question of war guilt.

Bismark and Gladstone, he asserted,

had agreed that the seizure of Alsace and Lorraine hy
Germany in I 87I was detrimental to the peace of Europe.
The military party in Prussia was responsible for the
terms of I 87I, and the Entente militarists were respon
sible for the terms of 19ll|.

"If the peace of I 87I was

a danger to Europe, what sort of danger," Neilson asked,
"is the Peace of Paris?"

The only way another European

conflagration could be avoided was for the Entente nations
to admit their "error" and draft a new peace treaty— one
lEli
without a guilt clause, ^
Reviewing the Gooch-Temperley collection of British
documents then being published, William L. Langer of
Clark University added his voice to those of the uncom
promising revisionists charging France with responsibil
ity.

The British documents, he asserted, strengthened

earlier suspicions of Poincare and pointed to his actions
as the least savory of any of the principal igi^ European
statesmen.
The French President's rejection of Grey's proposal
for "direct conversations" between St. Petersburg and
^•^^Neilson, pp. 83-87'
^^^Ibid, , pp. Illj.-15.
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Vienna as '’dangerous” was, according to Langer, at the
root of the problem»

Poincare advocated outside Inter

vention, fashioning himself from the very outset the
champion of Entente solidarity.
the need to keep Sazonov firm.

He repeatedly expressed
The attitude adopted by

Poincare and, at his behest, Sazonov was that Russia could
not back down.

France's policy. Langer asserted, was

cleverly and tactfully designed to make a good Impression
at home and, above all. In England.

France took her stand

at the outset and held to It consistently throughout.
Her policy left the Central Powers only two alternatlves-humiliation or war.
As Illustrated above, all of the post-1920 American
scholars concerned with war responsibility were not re
visionists.

In the early 1920's, In fact, the diplo

matic evidence to support such a position was relatively
meagre.

Pay's 1920-1921 articles In the American His

torical Review and the archival revelations flooding
Europe convinced Increasing numbers of American histor
ians that the blacks and #iltes painted by the Entente
apologists were at best greys, but still few Americans
were willing to attack the foundation of the Versailles
Treaty— the war guilt clause.

In the early 1920 's, a few

writers, notably journalists like Nock and Neilson, sounded
the note upon which many professional historians soon
l^^willlam L. Langer, "French Policy In I91I4.,"
Saturday Review of Literature, III, No. Ï4.O (April
30, 1927), 7Ü1-Ü 2 .
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wrote.

As the documentary evidence concerning the origins

of the war and memoirs of the wartime statesmen became
more profuse, the number propounding a revisionist thesis
grew proportionately until by the mid- 1930's, the "mod
erates," the most notable of whom was Fay, claimed a major
ity of American historians as followers.
There were some who ignored the latest documentary
evidence, labelling it German or Bolshevik propaganda,
and continued to write on the basis of the evidence offered
in the wartime belligerent apologies.

As late as 1930,

it was evident with the appearance of Schmitt's two volume
work on the war's background that an interpretation other
than revisionist might be gleaned from the post-war dis
closures.

Schmitt was joined by Seymour, Plorinsky and

others who cited the latest findings in support of the
antithesis of the revisionist position.
That the moderate revisionist view of the war's
origins had gained the upper hand by the 1930's was evi
denced by its espousal by most general historians con
cerned with the period.

Of these, Schevill, whose work

was originally published in the 1920's and revised in
each succeeding decade, Walter Langsam and Erik Achorn
of the 1930's and Black and Helmreich of the 19^0's
have been examined and found to adhere generally to
the moderate revisionist theory of World War I respon
sibility.

CONCLUSION

In the United States, the controversy over war res
ponsibility passed through four loosely-defined phases.
The first phase witnessed the circulation of the "colored
books" and secondary sources authored by Europeans designed
to sway American opinion in favor of one side or the other.
The ideas embodied in the initial belligerent apologies
had been current among Europeans for several decades and
were similar to the suspicions that gave birth to the
"war scares" of

1875

and

1877.

To the French mind, German

militarism, personified in von Moltke and William II, was
bent on conquering the world as it had Alsace and Lorraine.
In England, Germany was feared as a colonial and economic
rival and recognized relatively early as a power which,
if left alone, might challenge the virtual British monopoly
in the Near East and on the high seas.

To Russian statesmen

after I908, Germany was seen as the driving force behind
Austrian moves in the Balkans where a conflict with PanSlavism was imminent.

In each of the early Entente apolo

gies, Germany played the villain's role.
The German defense, on the other hand, was not dir
ected at any one of the Allied powers but at all three
collectively.

The fear of revanche appeared vindicated

by the Boulanger crisis in France.

When Russia shifted

her interests to the Balkans and the Near East after her
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humiliating defeat by Japan, concern was expressed in some
German quarters lest all Europe fall under the domination
of the Slavic hordes.

After consummation of the Entente

Cordiale, Germany feared Great Britain, but with the death
of the Germanophobe, Edward VII, and the agreement delim
iting spheres in the Near East, Anglo-German tensions
were ostensibly eased, and officials felt Great Britain
might remain neutral in any future war.

Nevertheless

in the hastily-prepared early statements, German apolo
gists, for want of a better scapegoat, exploited the
"encirclement theory" to exonerate Germany of the blame
for causing the war.

The motivations for the Entente

actions were the French desire for revenge, Russian aggres
sive aims in the Near East and English envy of German
commercial prowess.
In the second phase of the controversy, the basic
arguments were so contorted and exaggerated that each
side was charged with all conceivable barbarities.

His

torians the world over had lost the power to reason out
the war’s origins.

From l^l4 through 1920, American war

guilt scholars for a number of reasons seconded almost
unanimously the official Entente theory of responsibility.
Because of a similar cultural background and a decided
paucity of reliable information by which both sides of the
story might be told, British propaganda found a receptive
audience in the United States, and even before the American
entry in I917, the efforts of American historians were
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hardly in keeping with the presidential proclamation of
neutrality.

With American implication in "Europe’s War,"

a concerted drive was launched to mold dissident groups
into a conforming public amenable to a successful pro
secution of the war.

To the historian under the intel

lectual mobilization fell the task of revising traditional
historical views so that the Allies might appear in the
most favorable light possible.

To this end, the American

historical profession, almost to a man, lent its services.
Scholars, caught in the mass hysteria of war, were
guilty of acknowledging all sorts of absurdities which,
in retrospect, appear incredible.

Germany, as in the

early Allied apologies, played the part of the villain.
She had clandestinely plotted the war to achieve her
diabolical ends without regard for her neighbors in the
European family.

Austria was a "cat’s paw" of Pan-Ger

manism whose ultimate goal was the conquest of the world.
The plan by which that goal was to be realized was devised
by the Kaiser and his henchmen at Potsdam on July 5»19l4*
This was the basic American text, although some of the more
talented of the Entente mythologists added a few novel
twists.

When the fabrications of the wartime students of

responsibility were given legal sanction at Versailles,
"asininity triumphed."^
It was the unprecedented rapidity with which the
^Clarence W. Alvord, "Historical Science and the
War Guilt," The American Mercury, XI, No. lj.3 (July, I927),
324.
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archives of first Russia, Austria and Germany and later
France and Great Britain were opened that caused the
shift in historical opinion.

The opening of the European

repositories and seven years of exhaustive scholarship
therein constituted a third phase, an exploratory period,
in the war guilt debate.

It prepared the way for the

fourth phase where scholars could presumably approach the

problem free from external pressures.

Seldom in the annals

of historiography had there been so rapid and complete a
reversal in historical consensus as that which followed
the opening of the European archives.

A world-wide phenom

enon, it was particularly apparent in the United States
where, during the war, there had been such conformity of
opinion concerning war responsibility.
After 1920, the lines were drawn between the several
"schools" of American students of the war's origins.

The

first included those who closed their eyes to the recent
revelations, conveniently branding them Bolshevik or Ger
man propaganda.

A second group included those who cited

the latest evidence but used it to substantiate the I919
version of responsibility.

The third category encompassed

the revisionist#— those who felt the Central Powers had been
wronged by the guilty verdict handed down by the victors
at Versailles.

To these historians, the most pressing

problem facing civilization was the revision of the
"Carthaginian Treaty" to which Germany's signature had
been extorted at the point of a bayonet.

The American
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exponents of the new interpretation logically fell into
two sub-divisions: the "moderates" who felt all of the
belligerents were responsible for the war, and the un
compromising revisionists who maintained that the Central
Powers were innocent in l^l^.
In contrast to the earlier period of the war guilt
controversy, the origins of the war began to be considered
in the light of historical trends rather than through the
personality quirks of individual statesmen.

Furthermore,

an understanding of the "Twelve Days," was no longer ade
quate if one wished to fathom the real reasons for the
war.

Hundreds--indeed thousands--of forces had operated

on those twelve days which scholars had examined minutely
to solve a problem the answer to which lay hidden in the
past.

As one writer so aptly put it, "In those days, it

was not the living, but the all-powerful generations of
the dead who acted."
Although there was a commendable trend toward con
sideration of fundamental causes before assessing res
ponsibility for the war, the criticisms directed at the
early war guilt scholars are often equally applicable to
later students of the subject.

It has been noted above

that early American scholars of the war's beginnings were
motivated largely by national, racial or institutional
biases rather than by a sincere desire to tell the truth.
After 1917, patriotic responsibilities overshadowed in-

2
Alvord, The American Mercury, XI, No. ij.3, 326.
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tellectual responsibilities and often debased the end
products of American historians.

Distorted Judgments were

the rule among early students of war origins.

Most of them

were guilty of ascertaining responsibility before discern
ing the facts.

In the case of the earlier students of the

subject, reliable documentary evidence was scarce enough
that an interpretation holding Germany solely guilty for
causing the war might be condoned.

For many of the later American historians, however.
Justification for the position they assumed is more diffi
cult to find.

The post-war students in many instances

were as unbalanced as had been their predecessors.

No

longer did mere words suffice as evidence as was illust
rated by the varying interpretations assigned to identical
documents.

Many of the scholars publishing after I920

were guilty of omitting whatever evidence might tend to
refute their general thesis.

To Barnes, Germany was

innocent, and the most important event underlying the
war was the Buchlau conversations.

On the other hand,

Schmitt, who purported to examine all of the evidence
bearing on the outbreak of the war and who felt that
Germany was guilty on the basis of that evidence, com
pletely ignored the Isvolsky-Aehrenthal talks in his work.
With such contradictions apparent in the works of scholarly
writers, it was small wonder that the "pseudo-scientific"
dispute was deemed as "useful to society as English fox
hunting."3

Although both Barnes and Schmitt paid lip

^Alvord, The American Mercury, XI, No, k.3, 32k*
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service to the distinction originally made by Thucydides
in his history of the Peloponnesian Wars, neither of them
"practiced what he preached."

Of a total of

737

pages in

his volume on war guilt, Barnes devoted exactly eightyseven to what might be termed remote causes.

Schmitt, for

all practical purposes, wrote off the fundamental causes
in practice.

Of the three outstanding American post-war

scholars, only Pay accorded to underlying causes in pra
ctice the importance all three acknowledged in theory.
Nearly all of those who wrote on war responsibility
after 1920, like their wartime colleagues, adopted a point
of view before beginning their investigation.

Vfith Schmitt,

it was the conviction that the Versailles version of re
sponsibility was just, and he ignored those facts that
might tend to refute that allegation.

To Barnes, Article

231 was an anathema, and the assertion of German innocence
was the overriding characteristic of his contributions to
the great debate.

Barnes, however, did not attack the

philosophy behind the treaty as did Fay.

It was German

guilt, not "sole guilt" that bothered Barnes.

Having

cleared Germany to his own satisfaction, he merely attached
the guilty appelation to another party.

As Charles A.

Beard commented, he merely shifted villains.

Fay, on the

other hand, argued in terms of "relative responsibility,"
not "guilt," a term which connoted a prior inclination.
He disavowed attempts by any scholar to attach the "guilt"
to any one nation or man.

Moreover, he maintained that
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if it could be scientifically apportioned, the degree of
guilt would be different for the fundamental causes from
the immediate causes.

To Fay, there was no war "guilt."

The conflict was a manifestation of human society in action.
There was no more guilt involved in causing the war than
in any other aspect of a changing civilization.
Both the wartime and post-war students of the war's
origins were equally guilty of using vague terms without
bothering to define them.

For example, there were few #io

suggested what was meant by militarism, navalism, PanGermanism, Pan-Slavism, hegemony or encirclement.

Re

sponsibility or guilt meant very little if the scholar
did not reveal the context in which he used the term.
If the jargon used by the students of war responsibility
had been adequately defined, the suspicion that many of
the "scholarly" accounts would break down is probably wellfounded.
Besides the subjectivity that permeated the dis
cussion of the events leading to the war, historians gen
erally insisted upon passing moral judgments on the men
whom they studied.

If wartime scholars attributed incred

ible characteristics to the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg,
later historians were as guilty in their discussions of

Sazonov, Isvolsky, Poincare and Grey.

Had both the early

and later writers given human fallibility more consid
eration in their treatments of the war's beginnings, the
end product would have been more palatable.

Blundering
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was a better explanation for the war in 191^ than scheming.
By few historians was there a real effort to discover the
ideas that prevailed in that fateful summer.

Instead,

scholars tried to generalize on the actions of individual
statesmen through an idea attributed collectively to his
predecessors.

In other words, the events of I914 were

viewed by wartime and post-war scholars alike as one aspect
of an infinitely larger picture.

If the earlier writers

on war responsibility read the expansionist theories of
Treitschke and Bernhardi and applied them to explain the
actions of German officials in 191^, later scholars, par
ticularly the uncompromising revisionists, viewed the
events leading up to the war as a part of a long range
"plot."

It was easy and apparently fruitful to take the

French idea of revanche or the traditional Russian desire
for control of the Straits and apply them as the motiva
ting factors behind the actions of the two Entente powers.
If one reads a pro-German historian, he is likely
to be impressed with the importance of "Gallic excita
bility" in assessing the responsibility for the war.

On

the other hand, by a pro-Entente scholar one can expect
"Prussian militarism," "Junkerdom" or Pan-Germanism to be
accorded a position of predominant importance.

The gen

eralizations applied to national character by most students
of the war’s origins, although they might be substantiated
in isolated instances, very simply do not stand up to
critical analysis.

Traditional historical methodology
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was cast out of the window by many learned scholars because
the actions of Individuals in pre-l^l^ Europe were more
easily explained by vague and meaningless "national char
acteristics."

Until 1928, there was a decided need for

the reinstitution of traditional historical methodology
to discover the real causes of the war.

That need was

satisfied in the United States by Fay, who, to all outward
appearances, approached the problem of responsibility with
an open mind and a sincere desire to discover the truth.
His efforts performed in the United States the same service
as those of Gooch in England, Renouvin in France and
Albertini in Italy,
Whether the Barnes, Fay or Schmitt interpretation of
the war's origins is the proper one is still debated in
some quarters, although P a y ’s "divided responsibility"
thesis has been accepted generally by professional his
torians.

Perhaps the most fruitful and lasting result of

the post-war controversy was the final and complete repudi
ation of the war-time theories of responsibility which
rested largely upon emotional conjecture, not historical
fact.
The contradictory conclusions arrived at by the later
students of the subject can be attributed to a number of
reasons.

Because the proliferation of new evidence con

tinued almost until the outbreak of World War II, many
of the American scholars of responsibility, the majority
of whom published during the 1920's, were unable to take
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advantage of the later releases.

Furthermore, some scholars,

even as late as the 1930's, found it extremely difficult
to divest themselves of partisanship and drew conclusions
which were not warranted by the facts.
At any rate, it is generally agreed by the world’s
historians that the guilt for World War I can no longer
be laid exclusively at the door of Germany or any other
nation for that matter.

Revisionism, failed of its ultimate

goal--a de jure recognition by the architects of Versailles

of their ’'error’’--but it succeeded in convincing the world’s
scholars that no one nation could be saddled with responsi
bility for the ’’Great War.”
The triumph of National Socialism in Germany and
World War II gave rise to a cry for reconsideration of
the revisionist position.

In some historical circles--

few to be sure since most scholars had learned a lesson
from World War I— a mild reaction against the revisionist
theory of responsibility manifested itself.

Again the

Versailles version of guilt appeared to answer current
problems, and scholars in various nations announced the
discovery of new, incriminating evidence vindicating the

1919 verdict.

That evidence has not been forthcoming.

The thorough-going publication of the French documents,
the completion of the British collection in I938 and other
recent revelations have done nothing to alter the view that
the moderate revisionist view is the proper interpretation
of the w a r ’s origins.

The most recent critical analyses
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of the-years leading to the conflict bear out F a y ’s asser
tion that the only view worthy of the scholar is that which
holds all of the major European powers accountable for
World War
^See Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War.
3 vols. Translated and edited by Isabella M.
Massey. London; Oxford University Press, 1952-57»
Albertini, an Italian scholar, tended toward the
Schmitt view that Germany was perhaps more responsi
ble for the European War than the other powers, but
that each of the belligerents because of misunder
standings, misplaced suspicions, inadvertent blunders
or reluctance to act when action was necessary bore
some measure of responsibility. Unfortunately, Alber
tini ’s untimely death prevented his writing the last
chapter to his three volumes which was to have been
devoted to assessment of relative responsibility.
His thesis, however, agrees with that of Pay that
no power deliberately willed the war, but that all,
in a greater or lesser degree, contributed to it.
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